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This thesis is a collection of five self-standing articles dealing with different issues relating
to representationalism and relationalism in contemporary philosophy of perception and con-
temporary philosophy of memory. The main goal is to motivate a hybrid approach, where
insights from representationalism and relationalism are reconciled, to current debates in
both domains. The thesis is divided in two parts. Part I, which deals with perception, starts
by seeking alternative relational views of perception by relying on ideas from classical
pragmatism. These attempts further result in the development of a hybrid theory of per-
ception, grounded on the pragmatist theory of perception offered by Charles Peirce, that is
more sympathetic to “austere” versions of relationalism. Part II, which deals with memory,
starts by exploring the prospects of representationalism and relationalism to account for the
objects of memory and the objects of episodic hypothetical thought. Relational accounts
are further explored in this context for, despite their historical importance, they have been
unpopular recently due to the difficulty they face in dealing with memory errors. Finally, as
a positive proposal, I offer a hybrid theory of memory that is influenced by hybrid theories
of perception. Besides calling the attention of philosophers of memory to the importance
of taking relationalism seriously, this hybrid theory provides a novel theoretical framework
for contemporary philosophers of memory.
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This thesis explores the disputes between representationalist and relationalist views of per-
ception and memory in contemporary philosophy of perception and philosophy of memory.
The main goal is to motivate a hybrid approach, where insights from representationalism
and relationalism are reconciled, to current debates in the area.
As a first introductory step to this project, I should say a few words about the nature
of the chapters and the structure of the thesis. In terms of structure, the thesis is organized
as a collection of publishable papers. It is composed of five self-standing articles and an
appendix corresponding to a short discussion article. The articles were produced with the
purpose of being submitted to specialist journals. Three of them have been accepted for
publication (Chapters 2, 3 and 5, plus the discussion article in the Appendix A), one of them
is under review (Chapter 4), and one of them is currently in the process of being revised
for resubmission (Chapter 1). Since they are self-standing pieces of work, the issue of how
they fit together to compose a PhD dissertation becomes central. One natural strategy to
address this would be to re-write the chapters and try to arrange the seemingly unrelated
pieces in a way that would produce a convincing narrative addressing a certain problem or
question. I decided not to pursue this strategy here.
The main reason for not pursuing it is that doing so would produce an artificial and inac-
curate picture of how my thinking about the relevant issues evolved during my PhD. As will
become clear later, because the chapters are self-standing pieces, the formulation of some
ideas at different chapters varies, sometimes significantly, thus resulting in some theoretical
conflicts. While, as a general rule, avoiding conflicts is a desirable thing, not all conflicts
are harmful to a project. This is because the development of an idea in different contexts,
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even when the idea itself is presented in conflicting ways, can do more to clarify its implica-
tions than an overly rigorous formulation that is context-insensitive. This capacity to apply
the same or similar ideas in different contexts, and hence to enhance my understanding of
them, was crucial to the completion of this project. Thus, instead of working towards a
unified project with a definite purpose in mind, my efforts have been dedicated to exploring
the implications of broadly related ideas to various issues in the philosophy of perception
and the philosophy of memory.
A second and less central reason for not pursuing the strategy above is practical. Be-
cause more than half of the chapters have been accepted for publication, making changes to
them would alter their content, which could create potential conflicts between the versions
composing the thesis and the published versions. Since the published versions are more
likely to have a far reach, and are thus bound to be treated as the “official” discussion of
the topic by an author, I thought that having an accurate representation of them in the thesis
would diminish the risks of creating conflicts or misrepresentations.
Refraining from pursuing the initial strategy does not mean, however, that no attempt
has been made to provide a coherent overall picture of the thesis. Instead of rewriting
the chapters, I opted for the inclusion of introductory sections at the beginning of each of
them, where I discuss the relationship of the chapter in question with one or more of the
other chapters. Such introductions include discussions of how common notions used in
the chapters are understood and/or formulated differently, how my thinking about a cer-
tain topic developed, and the reasons for certain argumentative moves that, out of context,
would seem unmotivated or odd. The introductions are followed by short outlines provid-
ing overviews of the structure of the chapters. On top of chapter introductions and outlines,
I have also included this fairly long introduction to the thesis, which offers a preliminary
discussion of most of the problems that will be discussed later in the chapters, along with
some discussion about how I have approached those topics more recently. The thesis is
finished with a Conclusion making some final remarks as to how the chapters contribute to
achieving the overall goal of the thesis.
In sum, by pointing these things out, I hope to make explicit that this thesis is not meant
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to be read as a book-like project, but rather as a collection of philosophical essays on topics
that are broadly related. The broad topic uniting those essays is, as the title of the thesis
suggests, the dispute between representationalism and relationalism in perception and in
memory. In an attempt to situate most of the questions that will appear later in the chapters,
the next section of this Introduction will discuss indirect and direct realism, the historical
predecessors of representationalism and relationalism,1 and some problems and advantages
of each of those views. After contextualizing the dispute, I move on to consider how it
unfolded in the contemporary debate about perception and about memory. I then introduce
hybrid views of perception and discuss how they provide an insightful way to think about
representationalism and relationalism not only in perception, but in memory too. Finally,
the last part of the introduction offers a brief summary of each chapter and outlines the
structure of the thesis in more detail.
1. Indirect and direct realism
Traditionally, indirect realism is the view that the objects of perception and memory are
mental representations of the real world — in particular, in the case of perception, what is
represented are things in the environment, and in the case of memory, what is represented
are the past things or events. For traditional indirect realists, our access to the world is
indirect, in the sense that it is mediated by mental representations. Among defenders of
indirect realism are philosophers such as the early empiricists (e.g., Hume 2011; Locke
1975) and early twentieth century sense-data theorists (e.g., Russell 1912; Broad 1925;
Ayer 1956). Traditional versions of direct realism are, in contrast, the views according to
which perceiving and remembering involve being directly related to the real world — i.e.,
in the case of perception, being related to the objects residing in the environment, and in
the case of memory, being related to the past things or events themselves. For traditional
direct realists, thus, our access to the real world is unmediated. Proponents of direct realism
include philosophers such as Reid (2000), Laird (1920), and John Cook Wilson (1926).
1I want to acknowledge here that this is a controversial claim, especially for philosophers of perception.




The traditional dispute between direct and indirect realists revolves around two related,
but importantly distinct, questions about perception and memory. The first is the question
of the objects of perception: When one perceives something, what is the object of one’s
perceptual experience? The second is the question of the objects of memory: When one
remembers something, what is the object of one’s memory?2 Depending on how one an-
swers these questions, different, and often incompatible, pictures of the epistemology and
the metaphysics of perception and memory will emerge.
Consider, for example, the questions of how we know something about the environment
based on our perceptual experiences and how we know something about the past based on
our memories. Call this the knowledge problem. Direct realism offers a neat explanation
of how this is possible. In the case of perception, it is argued that perceptual experiences
can ground our knowledge of the world because they make us directly related to what is
out there in the world. Similarly, in the case of memory, direct realists say that we know
things about the past because, when we remember, we stand in a direct relationship to the
past events themselves. Because the relationship is direct, the objects in the world and
the past events are simply presented to us; there are no intermediaries that can deviate, or
contaminate, our access to those things. Indirect realists, in contrast, face difficulties to
provide simple answers to these questions. The reason is that, both in perception and in
memory, our access to the world is dependent on our relation to mental representations of,
respectively, the objects in the environment and the past events. Because the relationship
between representations, on the one hand, and the worldly objects and the past events, on
the other hand, is often contingent, there is no guarantee that one’s mental representation of
the environment or of the past has anything in common with how the environment actually
is, or with how the past was. Therefore, the indirect realist needs to provide an additional
explanation of how, in being related to mental representations, we can form knowledge
about reality.
While direct realism provides a neat account of the relationship between perception,
2Because the focus of my discussion will be memory of events, or what psychologists call episodic mem-
ory (see Tulving 1972, 2002), whenever I use the term “memory” without any further qualification, I will be
referring to episodic memory.
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memory, and the knowledge formed on their basis, it faces important difficulties to explain
the possibility, and indeed the actual occurrence, of perceptual and memory errors. Call
this the error problem. Perception and memory are about the real world, but it is not always
the case that what we perceive, or that what we remember, corresponds to how the world
actually is or was. It is well-known, both from common sense and from empirical research,
that it is not uncommon for us to perceive and remember things erroneously — for exam-
ple, when a straight stick that is half-submerged in water appears bent to me, or when I
remember there being a clown at my last birthday party when it is false that there was one
— or even for us to perceive and remember things that are not there, or that did not occur
— e.g., seeing a spider on the wall when there is no such spider, or remembering having
a birthday party ten years ago where there was no such party. On the face of such occur-
rences, it is not clear how they can be explained in a direct realist framework. For direct
realists, perception and memory consist of direct relations to the things that are perceived
and remembered, but if those things do not exist, it is hard to see how we could possibly
have perceptual experiences or memories of them. Indirect realism deals with this question
in a simple and coherent way. It explains the occurrence of error in terms of the presence of
mental representations that, despite appearing to be about the real world, fail to be satisfied
by, or to be related to, things that exist. In this sense, the problematic aspect of indirect
realism discussed above, namely, that representations do not necessarily correspond to how
the world is, becomes a strength of the view when it comes to explaining the occurrence of
error.
A third issue, which has received a lot of attention in the contemporary literature, con-
cerns the phenomenal character of, or to how things appear to us in, perception and memory.
Call this the phenomenology problem. When we perceive something, or when we remem-
ber an event, it seems to us that we are perceiving the thing itself, or remembering the event
itself. In other words, from a first-person point of view, perception and memory seem to
put us in direct contact with the things or events that are perceived and remembered. This
seems to lend support to direct realist views, as for indirect realists, the objects of percep-
tion and memory are mental representations, and it certainly does not seem to us that we are
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perceiving or remembering representations, but instead the things themselves. The advan-
tage of the direct realist is only apparent, though. When we take the occurrence of errors
into account, direct realism simply fails to provide a satisfactory account of the phenom-
enal character of those mental states. Perceptual and memory errors are not perceived or
remembered as such; usually, when we perceive or remember erroneously, it still seems to
us that we are perceiving and remembering real things. Thus, finding out that we are not
perceiving or remembering correctly involves an additional step, which often has to do with
the consideration of those mental states in the context of some background knowledge of
the world, or even with interacting with the relevant people who are or were also related to
the relevant objects and events. The problem that arises for the direct realist is, therefore,
that one can have the relevant experiences of objects and events even when there are no
such objects and events. This undermines the initial suggestion that being directly related
to objects and events explains the appearance of directness of perception and of memory.
The discussion above describes some epistemological, metaphysical, and phenomeno-
logical problems that arise in the context of the dispute between direct and indirect realism.
Despite the initial questions motivating these approaches to perception and memory being
very similar, the way the literature on perception and memory developed in recent decades
has been different. On the one hand, philosophers of perception have moved away from
discussions focused solely on the question of the objects of perception, to more general
discussions about issues pertaining to the metaphysical and phenomenological aspects of
perception. On the other hand, philosophers of memory have maintained the traditional
framework of direct and indirect realism, only starting to discuss the metaphysics and the
phenomenology of memory more systematically in the past couple of decades.
The goal of this thesis is to explore the disagreement between the contemporary de-
scendants of indirect and direct realism, the views which have been called, respectively,
representationalism and relationalism, and to propose a reconciliation of those views with
the purpose of advancing the debates in perception and memory.3 For the rest of this in-
3I should note that my discussion will be focused on a set of specific views that have been developed in
the context of debates regarding perception in the past few years in the subfield of philosophy of perception.
As such, I will follow the standard way to characterize the main views being discussed in the debate. By
clarifying this point, I want to make it explicit that I do not take this way of “mapping” the terrain to be
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troduction, I will explore how the traditional dispute between direct and indirect realism
relates to ongoing disputes in the philosophy of perception and in the philosophy of mem-
ory.4 Afterwards, I will move on to consider hybrid views that attempt to reconcile the
contemporary versions of those views. In doing so, I will set the stage for the development
of the main argument of the thesis, which is that hybrid accounts of both perception and
memory should be preferred.
2. Perception
In the contemporary perception literature, it has been a commonplace to assume that de-
bates about perception have moved away from discussions about the (in)directness of per-
ception to broader discussions about the nature of perception. The questions moving these
discussions have to do not only with the epistemology of perception, but also with the meta-
physics and the phenomenology of perception. The main alternatives currently on the table
to answer these questions are representationalism and relationalism.
2.1 Representationalism
Representationalism is the view that, at the most fundamental level, perception is a form of
intentionality — which is why the view is also sometimes called intentionalism (e.g., Searle
1983; Byrne 2001; see also Crane and French 2017) — for perception represents the world
as being a certain way similarly to other mental states that are described in intentional terms,
such as beliefs and desires. The characterization of perception in terms of intentionality has
led philosophers to claim that representationalism can hold on to a form of direct realism.
This is because, according to its proponents, representationalism eliminates the “veil of
perception” standing in between the mind and the world, which has been the source of
the problems raised for indirect realism. And this is possible because, following Brentano
exhaustive, in the sense that some theories of perception, especially those that have not been developed in the
context of this debate, might not be appropriately represented.
4For a more detailed discussion of this dispute and its implications for contemporary debates about per-
ception, see Fish (2010) and Crane and French (2017). While there are no contemporary systematic reviews
of the discussion in memory, see Bernecker (2008, chs. 5 and 6), Senor (2014, Sect. 1), and Michaelian and
Sutton (2017, Sect. 5) for some useful discussion.
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(1973), representationalists say that representing an object O as being F does not imply that
there is an object O that is F which is the object of awareness of perception. The objects of
perception are, instead, the real objects themselves, and we become aware of those objects
when the content of our perceptual experiences is satisfied by the relevant state of affairs
in the world. However, when this does not happen, it is not the case that we are aware
of non-material or non-existent things, as sense-data theorists suppose (e.g., Russell 1912;
Broad 1925; Ayer 1956), but rather that we fail to be aware of anything. For example, if
my perceptual experience represents a red book sitting on the table and there is in fact a
red book sitting on the table, the experience is successful in making me aware of the red
book itself. However, if I have an experience that is phenomenologically indistinguishable
from the previous one, but there is not a red book sitting on the table, representationalists
deny that I am perceiving a non-material or non-existent red book, saying, instead, that my
representation failed to make me aware of an object in my environment.
Despite the attempts of contemporary philosophers to formulate representationalism as
being a form of direct realism, it is not entirely clear whether they have been successful in
doing so. While some, such as J. L. Austin (1962), have argued that it is not theoretically
useful to distinguish between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ perception, others have maintained that
there is an important sense in which representationalism amounts to an indirect realist view
of perception (Snowdon 1992; Martin 2017; Travis 2017). Snowdon (1992), for example,
argues that because content is supposed to be abstract, perception is not capable of putting
us in a position to make demonstrative judgments about particulars in the surrounding en-
vironment (see also Campbell 2002; Schellenberg 2016). In this sense, Snowdon says that
perception only puts us in an indirect relation to what is perceived. More recently, Travis
(2017) has made a similar point when he says that, despite not postulating the existence of
non-physical objects standing between perception and the world, requiring the presence of
content in perception still implies a form of mediated relationship between mind and world.
Besides, there are other reasons why representationalism should not be viewed as a form
of direct realism. These have to do with the three problems introduced above. Consider,
first, the phenomenology problem. Because characterizing content in abstract terms is cen-
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tral to the idea that not all perceptual experiences need to involve a relation of awareness
between a subject and an object, representationalism faces trouble to explain why it seems
to us that we perceive particular, as opposed to abstract objects. Thus, it is not obvious how
this phenomenological particularity of perception (Schellenberg 2010) can be explained by
saying that perception is characterized in terms of content.
Consider, second, the fact that the advantages often ascribed to representationalism are
similar to the advantages traditionally associated with indirect realism. As Martin (2017,
270) notes “the typical concerns that intentional theorists appeal to in order to make us
recognize the intentionality of sense perception are the kinds of concerns that moved sense-
datum theorists at the beginning of the twentieth century”. More specifically, the strategy
adopted by representationalists to deal with the error problem is very similar to to strategy
adopted by sense-data theorists. While the former talk about content and the latter talk
about non-material objects, the appeal to introduce such entities is similar, that is, the as-
sumption that there is something that is shared, at the most fundamental level, by successful
and unsuccessful forms of perception. For sense-data theorists, what is shared is the fact
that both involve an act of awareness to objects, which is why sense-data are introduced.
For representationalists, in contrast, what is shared is the fact that both successful and un-
successful perception possess content. Thus, the motivation to postulate a common kind
factor shared by successful and unsuccessful perception is at the bottom of the efforts of
both contemporary representationalism and traditional indirect realism.
I shall emphasize that I am not suggesting that contemporary representationalism and
traditional indirect realism are, in a straightforward sense, the same views. The motiva-
tion to think of perception in terms of intentionality is, indeed, one important difference
between those views. I am also not trying to provide a definitive argument for the view that
representationalism is a form of indirect realism. What I want to highlight is, instead, that
the proximity, or the continuity, as Martin (2017) puts it, between these two views is more
significant than what is acknowledged by most contemporary philosophers of perception.
While acknowledging this proximity provides in itself an important contribution to the phi-
losophy of perception, as is shown by the works of Snowdon, Martin, and Travis, the reason
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why I bring it up here is primarily instrumental. As will become clear later, an important
part of the work of this thesis will be based on the assumption that current debates about
representationalism and relationalism in philosophy of perception can inform similar but
underdeveloped debates in the philosophy of memory. Since, in the memory literature, the
prevalent framework is still the traditional one of indirect and direct realism, the parallels
that I trace between representationalism in perception and representationalism in memory
will be more meaningful if the former can be viewed, at least for the sake of the overall
framework of the thesis, as a form of indirect realism.
2.2 Relationalism
Relationalism is the view that, at the most fundamental level, perception is a form of rela-
tion to the world (Campbell 2002; Martin 2004; Brewer 2007; Fish 2009). Relationalists
inherit the idea that perception is a form of awareness of objects from sense-data theorists,
but unlike them, they believe that relations of awareness only obtain in what are usually
described as successful or good cases of perception. Because in unsuccessful or bad cases
of perception — i.e., hallucinations — there is not a relation of awareness obtaining be-
tween a subject and an object, such cases are said to be occurrences of different kinds from
successful or good cases.
Relationalism provides a straightforward direct realist view of perception. However, as
Genone (2016) rightly notes, it goes beyond traditional direct realist views in that it is not
only concerned with the problem of the directness of perception, but also with providing
an account of how the objects of perception — i.e., the particulars in the world — play a
fundamental role in any complete account of the epistemology, the metaphysics, and the
phenomenology of perception.
To see this, consider the knowledge problem. Campbell (2002) has famously argued
for relationalism on the grounds that it provides a neat account of how perception grounds
singular thoughts, or thoughts about particulars in the world, because perceiving puts us in
direct contact with those particulars. In terms of Snowdon’s (1992) characterization, rela-
tionalism explains how perception puts us in a position to make demonstrative judgments
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about the environment, and, as such, to form knowledge about it. The same has been said
of relationalism in relation to the phenomenology problem. Because relationalists see par-
ticulars as constitutive parts of perception, the external objects “shape the contours of the
subject’s conscious experience by actually being the contours of the subject’s conscious
experience” (Fish 2009, 6; see also Martin 2004; Brewer 2007). This provides a simple
account of why it seems to us that we perceive particulars and, moreover, why we perceive
them as being directly available to us.
Despite these advantages, the biggest challenge faced by relationalists is, just as with
traditional direct realism, the error problem. Recall that the main motivation driving sense-
data theorists to postulate the existence of sense-data was that the objects that one seems
to be aware of in unsuccessful perception are not real objects. Since relationalists hold on
to the idea that successful perception involves a relationship of awareness, they need an
account of error that avoids the postulation of sense-data if the view is to be successful.
One common strategy adopted by relationalists to deal with this problem has been to deny
that unsuccessful perception involves a relationship of awareness to objects. By adopting a
disjunctivist theory of perception, where successful and unsuccessful perception are viewed
as mental occurrences of different kinds, relationalists explain away occurrences of halluci-
nations by claiming that they are not genuine cases of perception. Despite being introduced
by Hinton (1967a; 1967b) in the 1960s, disjunctivism only got traction more recently with
the works of Snowdon (1980) and Martin (2004) (see also Byrne and Logue 2008; Soteriou
2016). While relationalists have been consistent in their defenses of disjunctivism (see, e.g.,
Fish 2009), this solution has been met with skepticism by non-relationalists. One general
worry has been that disjunctivism is counterintuitive, for it underplays the metaphysical
importance of the phenomenological similarities between successful and unsuccessful per-
ception. Another worry is that disjunctivism is not appealing in itself because it goes against
both our common sense and our empirical understandings of perception.
I shall emphasize, again, that I am not suggesting that relationalism and traditional
direct realism are the same views. The goal of this discussion is, rather, to show that similar
motivations and problems that were present in the traditional debate are also present in
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the contemporary debate. As I mentioned above, acknowledging this theoretical proximity
will be important to properly understanding the motivations behind my proposal of using
discussions in contemporary philosophy of perception as starting points to promote similar
discussions in the philosophy of memory.
3. Memory
While the perception literature attempts to depart in important senses from the traditional
framework of direct and indirect realism, the memory literature still mostly relies on it.
In particular, the question of whether the objects of memory are mental representations of
events or the events themselves is still very important, although this has not been properly
acknowledged by contemporary philosophers of memory. The problems faced by direct
and indirect realism about memory are, however, similar to the problems faced by repre-
sentationalism and relationalism in the contemporary debate about perception.
3.1 Representationalism
In the philosophy of memory, representationalism or indirect realism is the view that the
objects of memory are mental representations of past events. Hume (2011) is, perhaps,
the most well-known defender of representational or indirect realist views. According to
Hume’s empiricist theory of memory, memories are less vivid and less intense forms of per-
ception, thus making mental representations the objects of memory. In the early twentieth
century, Russell (1912) and Broad (1925) have also proposed similar accounts of memory.5
Another form of representationalism, which has been very influential in the contempo-
rary literature, is implied by the causal theory of memory proposed by Martin and Deutscher
(1966). The causal theory’s central claim is that a subject counts as remembering if and only
if the subject’s current mental state is causally related, in an appropriate manner, to the past
events themselves. But not only this, the actual mental state must be a representation that
is sufficiently similar to the past representation of the event in perception. Thus, the theory
5See Holland (1954) and Michaelian and Sutton (2017) for more detailed discussion.
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assumes a form of representationalism or indirect realism about memory, for subjects be-
come aware of the past events only by being indirectly aware of actual representations of
them.6
Representationalism about memory has been very popular and it is often taken for
granted in philosophical debates about memory. In part, this is because it provides a simple
and intuitive answer to the error problem and because it is taken to be the most adequate
theory in the context of empirical research. For example, it has been suggested by a num-
ber of different researchers that memory is a result of a more general cognitive capacity to
think about events, whether those events occurred or not (see, e.g., Suddendorf and Corbal-
lis 2007; Schacter et al. 2007, 2012; De Brigard 2014a; Michaelian 2016c). Thus, because
relationalism seems to require the existence of the objects of memory — and hence of the
objects of other forms of episodic thinking — the view simply appears unappealing to most
people when considered in relation to these results. Another issue has to do with the fact
that it is now widely known that, rather than simply retrieving information from the past,
memory is constructive, in the sense that not all the information that one remembers needs
to be originated in one’s past experience of the relevant event (see, e.g., Schacter et al.
2007; Michaelian 2011, 2016c; Robins 2016b). This suggests that memory need not be
able to reach back to past experiences or events, but rather construct plausible and actual
representations of what happened. For this reason, a form of representationalism seems to
be the most simple and intuitive option, as representations can be constructed by the brain
in the absence of the represented objects. A third issue is that representationalism seems to
accommodate memory errors better. By memory errors, I mean occurrences of misremem-
bering (see, e.g., Robins 2016a; Michaelian 2016b), such as when one remembers some
details of an event incorrectly — e.g., remembering having strawberry cake at your birth-
day party, when you had chocolate cake — and occurrences of confabulation (see, e.g.,
Hirstein 2005; Michaelian 2016b; Bernecker 2017; Robins 2017a), such as when one re-
6It is important to note here that not all causal theories of memory are representationalist, for the require-
ment for causal connections between memories and events does not by itself entail a form of representation-
alism (see, e.g., Debus 2008). However, since Martin and Deutscher’s (1966) version of the causal theory,
which happens to be the most influential one in the contemporary debate, clearly assumes representationalism,
most philosophers have been tempted to accept the latter because they are committed to the former.
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members events that did not happen — e.g., remembering having a birthday party when
there was no such party.
Despite its advantage in accounting for the error problem, because representionalism is
a form of indirect realism, it will face similar problems to the ones discussed initially. With
regard to the knowledge problem, the challenge is to provide an account of how episodic
memories allow us to know something about the past. That is, because representations
mediate our contact with the past events, we cannot be sure that what we are aware of in
remembering actually corresponds to how the past was. With regard to the phenomenology
problem, representationalism faces trouble to explain the directness of memory. When
we remember past events, we seem to be remembering the events themselves, and not
representations. However, if the objects of memory are mental representations, it is hard to
see how that can be the case. So, in the case of memory too, the success of contemporary
versions of representationalism depends greatly on how they will deal with the problems
that traditional indirect realist views have faced.
3.2 Relationalism
In contrast to representationalism, relationalism or direct realism in philosophy of memory
is the view that the objects of memory are the past events events themselves and, therefore,
that our relationship to them is unmediated. Despite the attempts of philosophers such
as Thomas Reid (2000) and, later, of Russell (1921) and John Laird (1920), relationalism
about memory has not been very popular in the past few decades. Recent proponents of
the view include Dorothea Debus (2008) and Sven Bernecker (2008). Drawing inspiration
from relationalists in perception, especially from Martin (2004), Debus argues that, when
one successfully remembers, one stands in a recollective relation to the past events that is
absent in unsuccessful forms of remembering. As she puts it, successfully remembering
puts one in a direct relation to the past events themselves. Bernecker (2008), in contrast,
pursues a different strategy. He argues that, while memory involves representing the past,
the representation itself is not the object of mnemonic awareness. That is, remembering




Although, on the one hand, Bernecker takes himself to be a direct realist, and thus ar-
guably a relationalist, his view seems to be more accurately described as a form of represen-
tationalism along the lines of representationalism in perception. In other words, Bernecker
seems to accept that, in remembering, we are related to representations, but denies that this
makes our relationship to the past events mediated. However, it is not clear whether this
consists in a genuine form of direct realism or relationalism, for representations still seem
to stand in between one’s memory and the past events themselves. Debus, on the other
hand, seems to provide a view that is clearly relationalist. However, the kind of analysis
of remembering suggested by her view has been met with a lot of skepticism. This might
be due to two aspects of the current debate in the philosophy of memory. The first is the
popularity of the causal theory, which relies on a form of representationalism, in philoso-
phy of memory. The second is the idea that representationalism is better supported by the
empirical research discussed above. In addition to that, the prospects of relational views in
relation to empirical research on memory have not been addressed in enough detail. This
is, in part, because there are not many relational views out there, and also because those
who have proposed relational views have not explored this topic in detail. In this respect,
the contemporary debate on memory has not developed in the same way that its perception
counterpart has.
A third problem is the fact that relationalism seems unable to handle memory errors.
As I argue in Chapter 4, relational theories in their current form cannot distinguish prop-
erly between successful and unsuccessful cases of remembering. Moreover, I show that,
even if disjunctivism is in place, relationalists still face trouble to explain a particular form
of memory error, that is, misremembering (Robins 2016a). Despite all these problems,
relationalism is still appealing for some philosophers for similar reasons that traditional
direct realism about memory is appealing. In being a form of direct realism, relationalism
provides a straightforward answer to the knowledge and phenomenology problems. That
is, because the objects of memory are the past events themselves, there is no mystery in




4. Towards a hybrid approach
Until recently, many philosophers have taken representationalism and relationalism, both
in perception and in memory, to be incompatible with each other. However, it is not en-
tirely clear why they take this view. For example, in the perception literature, hybrid views
started to emerge recently, where elements of representationalism and relationalism are
put together in order to form unified and novel views (see, e.g., Siegel 2010; Schellenberg
2010, 2014; Logue 2013, 2014; Hanna 2015). This suggests that at least some elements
of representationalism and relationalism are not incompatible with each other. While there
is still much work to be done to identify which of those elements can be integrated, the
prospects for hybrid views of perception seem to be promising at this stage. The literature
on memory, in contrast, has not paralleled the developments in perception. As I said before,
with the exception of a handful of philosophers, the standard assumption seems to be that
some form of representationalism is correct. Again, this is not so much due to the fact that
relationalism has been shown to be problematic, as to the fact that this question has not
received the same amount of attention that its counterpart in the perception literature has.
Thus, the possibility of hybrid views of memory remains largely unexplored to date.
One particular hybrid proposal, which is defended by Susanna Schellenberg (2010;
2011; 2016), provides a potential useful framework to think of hybrid views in percep-
tion, and, as I will argue, in memory too. Although Schellenberg’s hybrid view shares
important elements with traditional representational views, she argues that some forms of
relationalism are not incompatible with it. Her claim is that perceptual representations can
be object-involving, in the sense that, if the particular objects that we perceive fail to exist,
the content of our perceptual representations will vary in significant ways. While defending
this claim requires some bold moves, especially with respect to the relationship between the
representational content and the phenomenal content of perception, if right, her view pro-
vides an overall account of how perceptual representations can be inherently relational.
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This account, I will argue, can be extended to the case of memory, which provides a
helpful starting point to think about hybrid views of memory. The idea is that, like per-
ceptual representations, mnemonic representations can be object-involving, or, to be more
precise, event-involving, in the sense that, if the particular events that we remember fail
to exist, the content of our mnemonic representations will vary in significant ways. This
will require making similar moves to the ones that Schellenberg does in the case of per-
ception, but again, if successful, this adapted view will provide an overall account of how
mnemonic representations can be inherently relational. One particular advantage of this
hybrid approach, as I discuss in Chapter 5, is that it is compatible with a broader theoretical
framework in psychology, according to which memory is just a form of mental time travel
(see Suddendorf and Corballis 1997; Tulving 2002). That is, it respects the theoretical
intuitions from other domains, while preserving important features of representationalism
and relationalism. In this sense, the hybrid view provides an important resource for those
sympathetic to relationalism to reconcile it with empirical research on memory.
This brief discussion makes explicit that there are still important questions to be re-
solved when it comes to the dispute between representationalism and relationalism both in
perception and in memory. In the perception literature, the question of what hybrid views
of perception will look like is only now starting to be addressed, which opens up different
possibilities for future research. In the memory literature, there is the question of whether
the general assumption that a form of representationalism is correct is warranted, and if
not, whether its alternative, relationalism, can provide a coherent view in light of empirical
research. In addition, there is a more general question, which has not been asked so far in
the literature, of whether hybrid views of memory are possible, as perhaps even plausible.
Given the prospects of this question in the perception literature, it seems to make sense to
ask it in the case of memory too.
Thus, given the current context of the dispute between representationalism and relation-
alism is situated today, this thesis consists in an attempt to move the debate forward. By
addressing the questions briefly discussed here, the main idea defended is that a form of
hybridism about perception and memory is the most promising view. Rather than provid-
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ing a final hybrid view of perception and memory, the general suggestion of the thesis is
that, instead of seeing representationalism and relationalism as two opposite and irrecon-
cilable views, philosophers will benefit from exploring ways in which these views can be
reconciled.
More precisely, the thesis has one major goal, which is to enhance our understanding
of the dispute between representationalism and relationalism, both in perception and in
memory, by defending a hybrid approach. Two sub-goals are, accordingly, subsumed to the
main goal.
1. The first is to contribute to the developing trend of hybrid views in the philosophy
of perception. In particular, I will propose a new hybrid view of perception, which
draws inspiration from a philosophical tradition that has been underexplored in con-
temporary analytic philosophy, namely, classical pragmatism. The option for prag-
matism is due to the fact that one of its founders, Charles Peirce, was one of the first
philosophers to propose a hybrid view of perception. Thus, I provide an interpreta-
tion of Peirce’s theory of perception that engages with the contemporary literature in
philosophy of perception.
2. The second is to advance the debate about representationalism and relationalism in
philosophy of memory. The work done in philosophy of perception will serve as a
starting point to conceive of the problems in the memory literature. The suggestion
will be that a form of hybridism is also the best alternative for philosophers of mem-
ory. However, since no one has proposed hybrid views in the literature, my efforts
will be directed at proposing a framework, rather than a definitive view, for the future
development of hybrid views of memory.
The focus on Charles Peirce’s pragmatism in my approach to perception is due to two
reasons. The first reason is that Peirce himself attempted to bridge traditional direct and
indirect realism about perception (Haack 1994; Bergman 2007; Legg 2014b; Wilson 2016),
which naturally provides a potentially useful starting point to think about hybrid views.
The second is that, as some philosophers have recently noted (Genone 2016; Locatelli and
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Wilson 2017), contemporary hybrid views of perception have been biased toward repre-
sentationalism, and one important question open in this literature is precisely whether al-
ternative views are possible. As it will become clear in Chapters 1 and 2, I take Peirce’s
pragmatic theory of perception to offer such an alternative, that is, a hybrid view that is not
biased toward representationalism and consequently one that can be potentially appealing
to philosophers who are sympathetic to relationalism. Peirce’s pragmatism thus provides
the foundation to understand the novel contributions made by my hybrid view of perception.
5. The thesis
The thesis is organized as a collection of five original and self-standing articles dealing
with different issues pertaining to representationalism and relationalism in perception and
in memory. Chapters 1 and 2 compose Part I of the thesis, which is dedicated to perception.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 compose Part II, which is dedicated to memory.
Part I – Perception
Chapter 1 The first chapter, Contextualizing perception, is an early attempt to deal with
some of the issues discussed above in perception. It employs some general classical prag-
matist ideas to provide a relationalist theory of perception. Although the explicit suggestion
is that a form of relationalism should be preferred over representationalism, the relational
view defended there departs radically from most relational views in the contemporary liter-
ature. Because one central aspect of my proposal is that disjunctivism, which is assumed by
virtually all contemporary relationalist views, should be abandoned, the relationalist view
that I offer already indicates an inclination to incorporate insights from representationalism.
Chapter 2 The second chapter, Perception pragmatized, explicitly proposes a hybrid view
of perception based on the ideas of the pragmatist philosopher Charles Peirce. While the
influence of Peirce’s pragmatism was only implicit in Chapter 1, his ideas are developed
here in more detail and in relation to contemporary hybrid views of perception. More
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specifically, I argue that my hybrid view, perceptual pragmatism, offers a reconciliation of
representationalism and relationalism that does not underplay the importance of relational-
ism, as is the case with some competing hybrid views. This chapter offers, therefore, an
updated version of the relational view offered in Chapter 1, but now explicitly recognizing
the importance of representationalism.
Part II – Memory
Chapter 3 The third chapter, Thinking about events, is more speculative in nature. It in-
vestigates a topic that has not been explored so far. Moreover, it represents an important
shift in the thesis: namely, the ideas developed in Chapters 1 and 2, which pertain to per-
ception, are now put to work in relation to memory. This chapter, which was co-authored
with Kourken Michaelian, proposes a novel question in the philosophy of memory. This is
the question of what the objects of episodic hypothetical thinking are. Because some have
suggested that episodic memory is just another form of thinking about hypothetical scenar-
ios, the chapter explores the prospects of representationalist and relationalist accounts of
episodic hypothetical thinking. The argument offered there is that neither representation-
alism nor relationalism alone can provide a satisfactory account of episodic hypothetical
thinking. The alternative proposal that we put forward is that a form of pragmatism about
episodic hypothetical thought, which is influenced by the account of perception developed
in Chapters 1 and 2, provides a more promising account of those mental states and their
objects. This allows us, finally, to extract a pragmatist account of memory from the more
general pragmatist account of episodic hypothetical thinking.
Chapter 4 The fourth chapter, Failing to remember, explores an important topic in con-
temporary philosophy of memory. This topic is closely related to one prominent discussion
in the philosophy of perception, which refers to the possibility of a relational account of
non-veridical perception, such as illusions and hallucinations. The chapter thus raises a
parallel issue for relationalists about memory. More specifically, the argument proposed
is that, given the occurrence of unsuccessful remembering, such as misremembering and
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confabulations, relationalism cannot distinguish properly between these cases and cases of
successful remembering. I focus on one prominent relational view, developed by Dorothea
Debus, to show that, if a relational account of memory is to succeed, it needs to deal suc-
cessfully with unsuccessful remembering.
Chapter 5 The fifth chapter, The hybrid contents of memory, adopts a more focused and
positive strategy, dealing explicitly with the question of whether a hybrid view of memory
is possible. This chapter attempts to use the insights from hybridism in philosophy of per-
ception to begin to develop hybridism in philosophy of memory. I discuss one prominent
hybrid account of perception, developed by Susanna Schellenberg, and expand its scope
to the case of memory. In particular, I offer an account, based on Schellenberg’s work, of
why representationalists and relationalists disagree in the case of memory. I then propose
an adaptation of her account of perceptual content to address the relevant issues in the case
of memory. Besides dealing with the dispute between representationalism and relational-
ism, the hybrid view developed here also provides insightful prospects for contemporary
discussions in philosophy of memory. That is, building on some of the work developed in
Chapter 3, I propose that a hybrid account of memory can give us a coherent picture of the
relationship between memory and other forms of episodic thinking.
Appendix Finally, in the short discussion paper Mental time travel and the philosophy of
memory, which is included as an Appendix, I offer an overview of the problems raised by







This chapter is an early attempt to discuss, in the domain of perception, some of the prob-
lems outlined in the Introduction. I develop and defend a novel relationalist theory of
perception — perceptual contextualism — grounded in pragmatist ideas. The central claim
of perceptual contextualism is that the distinction between veridical and non-veridical per-
ceptual experiences should be understood in terms of the capacity of the former to generate
pragmatic agreement among perceptual subjects in relevant contexts. Perceptual contex-
tualism endorses the core relationalist claim that the objects of perception are constitutive
parts of perceptual experiences but denies the assumption, made by many relationalists, that
those objects are necessarily ordinary material objects. I argue that the assumption need-
lessly restricts the explanatory reach of relationalism and show how the notions of context
and pragmatic agreement provide a means of distinguishing between veridical and non-
veridical experiences that allows us to expand the explanatory reach of relationalism by
avoiding commitment to any particular view about the nature of the objects of perception.
Chapter 1 is not only the first in terms of structure, but also the first in chronological
order. It is my first attempt to bring two bodies of literature together: contemporary philos-
ophy of perception and classical pragmatism. At this early stage, the connection between
them is only implicit, though. While the influence of Charles Peirce’s pragmatism is clear
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in various parts of the chapter, I did not explore the actual connections between his writings
and current discussions about perception in any further detail. This was done in Chapter
2. Thus, the reader should keep in mind that most of the ideas developed in the Chapter
1 are still embryonic. Some of them have, in fact, been abandoned along the way, but
some others have been developed in more detail in Chapter 2, where I present my final take
on perception in the thesis. For example, in Chapter 1, I take the enterprise of providing
a pragmatist-inspired account of perception to be fundamentally a relationalist enterprise.
However, this idea is dropped in Chapter 2, for a closer study of the works of Charles Peirce
made me realize that his pragmatist theory of perception is better understood as a hybrid
representational-relational view. Despite this important shift, various important ideas that
were introduced in this chapter re-appear in my discussion of perception in Chapter 2.
In particular, the notions of pragmatic agreement and pragmatic context are developed in
more detail there. Moreover, the denial of disjunctivism, which is first discussed in Chapter
1 and constitutes one of its main motivations, is also a central motivation for my discus-
sion of perception in Chapter 2. Thus, despite not being my final discussion of perception,
Chapter 1 plays an important instrumental role in the overall scheme of the thesis, for it
sets the stage for most discussions developed in Chapter 2. As such, it provides potentially
useful insights into the motivations of the work done Chapter 2.
Outline
This chapter develops and defends a novel relationalist theory of perception — perceptual
contextualism — that is grounded on pragmatist ideas. Section 1.1 reviews relationalist
and representationalist approaches to the problem of perceptual error. Section 1.2 develops
perceptual contextualism as an alternative relationalist view. The central idea of the view
is that veridical experiences are those that would generate pragmatic agreement among
relevant perceptual subjects. Perceptual contextualism is also discussed in relation to al-
ternative relationalist theories. Section 1.3 concludes by replying objections to perceptual
contextualism raised in relation to illusions and hallucinations.
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1.1 Perceptual error and the nature of perceptual experi-
ences
The question of whether perception is fundamentally relational has been widely debated
in contemporary philosophy of perception. Among those who give a negative answer are
representationalists, according to whom perceptual experiences are fundamentally charac-
terized by their representational content (see Searle 1983; Harman 1990; Dretske 1997,
2003; Byrne 2001, 2009). In opposition, relationalists give a positive answer, claiming
that perceptual experiences are fundamentally characterized by their relations to external
objects (see Snowdon 1980; Travis 2004; Fish 2008, 2009; Brewer 2007, 2011, 2013).1
In historical terms, this debate relates to but does not reduce to the older dispute between
direct and indirect realist theories of perception. On the one hand, relationalists explicitly
maintain that at least the fundamental aspects of perception are determined by its relation to
external objects. On the other hand, while representationalists are not indirect realists in the
strong sense of the term, i.e., they do not accept that in perception we are related to medi-
ating entities, they hold that at least the fundamental aspects of perceptual experiences are
determined by their representational content. The question of how to account for perceptual
error thus plays a central role in the debate between representationalism and relationalism,
just as it did in the dispute between indirect and direct realism.
1.1.1 Perceptual error
Representationalists and relationalists have given opposing accounts of perceptual error.
The view that I defend here — perceptual contextualism — is a relational theory of per-
ception that offers an alternative to current relationalist theories. For this reason, it will be
1This way of setting the stage is not uncontroversial at all. Some representationalist views understand
perceptual content as being Russellian propositions or Fregean senses, meaning that the objects and prop-
erties represented are viewed as constitutive parts of perceptual content (e.g., Speaks 2009; Chalmers 2004;
Schellenberg 2010, 2011). Other philosophers have argued that representationalism and relationalism are not
ultimately incompatible, defending “hybrid” accounts of perception (e.g. Schellenberg 2010, 2011; Siegel
2010; Logue 2014; Hanna 2015). I will not be concerned with these views here, so when I use the terms
“representationalism” and “relationalism”, I will be referring to what Schellenberg (2010; 2011) calls “aus-
tere representationalism” and “austere relationalism”, i.e., views of perception that accept either that objects
or representational content fundamentally and exclusively constitute our perception of the world.
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useful to review those accounts briefly.
Perceptual error can be understood here as referring to cases in which one has a per-
ceptual experience that fails to capture, completely or partially, the way the world is. For
representationalists, perceptual experiences are fundamentally characterized by what they
represent to be the case (see Searle 1983; Byrne 2001, 2009). When John sees a white cat,
John’s visual experience represents a cat as having the property of being white. On this
view, perceptual errors happen when an experience misrepresents the world, meaning that
it is inaccurate with respect to how the world is. Thus, if John has a visual experience of a
white cat, but no such object exists in the world, or if the cat is of another color, then his
experience represents the world inaccurately. Alternatively, we can say that the satisfaction
conditions of John’s experience (i.e., the conditions under which his experience would be
accurate) are not met.
Relationalists hold that it is not adequate to think of perception as being representa-
tional. For example, Charles Travis (2004) argues that perception does not by itself estab-
lish satisfaction conditions. When I see an apple sitting on the kitchen table, this experience
can be only accurate or inaccurate relative to something else, such as my prior beliefs about
how the world is. If I know that my partner bought some wax fruit to decorate the house
the day before, then I would be inclined to think that although it seems to me that I see a
real apple, I might be mistaken. If no such information is available, then I will probably
just infer that what I see is a real apple. No intrinsic feature of my experience can establish
its satisfaction conditions, but only its relation to other mental states, such as my beliefs.
Therefore, perception is not representational.
Although Travis (2004) does not explicitly endorse the view that satisfaction conditions
are determined by other mental states, it has been defended by other relationalists (see e.g.
Antony 2011 and Genone 2014). On these accounts, perceptual errors would be due to
those mental states and not to perception itself. If the (non-)veridicality of a mental state
depends on whether its satisfaction conditions are met in the world, and if perception cannot
establish those conditions alone, then perception cannot be said to be veridical or non-
veridical. Consequently, perceptual error is due to those mental states and not to perception.
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The above conception of perceptual error is congenial to relationalism because it im-
plies that perceptual error is not really “perceptual”, which implies, in turn, that even non-
veridical perceptual experiences can be relational now (see Martin 2004; Brewer 2007,
2011; Fish 2008, 2009). A further development of this approach is provided by James
Genone’s (2014) doxastic account of illusions. Genone accepts Travis’s claim that percep-
tual experiences do not establish satisfaction conditions and then proceeds to explain cases
of illusion, such as when a straight stick appears bent when one sees it half-submerged
in water, by claiming that they are caused by doxastic states accompanying the relevant
perceptual experiences.
To make the doxastic account fully compatible with a relational view of perception,
Genone (2014) introduces the notion of an “appearance property”. Appearance properties
are manifestations of the intrinsic properties of objects that are displayed or not depending
on the contexts in which the objects are perceived. It is important to note that, despite the
fact that they are context-dependent, Genone argues that appearance properties should not
be viewed as mind-dependent;2 they are dependent on physical contexts and not on minds.
Appearance properties play a central explanatory role in Genone’s account because they
allow us to explain error without having to appeal to representations. For example, when
a straight stick appears bent when one sees it half-submerged in water, the stick displays
the appearance property of being bent in that particular physical context. The doxastic
account says that this is a “perceptual illusion” because the experience is accompanied by a
mistaken belief, namely that the stick should continue to be bent.3 Therefore, if perceptual
error is due to doxastic states, we need not invoke representations in order to explain how
it occurs.
One problem with the doxastic account is that it is not clear why relationalists should
2One important worry here is that it is not clear that intrinsic properties appearing in different contexts
implies that they are context-dependent. I am taking this for granted here, since it is Genone’s view on
the subject. Later on, I will argue that we cannot think of context-dependent properties as being intrinsic
properties unless we make unwanted changes to our understanding of the latter.
3One might argue that this misreads the relationalist core account of perceptual error, for the relationalist
does not understand error as a cognitive process that happens after or separately from perception. I am not
saying here that error is a cognitive process, but rather that perceptual error happens because of doxastic
states that are somehow involved in perception. The distinction I am trying to convey here is analytic, that is,
it identifies different logical elements of perception, but it does not say that they are separated in reality.
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adopt it. The answer can be found in a commitment taken by most relationalists, namely,
that the objects of perception are ordinary material objects (Brewer 2007). This view, of-
ten called metaphysical naïve realism (hereinafter naïve realism), states that the objects of
perception are ordinary mind-independent objects, such as chairs and tables. Once relation-
alism and naïve realism are conjoined, it becomes clear why the doxastic account appeals
to relationalists; one can explain how perceptual error is possible without appealing to rep-
resentations. In perceptual error, we are related to ordinary material objects, but error is
due to doxastic states, and not to perception (or its objects). In the next section, I shall
argue that, despite the fact that the doxastic account fits well with relationalism, relation-
alists should avoid adopting it, for it requires an overly restrictive view of the objects of
perception.
1.1.2 Relationalism and naïve realism
I have suggested that the doxastic account becomes attractive to most relationalists because
they are committed to a particular view of the objects of perception, namely, naïve real-
ism. But these are independent views. Relationalism says that perception is fundamentally
shaped by its relation to objects. Naïve realism says that those objects are ordinary mind-
independent objects. While naïve realism implies relationalism, the contrary does not hold,
for relationalism, strictly understood, makes no claim about the nature of the objects of per-
ception. In this section, I argue that relationalists should reject both the doxastic account
and naïve realism. I provide two different arguments: the first shows that, instead of sav-
ing naïve realism, the doxastic account makes it implausible. The second says that naïve
realism should be abandoned as a view of the objects of perception because it provides an
overly restrictive account of those.
Let me start by clarifying what I understand by naïve realism. Naïve realism, as stated
above, is the view that the objects of perception are ordinary material objects. It can be
described by the two following claims
(i) The objects of perception have intrinsic properties (i.e., they have mind-independent
and non-relational properties);
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(ii) The objects of perception are self-subsistent or self-contained (i.e., they have a
non-relational existence).
This definition requires further clarification. Intrinsic properties are understood as proper-
ties that objects have independent of being related to other individuals, such as the rectangu-
larity of my laptop. This property is intrinsic because my laptop is rectangular independent
of being related to something else. Moreover, its intrinsic properties allow it to have a self-
contained or non-relational existence, meaning that the laptop is individuated as an object
independent of its relation to other things. Thus, intrinsic properties are sufficient to in-
dividuate objects, but they do not necessarily provide a full description of them, for some
properties, such as colors, can only be individuated in particular contexts. In sum, I will
understand intrinsic properties as the properties without which an object could not be what
it is. I shall call this the Naïve Individuation View (NIV).
There are two problems for relationalists who accept NIV and the doxastic account.
First, it is not obvious whether these two are compatible at all. Genone’s introduction of
appearance properties can be seen as an attempt to address this worry. He takes appearance
properties to be intrinsic and context-dependent simultaneously, because “part of what is
involved in an object possessing certain intrinsic properties is being disposed to appear
various ways in various conditions” (2014, 357). The problem with this claim is that it
contrasts explicitly with the notion of intrinsic properties as being non-relational. If intrin-
sic properties involve dispositions to appear in different ways in various conditions, then
(i) should be abandoned. But this would make NIV and the doxastic account incompati-
ble. The problem here is not that it is implausible to think of objects as having relational
properties, but why we should take relational properties to be intrinsic. Doing so seems to
require an alternative notion of what an intrinsic property is, which does not help to solve
the problem of reconciling NIV and the doxastic account.
The second problem is that relationalists who accept the doxastic account have to deal
with difficulties pertaining to NIV. One of the difficulties is that NIV restricts the explana-
tory reach of relationalism because it offers an overly restrictive metaphysical view of the
objects of perception. Casey O’Callaghan (2011; 2016) has recently noted that philosophers
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of perception have focused excessively on vision, making them think of other perceptual
modalities in analogy to it. But this is problematic, because it is not possible to individuate
the objects of those modalities in the way that the objects of vision are individuated (see
O’Callaghan 2011). For example, in audition we seem to be related to sounds instead of the
objects causing them. When you hear a car crashing against a tree a few hundred meters
away, the object of your auditory experience is a sound caused by the ordinary material
objects and not the car and/or the tree. Unlike in vision, in which you are acquainted with
ordinary material objects in your visual field, in audition you relate to sounds. But sounds
are extended in time, meaning that they can only be fully experienced in more than one
time slice. To see this, consider the differences in the sirens of police and ambulance cars.
In some countries, those cars use the same type of sirens, but the way we experience them
differs because of the variations in pitch and progress over time.4
The above shows us that an essential feature of the objects of auditory perception, i.e.,
their temporal extension, requires the presence of a perceiving subject in order to be prop-
erly individuated. This makes NIV inadequate to individuate auditory objects, for sounds
are essentially relational entities, i.e., they only exist in relation to perceptual subjects. But
this is incompatible with (i) and (ii), which suggests that NIV poses important constraints
on relationalism.
One possible way to avoid this conclusion is to either claim that the objects of different
perceptual modalities can be adequately individuated by NIV (or some reformulated version
of it), or to explain the differences highlighted above in terms of appearance properties. The
first alternative will only succeed if one can show us that (1) vision is metaphysically prior
to other sensory modalities, and (2) that the same criteria used to individuate the objects
of vision also apply to other modalities. While it seems uncontroversial that humans rely
mostly on vision to guide themselves in the environment, it is not obvious why this should
4One might argue that this objection against NIV is misplaced, for nothing is said to motivate the view that
NIV is visuocentric. Relationalists can consistently claim that besides relating to objects, perception also re-
lates to events, e.g., in auditory perception (O’Callaghan 2011). However, this actually supports the argument
for abandoning NIV. NIV is a commitment that most (but not all) relationalists make that is incompatible with
other modalities of perception. Thus, it is hard to see how things such as events could be consistently indi-
viduated by NIV. Therefore, since we have good reasons derived from other perceptual modalities to abandon
NIV, and since the doxastic account is an attempt to reconcile relationalism with NIV, the relationalist should
feel suspicious about the doxastic account.
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provide any reason to think that vision is metaphysically prior in relation to other perceptual
modalities. For example, in modalities such as smell or taste, it is not obvious that NIV
would be the best way (or even the most intuitive way) to individuate the objects of those
modalities. Like in audition, when you smell a cheese cracker, it is more intuitive to think
of the object of your experience as being a smell — something like a cheesy smell — rather
than the cheese cracker itself. Were you deprived of vision, it would not be obvious to you
that this smell is caused by an outside object, instead of merely being a quale inside your
head. Moreover, other species rely primarily on other sensory modalities, such as the case
of bats famously discussed by Nagel (1973). Therefore, even if vision is more fundamental
in practical terms for humans, it does not follow that it is metaphysically prior to other
sensory modalities. As a consequence, (1) requires further argument, but it seems hard to
see a non-arbitrary way to settle this question. As for (2), if it is right that the criteria used
to individuate visual objects cannot be extended to other sensory modalities, then unified
strategies along these lines are very unlikely to succeed. Moreover, if we cannot make a
substantial case for (1), then (2) seems to lose most of its appeal.
But what about the second alternative, that is, appealing to appearance properties? Does
it shed any light on these difficulties? One could say that one is aware of the car crash
because the car has an appearance property that is manifest only when the car crashes into a
tree. While this view is plausible in principle, it complicates things in an undesired way for
the naïve realist. This account would have to allow that physical objects have appearance
properties that are spatially extended beyond the proximal spatial region that they inhabit
— e.g., a property that, despite being a property of a particular object residing in a restricted
spatial region, only manifests itself beyond the limits of that spatial region. Again, while
this view might be plausible in principle, it is hard to see how to reconcile it with naïve
realism. The difficulty with this strategy is that, in extending NIV to audition, important
features of auditory perception are left unexplained. As O’Callaghan rightly points out, this
strategy “fails to recognize the diversity of types of individuals that are objects of perceptual
awareness” (2011, 151).
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1.2 Perceptual contextualism
I have argued that the doxastic account is inconsistent with NIV. I have also argued that NIV
limits the prospects of relationalism to individuate the objects of perception in modalities
other than vision. This does not mean that relationalism is wrong, but only that it becomes
problematic when associated with NIV. But since these two theses are independent of one
another, one can still be a relationalist and abandon NIV. In this section, I argue for a
relationalist theory that avoids ontological commitments, such as NIV, about the nature of
the objects of perception. Moreover, to provide a relational account of perceptual error
and the plurality of the objects of perception, this view introduces pragmatist elements to
distinguish between veridical and non-veridical experiences and to individuate the objects
of perception. I call it perceptual contextualism.
A central feature of perceptual contextualism is that it is not committed to any partic-
ular ontological view of the objects of perception. Instead, it characterizes the objects of
perception in terms of how they would prompt subjects to act. Hence, perceptual experi-
ences should be analyzed relative to what I will refer to as “pragmatic contexts”, which are
understood in terms of the biological, evolutionary, and practical features of the settings
in which experiences occur. Perceptual contextualism makes two important claims: first,
that perceptual experiences are veridical if they would generate pragmatic agreement in
pragmatic contexts, and second, that the objects of perception can only be individuated in
pragmatic contexts. This section is dedicated to motivate and develop these claims.
1.2.1 The resistance view of experiences
Perceptual contextualism starts by proposing a new way to look at perception, one that
considers the actions subjects perform on the basis of their experiences.5 In this respect, it
opposes what I will refer to as the Revelation View of experiences. The Revelation View,
which is implicitly accepted by most representationalist and relationalist views, says that
perception is a passive relation to self-contained and non-relational objects residing in the
5For views that share similar motivations, see Nöe (2004) and Nanay (2013)
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world (see Chirimuuta 2017 for a related discussion). On this view, perception is essen-
tially a matter of receiving some external stimulation through our sensory organs, which
is then processed internally to produce perceptual experiences of the world. The subject
is essentially passive in this process, for perceiving only requires being stimulated by the
world and processing the stimuli.
Perceptual contextualism introduces an alternative view that I call the Resistance View
of experiences. The Resistance View opposes the Revelation View by ascribing the sub-
ject an essentially active role in perceiving the world. Besides how internal stimulation is
processed, perception is also determined by how subjects would act on the presence of the
stimuli. In this respect, the Resistance View denies that there is a sharp separation between
perceiving and acting. It thus becomes attractive for two reasons. First, as I will argue, it
provides a framework to distinguish between the objective and the subjective elements of
perception in pragmatic terms. This is important because, in doing so, we can avoid ap-
pealing to ontological notions to individuate the objects of perception. Second, it provides
an account of this distinction that is internal to the theory, meaning that its plausibility will
not depend on the plausibility of other philosophical theses. Thus, the Resistance View
does not depend on other views, such as NIV, to explain how the objects of perception are
individuated.
The core claim of the Resistance View is that perception is essentially impositional. By
“impositional” I mean that it offers a sense of external resistance to perceptual subjects.
This resistance prompts subjects to act in the presence of experiences, thus revealing ele-
ments in perception that resist any conscious efforts to be changed. For example, in seeing
an apple, I see an object with certain shape and color. If I wish that the apple becomes
blue, the experience will not simply change because of my wish. This is what is meant by
imposition or resistance here, namely, that some elements of our experiences do not depend
on our minds to be presented to us as they are. They are simply imposed on our stream of
consciousness.6
6In terms of its historical roots, the Resistance View is motivated by Charles Peirce’s view that perception
is impositional, in the sense that subjects cannot control whether or how they will experience the world. This
idea is developed in more detail in Chapter 2, Sect. 2.2, where I talk about the percept in Peirce’s theory of
perception.
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Now, perception is essential for subjects to act in the environment. These actions will
be motivated by how subjects interpret the impositional elements. If I see a red apple, I
will likely eat it, for it is a sign of a ripe fruit. Moreover, actions will have impact on other
perceptual subjects. For instance, if a mother wants to teach her child that red apples are
good to eat, she can put them next to spoiled apples and point out the relevant features to
identify the good apples, such as their color. The child can then either identify the good
apples correctly or fail to do so. In the former case, the child coordinates her actions
to comply with the mother’s instructions, meaning that her experience of the apple was
similar to the mother’s to the extent that it allowed for coordinated actions in that context.
This case shows that, in having different experiences of the world, different perceptual
subjects — the mother and the child — can interact based on what they perceive, which
allows for the coordination of their actions to achieve a certain goal. Perception is therefore
active, for our interactions with the world and other perceptual subjects determine how we
perceive.7
The Resistance View says that the impositional elements are the objects of perception.
More importantly, it says that the objects of perception are always objects for action. They
are not, however, mere creations of the mind because they resist the attempts of subjects
to change them. On the example above, when the mother and the child are successful in
coordinating their actions, the Resistance View says that it is because their experiences have
the same relevant impositional elements, and hence the same object. But these elements are
not dependent on individual minds, for they are neither a creation of the mother’s mind nor
of the child’s. In this sense, they are external to individual minds. Being external, however,
does not imply that the object exists concretely, e.g., as ordinary material objects. If a child
sees a unicorn, her experience does have impositional and external elements, but it does not
follow that these elements exist concretely, i.e., that there is a unicorn. What will determine
whether the object exists concretely is how the actions prompted by perceiving it would be
coordinated with the actions of other subjects in the same context. For example, if the child
tells her parents about the unicorn, but they fail to see it, then the object does not exist. The
7For a clearer and more detailed discussion of this topic, see Chapter 2, Sect. 2.3.2, where I talk about the
phenomenology-first approach to perception.
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general point here is that the existence of an object of perception depends on whether it
could serve as basis for coordinating the actions of multiple subjects.8
To make this point clear, let us see what the Resistance View says of illusions and
hallucinations. Consider a straightforward visual illusion, such as seeing an apple as being
gray. When you see this object, it is presented to you with certain qualities, such as being
round and gray. This experience has the impositional element of gray, for even if you try
to change it, you will not be able to. Now, suppose that you tell your friends that you see
a gray apple on the table. When they look at the object, they see a red apple instead of
a gray one. In this case, your experiences have different impositional elements, i.e., gray
and red, and when you act on the basis of this experience, you find out that other subjects
perceive the object differently. Despite being impositional and external to your mind, your
experience failed to be the source of actions that would be coordinated with other subjects,
which makes it illusory. The same analysis applies to hallucinations. Suppose, again, that
you see a gray apple on the table, and you tell your friends about it. Now, instead of seeing a
red apple, your friends do not see anything on the table. In this case, assuming that you have
no control over your hallucination, your experience has impositional elements because you
cannot simply stop seeing the apple. However, despite being external to your mind in this
particular sense, the object of your experience does not exist, for the impositional elements
that individuate it as an object (its shape and color) failed to be the source of actions that
would be coordinated with other subjects, thus making it a hallucination.
To sum up, the Resistance View says that the objects of perception are the impositional
elements. It also says that those objects exist only if they could serve as basis for coordi-
nated action in the environment. On this account, no reference to the nature of the objects
of perception is made to explain how they are individuated. The distinction between the im-
positional elements that exist and those that do not is explained by the actions they would
prompt in subjects. Similarly, the objective and subjective elements of perception are dis-
tinguished in terms of the actions that they would promote. Therefore, we do not need to
say that existing objects are physical, or that non-existing ones are mental, or even that the
8These claims might strike some as wildly implausible. I address some worries related to this point in
more detail in section 1.2.2.
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objective elements of experiences are caused by the world and that the subjective ones are
caused by the mind. Again, all we need is reference to the actions promoted by those ele-
ments, which eliminates the need to make ontological assumptions about the nature of the
objects of perception. I will develop these ideas in more detail below.
1.2.2 Pragmatic contexts
The discussion above introduced the Resistance View. I will now explain how it helps
relationalism with perceptual errors and the plurality of the objects of perception. Percep-
tual contextualism says that the distinction between veridical and non-veridical experiences
and the individuation of the objects of perception are only possible in pragmatic contexts.
Bluntly put, an experience is veridical if it would generate pragmatic agreement in prag-
matic contexts, and an object of perception is properly individuated if perceptual subjects
would pragmatically agree on the nature of those objects in pragmatic contexts. To make
this clear, I will now discuss what I mean by “pragmatic context” and “pragmatic agree-
ment”.
A pragmatic context is a situation in which a subject has a perceptual experience p, such
that a full description of p is given by:
(i) how the perceptual subject S of which p is a part is wired;
(ii) the selective history that describes how S came to be wired in that particular way;
(iii) the set D of dispositions that S may have in the presence of p by acting in its envi-
ronment; and
(iv) how the actions and dispositions to act that S has relates to the actions and disposi-
tions to act that other perceptual subjects of the same kind as S have.
So, for perceptual contextualism, the distinction between veridical and non-veridical per-
ceptual experiences, and the individuation of the objects of perception, are only possible
when the relevant pragmatic context characterized by (i)–(iv) is identified.
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To clarify, let us consider this in more detail. Perceptual contextualism says that an
experience is correctly described by making explicit that you are a human being S who be-
longs to an evolutionary species E that has been the subject of a natural selective process,
which has wired members of that species to be a certain way (i and ii above). Moreover, for
the large majority of members of E, the way they are wired makes them disposed to act in
a set D of ways when p occurs (iii above), such that they can interact with other members
of E, and pragmatic agreement among them may be reached (iv above), in the sense that
members of E would be able to coordinate their actions when p is the case. “Pragmatic
agreement” refers to the situation in which perceptual subjects are successful in coordi-
nating their actions with other perceptual subjects because they have the same or similar
experiences of the world. For example, human individuals with normal functioning visual
systems who are asked to separate small red balloons from the big white ones would be
in pragmatic agreement as long as they could coordinate their actions to realize this task.
In terms of the Resistance View, each individual will have experiences with impositional
elements and they will engage in actions because of those experiences. These actions allow
for the identification of common impositional elements in their experiences (e.g., that ev-
eryone sees size in the same way), thus making the coordination of further actions possible
to achieve the initial goal.
Similarly, on the apple case discussed above, perceptual contextualism says that the
object of the mother’s and child’s experiences is the apple, because it generated pragmatic
agreement. In other words, the mother and the child had experiences with the same relevant
impositional elements in a pragmatic context, which allowed for the coordination of their
actions in relation to the object of their experiences. This is possible because humans share
similar perceptual mechanisms (condition i), which is explained by the fact that members
of the human species were selected to have those mechanisms (condition ii). Consequently,
humans are wired in such a way that allows for a certain set of reactions when they have p,
such as being able to identify the apple as a round and red object (condition iii). Finally, by
engaging in actions on the basis of p, other individuals will be able to evaluate one’s actions
and coordinate their own actions accordingly, thus reaching pragmatic agreement or not.
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Note that this account does not require that humans have identical experiences of the
world, but only experiences with the same relevant impositional elements in pragmatic
contexts. The mother and the child can have different experiences of the apple, as long as
those experiences have the relevant impositional elements in the relevant pragmatic con-
texts. The same holds for other species. In fact, one worry with the present account is that
it looks “speciesist”, for pragmatic contexts only provide an account of pragmatic agree-
ment among individuals of the same species. This worry can be resolved by noting that
the notion of pragmatic contexts is consistent with the idea that different species may have
evolved in a similar way, such that how they respond to the environment can be similar.
For example, both humans and pigeons will avoid being hit by a ball that is rapidly coming
in their direction. For perceptual contextualism, there is a pragmatic context in which the
human and the pigeon could be at least in partial pragmatic agreement, for their experiences
had impositional elements that prompted reaction in a similar way. However, humans and
pigeons have different perceptual systems — e.g. humans are trichromatic while pigeons
are tetrachromatic — which means that there are some pragmatic contexts in which there
would not be pragmatic agreement. If, for instance, we could devise an experiment in which
pigeons had to somehow identify the color of objects, there would be pragmatic disagree-
ment between humans and pigeons. This highlights an important feature of the notion of
pragmatic agreement. Although I have focused on cases of human interaction, pragmatic
agreement does not require linguistic capacity or sophisticated cognitive processes, as with
the pigeon case. Pragmatic agreement is, therefore, ultimately about the actions subjects
would perform on the basis of their experiences.
Perceptual error
How does appealing to pragmatic contexts help to explain cases of perceptual error? Given
the importance ascribed to the active role of perceptual subjects in perception, perceptual
contextualism claims that the distinction between veridical and non-veridical experiences
can only be made in pragmatic contexts. More precisely, an experience is not veridical or
non-veridical in itself, but only in relation to pragmatic contexts. In this sense, percep-
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tual contextualism resembles Travis’s (2004) view, according to which perception cannot
establish satisfaction conditions by itself.
To see this, imagine that you are walking in the park and you see an exotic bird sit-
ting on a tree. You try to show it to your partner, but she says that there is no bird on the
tree. To solve the disagreement, you ask another person to look at the tree, and this per-
son reports that there is no bird there. Here there is pragmatic disagreement between you
and other individuals of your species. According to the Resistance View, your experience
has impositional elements that prompted you to act, i.e., to show your partner the exotic
bird. Therefore, it has an object. However, if we consider the pragmatic context of your
experience, we will notice that it failed to prompt actions that could be coordinated with
other individuals of your species. So, the object of your experience failed to be the source
of pragmatic agreement in that particular context. Since you are the only person who can
see the bird, perceptual contextualism says that your experience is non-veridical because it
fails and would fail (if further interaction took place) to be a source of coordinated actions
in that particular context. In terms of (i)–(iv) above, you had an experience p in a prag-
matic context determined by how you are wired (condition i) and the species to which you
belong (condition ii). Furthermore, you acted on the basis of p (condition iii), and those ac-
tions were evaluated by other subjects of your species in that context (condition iv). Since
those subjects could not coordinate their actions with your actions, your experience failed
to generate pragmatic agreement in that context, and is consequently non-veridical.
There are two important things to note about this account. The first is of crucial impor-
tance. It refers to the fact that pragmatic agreement need not always be an actual process,
in the sense that subjects always need to engage with their experiences to determine their
veridicality. Suppose that, instead of trying to show the bird to your partner, you did not
say anything. In this case, there is no interaction based on the experience. For percep-
tual contextualism, your experience is still non-veridical (or hallucinatory) because, if you
had acted on the basis of that experience, it would have generated pragmatic disagreement.
Thus, what is important is whether there would be pragmatic agreement if enough interac-
tion happens in a pragmatic context, and not so much the actual occurrence of agreement.
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Hence, a more informed definition is that an experience is veridical if it would generate
pragmatic agreement in relevant pragmatic contexts.
Again, this is not a trivial point. Perceptual contextualism purports to be a realist theory
of perception, and this is only possible if we analyze veridicality in terms of whether there
would be pragmatic agreement.9 So, the proposal here is not to provide an infallible set of
necessary and sufficient conditions to distinguish veridical and non-veridical experiences.
Perceptual contextualism allows for the possibility of there being veridical experiences that
fail to generate pragmatic agreement and non-veridical experiences that generate pragmatic
agreement in some contexts. These cases happen when there is not enough interaction
in pragmatic contexts. A more qualified claim would be, therefore, that an experience is
veridical if it would generate pragmatic agreement given that enough interaction with the
object had taken place.
The main point here is that understanding what it means for an experience to be veridical
requires understanding the notion of pragmatic agreement. In this sense, perceptual con-
textualism adopts a broad Peircean pragmatist stance towards perception. Charles Peirce
believed that pragmatism was essentially a method to logically analyze our ideas (see Hook-
way 2012 and Legg 2014a) and not some metaphysical view of the universe. For example,
Peirce said that to fully understand the notion of truth, we need to understand what it means
to reach agreement at the end of inquiry. This does not mean, however, that truth is de-
termined by agreement. For Peirce, a proposition would be true if, given enough inquiry
about its nature, it would not generate disagreement among inquirers. So, not all situations
of agreement are situations in which inquirers reached truth. As Hookway (2012) points
out, Peirce is not concerned so much with offering a theory of truth, but rather an account
of what it means to say that something is true (see also Legg 2014a, 210). I am making
a similar point for veridicality: i.e., understanding this notion requires understanding the
notion of pragmatic agreement. But this does not mean that veridicality is determined by
pragmatic agreement. I talk about some motivations for this view in more detail in the
objections, but for now, we can simply consider the fact that, if we did not interact based
9I’m indebted to Cathy Legg for initially pointing this out and for many helpful discussions that helped
clarify this idea.
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on what we perceive, and if we did not take for granted that some experiences lead to co-
ordinated action and some do not, we could not possibly have formulated the notion of a
veridical experience. This suggests that the relationship between perception and action is
much more important than most views in contemporary philosophy of perception acknowl-
edge10, which is why perceptual contextualism and the Resistance View are important.
The second important thing is that, despite being non-veridical, your experience has an
object to which it is related. This does not mean, of course, that the object exists concretely
(see section 1.2.1). As discussed above, the Resistance View avoids using ontological no-
tions to talk of the objects of perception, so whether an object exists concretely is not
relevant to identify the object of an experience. This raises an important issue about the
nature of those objects. If non-veridical experiences have objects, and if they are not phys-
ical, then they should be mental objects. While this holds for most theories of perception,
perceptual contextualism says that this is a false disjunction when it comes to identifying
the objects of perception. The idea is that, in studying perception, we start by looking at
how the world appears to us, and only later we investigate the nature of the objects of our
experiences. This investigation takes place when subjects interact with those objects and
observe the actions that can be employed by being related to them. Thus, instead of starting
with the assumption that the objects of perception possess properties such as physical and
mental, existence and non-existence, perceptual contextualism says that we ascribe those
properties to the objects of perception based on the actions that they would prompt. On this
view, then, the veridicality of an experience does not have to do with the nature of its ob-
jects, but with the actions that would be generated by the experience. This is an important
distinctive feature of perceptual contextualism: it is a theory of perception that avoids initial
commitment to the nature of the objects of perception. Instead of assuming that perception
is about the interaction of two fundamentally distinct domains, i.e., the mind and the world,
it starts by looking at perception alone, and only then provides an account of the distinction
between mind and world in terms of our interactions with what we perceive.
10There are substantial works in philosophy of mind and cognitive science that take this idea seriously, e.g.,
the vast literature on enactivist views of the mind such as Varela et al. (1991); Thompson (2007); Rowlands
(2010); Chemero (2011); Hutto and Myin (2012), but these have not received much attention from most
philosophers concerned with the questions I addressed so far.
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One objection here would be that despite being neutral about the objects of perception,
perceptual contextualism entails an extreme metaphysical view, for it will only be plausible
if one is already inclined to accept a pragmatist metaphysics. This objection is vague and
uninformative. For one thing, there is no such thing as a pragmatist metaphysics, in the
sense that different formulations of pragmatism will imply different and sometimes incom-
patible metaphysical views. So it is not clear what the “extreme” elements of a pragmatist
metaphysics are. Moreover, there are no a priori reasons to dismiss pragmatist views of
metaphysics as incoherent, so it is not clear why being committed to a pragmatist meta-
physics is inherently problematic. I am not denying that the burden of proof is with the
perceptual contextualist here, for it is up to him to motivate such views, but only that being
associated with more general pragmatist views is not an inherent problem.
But more importantly, while it is true that perceptual contextualism would be initially
more attractive to those who accept broad pragmatist views, this is not the central motiva-
tion of the view. So it is simply misleading to dismiss it on these grounds. As I argued in
section 1.2.1, perceptual contextualism relies on a new view of experience that considers
actions as being fundamental to understand the nature of perception. By proposing to define
the nature of the objects of perception in terms of the effects generated by our interaction
with them, the Resistance View starts with a theory of perception and builds a metaphysical
view out of it (e.g., by claiming that the objects of perception are physical or mental in
relation to the actions they generate).
This might strike some as an implausible move, but the motivation here is similar to
classical pragmatist views. Perceptual contextualism shares with these views the idea that
subjects are not mere spectators of the world, but are instead constantly interacting with it.
Thus, how we think about the nature of the world cannot be separated from how we interact
(and have previously interacted) with it.11 And understanding how we interact with this
world is one thing that any theory of perception should be able to explain. The Resistance
View denies, therefore, the assumption that a theory of perception should be constrained by
a prior metaphysics.
11In this respect, perceptual contextualism share some of the motivations of enactivist views of perception.
See e.g. Varela et. al. (1991) and Nöe (2004).
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This is a quick response and I do not expect it to convince anyone that pragmatism is
right. However, I hope it shows that instead of being a wrong-headed view, perceptual con-
textualism shares important motivations with an important philosophical tradition, namely,
classical pragmatism. And since discussing the plausibility of pragmatist views is beyond
my scope in this paper, I take it to be a mistake to dismiss perceptual contextualism merely
on these grounds.
To conclude, doing justice to the second point would require discussing how percep-
tual contextualism, and the pragmatist view that it adopts more generally, understands the
nature of physical objects. For my current argument, all that matters is that, if we accept
the Resistance View, then it makes sense to say that non-veridical experiences have objects.
As I will discuss in section 1.2.3, this is one distinctive feature of perceptual contextual-
ism in comparison to other relationalist views. For now, it suffices to note that perceptual
contextualism provides a picture of how a relational view can explain perceptual error in
pragmatic terms.
Plurality of the objects of perception
Now I will consider how perceptual contextualism explains the plurality of the objects
of perception. Like with perceptual error, the objects of different perceptual modalities
are individuated in specific pragmatic contexts. The idea is that different modalities will
individuate different pragmatic contexts depending on how pragmatic agreement could be
reached in each modality. I will further discuss the case of auditory perception to clarify
this point.
Recently, Casey O’Callaghan (2011; 2016) has pointed out that traditional theories of
perception focus too narrowly on vision, leading philosophers to think of the objects of
other modalities in analogy to the objects of vision. However, O’Callaghan argues that this
strategy is misleading, particularly in relation to auditory perception. He defends the view
that auditory objects have a temporally extended structure, which makes them structurally
different from visual objects, which are not temporally extended. For him, auditory objects
should be conceived in light of their mereological structure,
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What it [the mereological conception of objects] must allow is that perceptual
objects have proper parts that are treated collectively as a single perceptual
unity. It must also allow that perceptual objects of different varieties differ
in internal structure. For instance, visible material objects have a complex
spatially-extended internal structure. Audible sounds or auditory objects have
a complex temporally-extended internal structure. (O’Callaghan 2011, 152)
Leaving aside the details of his account, what is important for my purposes is O’Callaghan’s
suggestion that a proper way to individuate the objects of perception should take into ac-
count the structural differences of different modalities. In light of this, my claim is that,
by individuating the objects of perception in pragmatic contexts, perceptual contextualism
provides a view that follows this suggestion. This becomes clear by looking at the neutral-
ity of the Resistance View in adopting any ontological theory to individuate the objects of
perception. Given that having impositional elements is the only requirement for an experi-
ence to have objects, perceptual contextualism does not discriminate between objects with
different structures outside of pragmatic contexts.
To see this, consider that the way the impositional features of experiences present them-
selves in different modalities varies, and the way pragmatic agreement would be reached in
those modalities varies accordingly. One may need different standards to evaluate the acts
and judgments made about a certain object, say a piece of chalk, that could be related to
different sensory modalities. If one points to a piece of chalk and says to a colleague “There
is some chalk”, then it might suffice for one’s colleague to only look at the chalk and nod
in agreement. However, if one claims that the chalk makes a squeaky noise when one uses
it on a chalkboard, then one’s colleague will have to use the chalk on the blackboard to see
whether this is true.
In the case above, different standards are required to individuate the objects of each
experience. This means that different pragmatic contexts would be identified, and that
pragmatic agreement would be reached in different ways in different sensory modalities. In
particular, time is an essential feature to reach pragmatic agreement in the latter case, for
how an experience feels in different temporal moments is essential to determine whether it
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has the quality of being squeaky. In the visual case, however, time does not play a funda-
mental role, for one can usually describe the impositional elements of a visual experience
in a single temporal moment. Thus, depending on the modality that we are considering,
perceptual experiences will have different impositional elements, which is compatible with
the idea that objects might differ structurally across modalities.
By introducing the Resistance View, and the notion of pragmatic contexts, perceptual
contextualism makes room for the pluralist view of the objects of perception that is required
to deal with cases of non-visual sensory modalities. This is possible because, contrary
to most relationalist views, perceptual contextualism adopts a view of experiences that is
neutral about the ontological status of the objects of perception. The objects of perception
are considered in the context of the actions that they would generate in subjects, i.e., in their
pragmatic contexts. Therefore, the neutrality of the objects of perception and the pragmatic
account of veridicality allow perceptual contextualism to solve the difficulties raised in
section 1.1 in a relationalist framework.
1.2.3 Perceptual contextualism and disjunctivism
One striking feature of perceptual contextualism is that it seems to be inconsistent with
disjunctivism, which is prevalent in most contemporary relationalist views. Although there
are different forms of disjunctivism (see Byrne and Logue 2008), I will focus on what is
often called metaphysical disjunctivism, and from now on simply disjunctivism. Disjunc-
tivism says that veridical and non-veridical experiences belong to two exclusive metaphysi-
cal kinds. Consider the case of Macbeth hallucinating a dagger. For the disjunctivist, either
Macbeth sees a dagger or it merely seems to Macbeth that he is seeing a dagger. The
usual philosophical interpretation of the disjunctive operator has it that either Macbeth has
a veridical experience of seeing a dagger or Macbeth has an experience of another kind
entirely (see Martin 2004; Snowdon 2008; Fish 2009).
Disjunctivists thus deny that there is a “common kind” factor that veridical and non-
veridical experiences share. This means that, even if both veridical and non-veridical expe-
riences seem exactly alike to Macbeth when he reflects on them, it does not follow that they
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belong to the same metaphysical kind. For the disjunctivist, phenomenological indistin-
guishability does not imply metaphysical identity. Now, the question is whether perceptual
contextualism can accept this kind of disjunctivist reasoning, and if not, how it purports to
be a relationalist theory that denies disjunctivism.
Perceptual contextualism accepts that veridical and non-veridical experiences have a
common kind factor, and, consequently, it denies disjunctivism. But even without being a
disjunctivist theory of perception, perceptual contextualism is a genuine relationalist the-
ory. For it recognizes that we are related to objects both in veridical and non-veridical
experiences. This is one important feature that distinguishes perceptual contextualism from
current relationalist views in philosophy of perception. In opposition to other relational-
ist views, perceptual contextualism denies disjunctivism because one of its core claims is
that the objects of perception — or the impositional elements of experiences — are funda-
mental in shaping experiences. But given that even non-veridical experiences have genuine
objects, and that veridicality is determined in the pragmatic domain of perception, all expe-
riences are essentially of the same kind. Being veridical (or non-veridical) is a feature that
perceptual experiences acquire in pragmatic contexts and not something intrinsic to them.
As a consequence, for the perceptual contextualist, veridical and non-veridical experiences
belong to the same metaphysical kind.
However, denying disjunctivism and accepting relationalism might have some counter-
intuitive consequences. Does perceptual contextualism say that there are no differences
between perceiving a physical object, such as my laptop, and an object that does not ex-
ist, such as a unicorn? If no, then how should we distinguish between these? Perceptual
contextualism says that the objects of our experiences are the impositional elements, so
both can be objects of our experiences. However, impositional elements are not physical or
mental in themselves, but only in relation to the pragmatic contexts in which they are per-
ceived. Perceptual contextualism assumes that a theory of the objects of perception should
be a corollary of a theory of perception more generally, meaning that it does not initially
take a standpoint on which objects exist and which do not, or which objects are physical
and which are mental. This is not to say, however, that I deny that these distinctions are
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meaningful. I do believe that some objects exist and some do not, but instead of taking this
distinction for granted, I think that such distinctions are only possible when we have a clear
understanding of the nature of perception and how it allows us to interact with the world.
For example, we know that most physical concrete objects, as opposed to non-existing or
abstract objects (assuming that there are such things), can be manipulated with our bod-
ies because we interacted with those objects before based on our perceptual experiences.
In fact, taking these things for granted is part of the reason why the relationship between
acting and perceiving is often underemphasized. Perceptual contextualism is an attempt to
show why it is important to think about them.
But, as I said in section 1.2.2, my aim here is not to convince one that a theory of per-
ception requires a radical and novel metaphysics, but only to show that some important
problems can be reconceived from a pragmatist perspective. Whether the resulting meta-
physical revisions would be plausible is the topic of another discussion. For now, I will
restrict myself to pointing out that this way of conceiving of the distinction between phys-
ical and mental is another idea very familiar to classical pragmatist views, which should
suffice to show that it is not simply an arbitrary or wrong-headed way to see the matter.
These considerations might lead one to think that perceptual contextualism is a sort of
disguised sense-data theory of perception, for it says that we are related to entities that are
not ordinary material objects in perception. This is incorrect for two reasons. The first
reason is that perceptual contextualism does not claim that perception is related to some
intermediary entity standing between mind and world. Perception is a direct relation to
objects, but the nature of this relation, and the nature of the objects involved, are ultimately
determined in pragmatic contexts. Perception is, therefore, always relational and direct, for
nothing stands between mind and world. This leads us to the second reason, i.e., that the
veridicality/non-veridicality distinction is not cashed out in terms of whether some interme-
diary mental entity relates to the external world, but rather in terms of whether perception
would generate pragmatic agreement. Again, instead of explaining this distinction by refer-
ring to the nature of the objects of perception, perceptual contextualism does so by adopting
a pragmatist account.
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To conclude, perceptual contextualism does not accept disjunctivism but is not a sense-
data theory of perception either. It offers a new way to think of perception, one that takes
into account its active and pragmatic dimensions, to develop a new relationalist view that
deals with problems relating to perceptual error and the nature of the objects of perception.
Moreover, it provides a new perspective to think about relationalism by denying one as-
sumption widely accepted by current relationalist views, namely disjunctivism. Although
more needs to be said in order to provide a full-blown pragmatist view of perception, the
current paper takes one step forward in providing the basis for such enterprise.
1.3 Objections
I have presented and developed the main aspects of perceptual contextualism. In this sec-
tion, I will consider three important objections to the view. The first objection says that
perceptual contextualism cannot make sense of cases of veridical hallucinations, such as
when one perceives one’s environment veridically, but one’s experience is being caused by
something other than the environment. The second objection maintains that perceptual con-
textualism does not offer a reasonable account of illusions because it fails to acknowledge
that well-known cases of illusions, such as the Müller-Lyer illusion, are really illusory. The
third objection says that perceptual contextualism tries to introduce representationalism by
the back door, since it allegedly fails to acknowledge important insights of relationalism.
1.3.1 Objection 1: Veridical hallucinations
Perceptual contextualism claims that a perceptual experience is veridical if it could gener-
ate pragmatic agreement in pragmatic contexts. But if this is the case, one can object that
it cannot explain how two subjects can have phenomenologically indistinguishable experi-
ences of some given object that nonetheless have entirely different causes. For example,
when you look at a newspapers sitting on the table and have a veridical experience of that
object, your partner, who is also looking at the same newspapers, has an experience that
is phenomenologically indistinguishable from yours, but that is being caused by some evil
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scientists manipulating her brain. In this case, you reach pragmatic agreement about the
newspapers, but, the objection goes, there is an obvious sense in which your experience is
veridical, while hers is not. Call this a veridical hallucination.
This objection only follows if we adopt a narrow interpretation of what it means to
reach pragmatic agreement. If pragmatic agreement refers to actual situations where sub-
jects actually reach agreement about the nature of the objects of their experiences, then
it would be true that perceptual contextualism cannot distinguish veridical perceptual ex-
periences from veridical hallucinations. However, as I have argued in section 1.2.2, what
determines whether an experience is veridical is if it would generate pragmatic agreement
in the relevant pragmatic contexts.
What this means in more concrete terms is that, if enough interaction happened in the
pragmatic context of a veridical hallucination, we would find out that despite looking ex-
actly like a veridical experience, it is not veridical. It might well be the case that my partner
and I never find out that her experience was a hallucination, but this is because there are
usually no good reasons to inquire about the nature of this kind of ordinary experience.
Suppose that for some reason we decided to further interact with the newspapers to per-
form various tasks. My partner and I can describe the newspaper in a similar way (e.g., it
has such-and-such properties) but if we were asked to perform an action, such as opening
the newspapers, or using it to kill a fly, there would be clearly some form of pragmatic
disagreement between us. The object causing her experience is different from the object
causing mine, which will make our reactions to the environment differ in some important
sense. The possibility of such disagreement is what distinguishes a veridical hallucination
from a non-veridical one.
One natural reaction to this reply is to say that a veridical hallucination would allow her
to perform the same kinds of action that I would do in that pragmatic context. However, this
will only hold if we make the further assumption that not only her visual experiences, but
all her perceptual experiences, are being caused by something other than the newspapers.
Thus, when she moves her arm to reach for the newspapers, something other than the news-
papers (e.g. an evil scientist) is providing her with stimuli that will allow her to perform the
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right kind of actions in that pragmatic context. We can accept skeptical scenarios like these
as legitimate to think about perception, and many philosophers have done so, but percep-
tual contextualism advises against it. If we accept the idea that veridical experiences and
veridical hallucinations could not possibly result in any practical difference in the world,
which is required by these cases, then the motivation to conceive of them as two different
kinds of mental states seems to lose its appeal.
To see this, consider the related claim that there are two classes of horses, real horses
and virtual horses, but our interactions with them could not possibly result in any practical
differences. Virtual horses do the same things as real horses: we can ride them, they make
the same noises, and if we cut them open, we would find the same organs inside. The only
difference between them is that virtual horses are not physical objects; they only behave
like physical objects, and the reason is that careful scientists are constantly providing the
right causal stimuli to the things interacting with them. Now, if there is no possible way
in which our experiences and interactions with virtual horses could ever differ from our
interactions with real horses, then it seems misleading to suppose that there are such things
as virtual horses. Again, this would only make sense in highly speculative contexts, such
as the skeptical scenario above.
Moreover, accepting the possibility of such skeptical scenarios raises problems to all
theories of perception, for they cast doubt on the coherence of the distinction between
veridical and non-veridical experiences. In this sense, the problem here is not with con-
ceiving of veridicality in terms of pragmatic agreement, but with the very possibility of
knowing whether our perceptual experiences ever relate to anything in the world. But this
touches on further epistemological problems that are not restricted to perceptual contextu-
alism, which does not make it a special problem for the latter. To sum up, as long as we
acknowledge that there could be some practical difference in cases of veridical hallucina-
tions, these offer no problem to perceptual contextualism.
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1.3.2 Objection 2: Illusions
This objection says that there are genuine cases of illusions that generate pragmatic agree-
ment. Consider, for example, the well-known case of the Müller-Lyer illusion. The Müller-
Lyer illusion consists of two parallel lines of the same length, one of which has an inward
“arrow’s head” (two short segments spreading out of each extreme), while the other has an
outward “arrow’s head” that consists of two segments converging to each extreme point.
Now, when normal human perceivers look at this figure, they see one of the lines (the one
with two outward-pointing arrow heads) as being greater in length than the other. This
case is problematic for perceptual contextualism because despite knowing that the lines are
of different lengths, humans continue to see them as being of the same length. Thus, the
objection goes, there are illusions that generate pragmatic agreement.12
The same response applies to this case. In illusions, where things appear to be differ-
ently than they really are, individuals who do not know about the illusion will eventually
be in pragmatic disagreement with those who know it. For example, a person who does not
know the Müller-Lyer illusion will say that the lines are of equal length, but this will result
in pragmatic disagreement with the report of those who know about the illusion. The latter
will say that it appears to them that the lines are of the same length, but they know that they
are perceiving lines of different length.
This response might worry some because it seems to be an arbitrary account of illusions.
To see this, suppose that almost all human beings were wiped out of the planet, such that
only a few who do not know about the Müller-Lyer illusion were left. When these individ-
uals look at the figure, they will pragmatically agree that the lines are of the same length.
In this case, the objection goes, perceptual contextualism would have to say that there is
no illusion because pragmatic agreement is reached. But this is absurd, for it cannot be the
case that an experience is veridical at some time and non-veridical at another time in the
same pragmatic context.
The problem with this reaction is that it assumes that pragmatic agreement provides a
set of necessary and sufficient conditions to distinguish between veridical and non-veridical
12I’m indebted to Kirk Michaelian for pressing me on this point.
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experiences. But, as I argued before, this is an incorrect way to interpret my proposal. By
saying that veridical experiences are those that generate pragmatic agreement, I am not say-
ing that whenever there is pragmatic agreement a given experience is veridical. The whole
point of perceptual contextualism is to emphasize the importance of pragmatic agreement
in understanding what it means to say that an experience is veridical. To see why this is
important, consider the fact that the possibility of there being pragmatic disagreement is
what allows us to distinguish between veridical and non-veridical experiences. In other
words, if a given experience, such as the visual experience of the Müller-Lyer lines, had
never generated pragmatic disagreement, there would be no reason to call them illusions.
On the case above, if those subjects started to investigate how perception works, they would
eventually realize that the Müller-Lyer lines are illusory because there would be pragmatic
disagreement at some point in their investigation. I am not claiming that the metaphysical
status of the experience changed (it was veridical, now it is non-veridical), but only that we
were wrong about it in the first case. We cannot rule out the possibility, although unlikely,
that in the future we might find out that this is not an illusion for some unknown reasons.
While it is tempting to see this “fallibility” as a weakness of perceptual contextualism,
and therefore a reason to reject it, a more positive interpretation is that, instead of relying
merely on fixed intuitions about what would count as a veridical experience and what would
not, perceptual contextualism offers a theory of perception that makes sense of the possi-
bility of us being wrong about how we classify such cases. This is particularly important
for scientific practice, for as Susan Haack (2009) correctly notes, the meaning of scientific
terms, such as “veridical” and “illusory”, often change, and it is a theoretical virtue to have
a theory that can accommodate these changes.
1.3.3 Objection 3: Representationalism by the back door?
A third objection says that rather than providing a relationalist theory, perceptual contextu-
alism is introducing representationalism by the back door. This objection is motivated on
the grounds that, first, the impositional elements of perceptual experiences are elements of
experiences and not of the objects themselves. Thus, perceptual contextualism fails to pre-
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serve the relationalist intuition that perception is a relation to external objects. Second, one
might claim that perceptual contextualism is committed to a view that relationalists deny,
namely, that the perceptual relation is determined only after the identification of pragmatic
contexts. This claim, the objection goes, is more suited to representationalism, for the way
a perceptual system represents the world depends on the context where the representation
takes place.13
Let us start by considering the first part of the objection. Perceptual contextualism
says that the impositional elements are the objects of experience. Thus, the impositional
elements are constitutive parts of our experiences. This is not different from the original
relationalist claim that worldly objects are constitutive parts of perceptual experiences. In
this respect, the only difference between perceptual contextualism and standard relationalist
views lies in how to classify the objects of our experiences. While the standard relationalist
says that they are ordinary material objects, the perceptual contextualist says that they are
impositional elements that are forced on our consciousness. But this disagreement is not a
disagreement about the nature of perception (i.e., both standard relationalists and percep-
tual contextualists believe that it is essentially relational), but instead a disagreement about
the nature of the objects of perception. As long as both views are in agreement that percep-
tion involves a relation to things external to itself, there is no reason to see the perceptual
contextualist commitment to impositional elements as being a form of representationalism.
Since this only answers to the first worry, the second worry still remains open. Does the
commitment to pragmatic contexts prevent perceptual contextualism from being a relation-
alist theory? This objection only holds if we accept that relationalism is necessarily com-
mitted to disjunctivism. That is, the reason why standard relationalist views are committed
to the idea that the nature of the perceptual relation is determined before the identification of
pragmatic contexts is that they assume, as a matter of definition, that a mental state is either
a perceptual state (when there is a relation to an external object) or something else entirely.
Conversely, perceptual contextualism denies disjunctivism and says that both veridical and
non-veridical experiences are genuine cases of perception, and that the distinction between
13I’m grateful to one anonymous referee for raising this objection.
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veridical and non-veridical experiences is to be given in pragmatic contexts. As a result,
perceptual contextualism ends up offering a stronger version of relationalism, that is, one
that recognizes that all perception is relational, and that veridicality is to be assessed in
pragmatic contexts. This shows us that it is mistaken to think of perceptual contextualism
as a form of representationalism, for the reason why standard relationalist views reject that
the perceptual relation can be identified only in pragmatic contexts results primarily from





This chapter presents my final discussion of perception in the thesis. I develop a theory of
perception that reconciles representationalism and relationalism by relying on pragmatist
ideas. I call it the pragmatic view of perception. I argue that fully reconciling representa-
tionalism and relationalism requires, first, providing a theory in which how we perceive the
world involves representations; second, preserving the idea that perception is constitutively
shaped by its objects; and third, offering a direct realist account of perception. This consti-
tutes what I call the Hybrid Triad. I discuss how Charles Peirce’s theory of perception can
provide a framework for such a view and I devote the rest of the chapter to developing my
own pragmatic and Peircean theory of perception. In particular, I argue that considering
perception as a continuous temporal process, which essentially involves interaction with
the environment, allows us to do justice to the Hybrid Triad. I motivate this view by dis-
cussing how a pragmatic theory of perception would deal with issues such as the distinction
between veridical and non-veridical experiences and the nature of perceptual objects.
Chapter 2 expands various topics discussed in Chapter 1, but now offering a different
take on them. As I pointed out in the introduction to Chapter 1, my study of the works of
Charles Peirce made me realize that the best way to characterize his pragmatist theory of
perception in relation to contemporary philosophy of perception is to frame it as a hybrid
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representational-relational theory. More importantly, though, the hybrid approach offered
by Peirce’s theory differs in important ways from current hybrid approaches. Current hybrid
views of perception have relied too much on ‘austere’ representationalism, which has made
them unappealing to relationalists. Chapter 2 can be viewed as an attempt to counterbalance
this tendency. By introducing what I call a “Hybrid Triad”, I try to develop a hybrid view
that does justice to ‘austere’ relationalist insights. Such a view requires, however, taking
on some commitments that are unfamiliar to, and are often viewed as highly implausible
by, analytic philosophers. While this is a worry that is expected to arise when an unfamiliar
view is put on the table, the discussion of perception in Chapter 2 can still be insightful for
those who are not willing to get on board with Peirce’s pragmatism for at least two reasons.
The first reason is that the current status of hybrid theories in the contemporary literature is
still unclear, and, to my knowledge, no effort to develop a relationalist-inspired hybrid view
has been made. In this respect, Chapter 2 offers the first systematic discussion of this topic.
The second reason is that, while Peirce’s theory of perception might require committing to
some unfamiliar views, Chapter 2 sets the stage for further pragmatist approaches to the
philosophy of perception. In particular, given the unbalanced focus on austere representa-
tionalism in hybrid approaches, the suggestion that pragmatism provides a hybrid route for
those who are more sympathetic to austere relationalism can be viewed as a initial motiva-
tion for them to develop alternative pragmatist theories of perception that will require less
unfamiliar commitments.
Besides this shift to a hybrid approach, Chapter 2 also highlights important develop-
ments in my thinking about the notion of pragmatic agreement. Partly due to a more
nuanced understanding of Peirce’s theory of perception in relation to his semiotics, and
partly due to a better grasp of the overall place of Peirce’s pragmatism in relation to other
pragmatist views, Chapter 2 employs a notion of pragmatic agreement where contexts of
“agreement” — the pragmatic contexts — are understood as being ideal or counterfac-
tual situations, as opposed to actual situations, which was the underlying interpretation
employed in Chapter 1.1 This provides an important improvement over the proposal in
1While I hint sometimes at a counterfactual characterization in Chapter 1, this characterization is not yet
wholly integrated into the overall framework of my proposal there.
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Chapter 1, as the worries about anti-realism that arose there can now be approached in a
more effective way.
In terms of its place in the thesis, Chapter 2 closes Part I, which is dedicated to per-
ception. However, because some of the work done in Chapter 3 still relies on it, it will be
important to clarify the connection between these two chapters. One important notion that
is introduced in Chapter 2 is the notion of a pragmatic object. This notion is introduced
and developed in the context of Peirce’s semeiotic, or his theory of signs. Besides offering
a more clear and detailed account of what the objects of perception are in comparison to
Chapter 1, the notion of pragmatic objects will play an essential role in Chapter 3, where
the questions of the objects of episodic memory and of the objects of episodic counterfac-
tual thought are approached. The overall proposal of Chapter 3 is to provide an account
of the objects of different forms of episodic thinking as pragmatic objects. The way this
notion is used in Chapter 2 is not always consistent with the way it is used in Chapter 3.
This is because they are being applied to different domains of investigation. Despite any
possible inconsistencies, the overall idea of pragmatic objects and the motivations behind
its introduction are consistent over both chapters.
Outline
This chapter develops a pragmatist theory of perception that reconciles representational-
ism and relationalism. Section 2.1 surveys representationalism and relationalism and raises
some problems for a recent attempt to reconcile them. I also discuss how a reconciliatory
theory should look. Section 2.2 discusses Charles Peirce’s views on perception and intro-
duces pragmatist ideas to theorize about perception. I argue that acknowledging what I
call the pragmatic dimension of perception is required to fully reconcile representational-
ism and relationalism. Finally, Section 2.3 lays the groundwork for a pragmatist theory of
perception that successfully reconciles representationalism and relationalism.
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2.1 The nature of perception
What is it that determines how we perceive the world? This question has been central in
contemporary philosophy of perception, motivating three different influential views. The
first is representationalism, which takes perception to be essentially a matter of representing
the external world (see, e.g., Searle 1983; Harman 1990; Dretske 2003). Representation-
alists say that when I look at a book sitting on a desk, my visual experience consists in
a representation of that object and its properties. If the book is red and rectangular, my
experience represents the object as being a book, as having the properties of being “red”,
“rectangular”, and so on. What explains how I perceive the world is not how the object is,
but how my mind represents it to be. In other words, “[t]he properties and situations one
is aware of in having an experience... [are the] properties things are represented as having”
(Dretske 2003, 71). This means that “[t]he world needn’t contain [the properties] in order
to be represented as containing them.” (Dretske 2003, 71), for experiences can represent
the world differently than it really is.
The second view is relationalism, which holds that an experience is ultimately shaped
by its relation to an external object (see, e.g., Martin 2004; Travis 2004; Brewer 2007;
Fish 2008, 2009). For the relationalist, the way I experience the world is directly shaped
by the objects and their properties. The reason why I see a red and rectangular book is
that I stand in a perceptual relation with it, meaning that I am directly acquainted with the
book. The objects of perception “shape the contours of the subject’s conscious experience
by actually being the contours of the subject’s conscious experience.” (Fish 2009, 6). That
is, the object shapes the experience by being a constitutive part of it (Martin 2004, 64).
As Bill Fish correctly notes, representationalists and relationalists can agree that the way
experiences present the world to us is the same; what they disagree about is whether the
phenomenology of our experiences is ultimately shaped by the subject representing features
of the world or by the features themselves (Fish 2009, 13–14).
The third view, which I will call hybridism, says that representationalism and relation-
alism need not be seen as exclusive (see Schellenberg 2011, 2014; Logue 2013; McDowell
58
CHAPTER 2. PERCEPTION PRAGMATIZED
2013; Hanna 2015). Susanna Schellenberg (2011; 2014) argues, for example, that per-
ception is partly determined by some internal structures and partly determined by external
objects. According to Schellenberg, external objects can be parts of the content of experi-
ences, but they do not determine, or at least not directly, the phenomenology of experiences.
What makes my experience of the red rectangular book have the properties “red” and “rect-
angularity” are the concepts recruited by the capacities I have to identify particular features
of the environment (Schellenberg 2014, 210). For example, a red rectangular book recruits
my capacity to discriminate things that are books from things that are not books, my capac-
ity to discriminate red and rectangular things, and so on. These capacities and the concepts
employed thus determine the phenomenology of my experience. Therefore, perception is
representational because it is shaped by the capacities recruited and also relational because
objects recruit the capacities.
The motivations for these views vary, but two of them will be important for my pur-
poses. The first has to do with the phenomenological directness of perception. When I see
a red rectangular book, it seems to me that I stand in a direct contact with an external object
that is red and rectangular. Perception is direct, in the sense that I do not perceive redness
as being a property of my experience, but as a property of the book in front of me (see,
e.g., McDowell 1996; Crane 2006; Hellie 2007; Fish 2009; see Millar 2014 for a critical
assessment). The second motivation relates to the nature of illusions and hallucinations.
Illusions, on the one hand, consist in cases in which we perceive an object as having a
certain property when it does not, e.g., seeing the red book as being green under different
lighting conditions. Hallucinations, on the other hand, are experiences about things that do
not exist; for instance, seeing a unicorn in my room. For my purposes, I will use the term
non-veridical experiences to cover both illusions and hallucinations.
Relationalists take the idea that objects shape perception seriously, which allows for
an intuitive account of the phenomenology of perception, for it preserves the idea that
perception is a direct relation to the world. Directness is understood here in relation to the
idea that what fundamentally shapes the way we perceive the world are worldly objects,
and not in relation to the idea that perceptual experiences are directly or indirectly related
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to worldly objects by means of intermediary entities, such as sense-data. So, while most
representationalists would indeed say that perception is direct in the sense that there are no
intermediary entities connecting our perceptual experiences to the world, they would deny
that perception is direct in the sense that it is fundamentally shaped by worldly objects.
In this sense, since it seems to me that I have phenomenologically identical experiences
in either the presence or in the absence of an object — e.g., when I hallucinate a red and
rectangular book — relationalists have to deny that veridical and non-veridical experiences
are both instances of perception, for the latter do not relate to objects.2 This results in a
disjunctivist account of this distinction, i.e., either a mental state is a perception, in which
case it relates to objects, or it is something else entirely.
Representationalists offer an intuitive account of why non-veridical experiences can ap-
pear exactly like veridical experiences. Since my experiences are shaped by how I represent
the world to be, I can have an experience that represents a red rectangular book sitting on
the table when there is no such book — or when its properties are markedly distinct, such
as when I see the book as being green. However, this account is at odds with the idea that
our experiences put us in direct contact with the world, for how the subject perceives it is
not ultimately shaped by how the world is.
As an alternative, hybridists try to reconcile these two views. Susanna Schellenberg
(2011; 2014) argues that veridical and non-veridical experiences can be phenomenologi-
cally indistinguishable because, in both cases, the same capacities to identify a given object
can be triggered. When I have a veridical experience of the red rectangular book, the book
recruits my capacities to identify an object as being a book, as having the color red, and
a rectangular shape. These capacities explain, in turn, why I see a red rectangular book.
However, I can have phenomenologically identical experiences in the absence of objects,
since “[w]e can employ a perceptual capacity even if a relevant particular is not present —
where a relevant particular is a particular of the type that the capacity functions to single
out”, for in such cases, “one could be prompted to employ the capacities due to nonstandard
circumstances, such as unusual brain stimulation or misleading distal input.” (Schellenberg
2Although some relationalists, such as Fish (2009), deny that veridical and non-veridical experiences have
the same phenomenology.
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2014, 211). This account allegedly reconciles relationalism and representationalism be-
cause it preserves the relationship to external objects in veridical experiences and explains
how veridical and non-veridical experiences can be phenomenologically alike.
There are two important problems with Schellenberg’s (2011; 2014) hybrid view. First,
while it provides an account of why veridical experiences involve a relation to their objects,
it is not the kind of relation that matters for the relationalist. As Bill Fish points out, when
the relationalist says that objects shape our experiences, “the metaphor of ‘shaping’ is read
in a constitutive rather than a merely causal sense.” (2009, 6). Therefore, the fact that ob-
jects trigger our capacities to identify their properties consists merely in a causal connection
holding between objects and experiences. Schellenberg’s account fails to incorporate this,
for the subject can have that same experience when the object is not present, that is, as long
as the relevant capacities are triggered.
The second problem is that if Schellenberg’s hybrid account wants to do full justice
to relationalism, then it should adopt some form of disjunctivism, for if her hybrid view
is both fundamentally relational and representational, then there must be a fundamental
difference between veridical and some cases of non-veridical experiences. Since a relation
to an external object is at least part of what fundamentally makes an experience what it is, if
such a relation is absent at least in cases of hallucinations, some non-veridical experiences
will be fundamentally different from veridical ones. But if this is true, then it cannot be the
case that perception is fundamentally relational.
One worry here would be that it is not clear why hybrid views should preserve these
relationalist intuitions. It is plausible to think of hybrid views as attempts to reconcile some
important features of representationalism with some important features of relationalism,
while consistently leaving out some other important features from each theory. In fact,
Schellenberg’s hybrid view is often taken to be a variant of representationalism that incor-
porates relational elements by introducing perceptual contents that are object-involving.3
So, it might be argued that not incorporating all the important relationalist features into a
3Representational views of this sort usually define perceptual content as being structured propositions,
which are partly determined by objects. See, for example, Speaks (2009); Chalmers (2004); Schellenberg
(2010); Siegel (2010) for variants of such views.
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hybrid view is not an inherent problem for Schellenberg’s view.4
In response, I should say that my aim here is not to provide an argument against Schel-
lenberg’s view, but rather to point out aspects of her view that might be seen as problematic
from a relationalist perspective. In other words, in claiming that her view leaves out impor-
tant elements of relationalism, I want to suggest that a hybrid view that incorporates these
elements could be potentially insightful and also more appealing to those with relationalist
inclinations. For this reason, I will simply take it for granted from now on that the under-
lying motivation behind hybridism is right, namely, that to explain perception, we need to
take into account both representational and relational elements. As a result, the following
discussion will be an attempt to develop a hybrid view that is more sensitive to the relational
aspects of perception.
Before moving on, it will be instructive to discuss what a hybrid view should look like
in this context. Preserving the relationalist idea that objects stand in a constitutive relation
to perceptual experiences, and the representationalist idea that perception involves repre-
senting the world, requires acknowledging that perceptual objects can be at least partly
individuated by how the subject represents the world. If the act of representing and how
an object is are completely independent of one another, then it seems impossible to have
a hybrid view that genuinely reconciles the two views above. However, in acknowledging
this, I am not saying that hybridism should accept that perception requires the postulation
of intermediate entities, such as sense-data, between the subject and the world (see Rus-
sell 1912; Ayer 1956). This would mean giving up on another idea dear to relationalism,
namely, that perception puts us in direct contact with the world. I am suggesting, instead,
that hybridism should rethink the idea that how the world is is completely independent of
how we perceive it.5
Therefore, I suggest that a genuine hybrid view should, first, recognize the representa-
tionalist insight that perception depends on how subjects represent the world to be; second,
4I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this point.
5Some might worry that this view flirts with subjective idealism. However, the kind of dependence I have
in mind is intersubjective dependence. In other words, we should recognize that the world is partly shaped by
how multiple perceptual subjects interact with it, as opposed to one single subject (see Zahidi 2014 for related
discussion). For more on this, see Section 2.3.2.
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preserve the relationalist insight that the objects of perception shape our experiences in a
constitutive sense; and third, offer a direct realist view of perception. I call this the Hybrid
Triad. This paper develops a view that satisfies the Hybrid Triad. I rely on Charles Peirce’s
theory of perception in order to show how representationalism and relationalism can be
combined so as to provide a fully consistent hybrid view. I will not be defending Peirce’s
view here, but only take it as a starting point to develop my own pragmatic view. In partic-
ular, I will argue that Peirce’s view that perception is a continuous process of interpretation
of what we sensorily apprehend in our interactions with the world is the key to satisfy the
Hybrid Triad. I then develop this theory in more detail by discussing how it conceives of
the nature of perceptual objects and how it conceives of the distinction between veridical
and non-veridical experiences.
2.2 Peirce’s theory of perception
In this section, I will discuss the main aspects of Peirce’s theory of perception, which intro-
duces an alternative hybrid theory. Peirce’s theory of perception follows a general trend in
classical pragmatism to overcome dichotomies created by opposing philosophical systems,
such as rationalism and empiricism, materialism and idealism, and so on. Peirce wanted
his theory of perception to reconcile both direct and indirect realist theories of perception.
Although the debate between representationalism and relationalism is not strictly about the
directness or indirectness of perception, it presents itself as an updated version of this old
quarrel: i.e., instead of asking whether perception is direct, we now ask whether the objects
themselves, or representations of them, ultimately shape how we perceive the world. In this
respect, Peirce’s view can be instructive.
Peirce says that perception is composed of two important and irreducible elements, the
percept and the perceptual judgment. The percept is that which immediately imposes itself
on us and contributes something positive to our current stream of consciousness. Suppose,
for instance, that you are sitting next to a river thinking about the future. Then, all of a
sudden, lightning strikes the river, and you experience a very intense flash invading your
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visual field followed by loud thunder. Your stream of conscious experiences is abruptly
interrupted by an experience possessing certain features that positively contribute to the
contents of your mental states (i.e., the experience has certain qualitative features such as
a brief but intense brightness in your visual field). The percept, according to Peirce, “is
a forceful thing. Yet it offers no reason, defence, nor excuse for its presence. It does not
pretend to any right to be there. It silently forces itself upon me.” (CP 7.621).6 This
means that, in perception, we seem to be related to something that is external to our own
consciousness and that presents itself as being insistent, in the sense that it is forced on our
consciousness, but makes no claims of any kind (see Haack 1994; Bergman 2007; Legg
2014b; Wilson 2016). The percept “is absolutely dumb. It acts upon us, it forces itself on
us, but it does not address the reason, nor appeal to anything for support” (CP 7.622, his
emphasis), meaning that it cannot establish truth conditions alone.
The perceptual judgment, on the other hand, consists in the interpretation of the percept
in propositional terms, such as when we say, “The lightning was very intense”. In opposi-
tion to the percept, the perceptual judgment is abstract, for it prescinds from the immediate
and particular elements of perception in order to establish a general, coarse-grained connec-
tion in propositional form. To use Peirce’s own example, when we see a yellow chair, the
percept conveys the exact qualitative features of that object — e.g., that the object’s color is
a certain tone of yellow. The perceptual judgment, on the other hand, abstracts from these
particularities, focusing instead on a general description of the object, e.g., “x is yellow”.
Like many relationalists in contemporary philosophy of perception (see, e.g., Travis
2004 and Genone 2014), Peirce acknowledges that there is an important sense in which
perception is “silent”. The percept is not the kind of thing that is either “true” or “false”;
it is just imposed on us and does not depend on anything else to be what it is. The “dis-
cursive” or representational aspect of perception that allows me to say that I see a yellow
chair is introduced by the perceptual judgment. The perceptual judgment announces its
representation of something, and hence it can be said to be either true or false (CP 7.630).
While the percept delivers us particular objects which have a particular color, shape, etc.,
6For convenience, I refer to Peirce’s work from the Collected Papers.
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the perceptual judgment abstracts from these particular properties to form propositional
judgments.
One important problem is how to understand the relationship between the percept and
the perceptual judgment. Two points are of interest here. The first relates to Peirce’s
claim that the distinction between the percept and the perceptual judgment is analytical
(CP 7.626–36), that is, it is intended to help us understand two conceptually distinct ele-
ments of perception, rather than to establish a clear-cut division in how perception unfolds
in time. This idea is reflected in his introduction of the notion of the percipuum, which is
the analytical moment in which the percept is interpreted by the perceptual judgment (CP
7.643). The percipuum is required because, for Peirce, thought is always a mediation, and
placing the percept as an object of analysis implies standing in a mediated relation to it. So,
the percipuum is not the percept per se, but the first stage at which the perceptual judgment
interprets the percept.
The second point is about the nature of the percipuum. One natural interpretation would
be to think of it as being a single mental state combining both the percept and the perceptual
judgment. But, for Peirce, this is not right, for the percipuum is an analytical rather than a
temporal moment of perception. In the same way that it would be misleading to pinpoint
an exact temporal moment when a given species originated in the course of evolution, it
is misleading to see the percipuum as a single mental state combining the percept and the
perceptual judgment in the course of our perceptions (see also Legg 2014b).
To make these points clear, I will appeal to Sandra Rosenthal’s (2001) interpretation of
the percipuum and discuss how these elements work in perception. Rosenthal distinguishes
between two uses that Peirce makes of the notion of the percipuum. The first use, which
she calls narrow, is when the perceptual judgment captures the percept in relation to a
synthesis of previous percepts. This synthesis is responsible for recruiting certain habits
developed by the subject based on his previous experiences, such that he will perceive the
world influenced by those habits. Consider the case in which I see a red apple sitting on the
table. The perception of this object will be influenced by habits I developed in my previous
interactions with apples; for example, I will perceive that object as something that I can eat.
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It is important to note that this is not a two-step process: I do not see the apple first and
only then form a judgment that it is an object that I can eat it. Rosenthal (2001) notes that,
according to Peirce, perception is not a matter of passively receiving some “given” content
from the world, but rather a “taken”. Thus, when considered in this narrow sense, the
percipuum should not be understood as delivering the subject an “appearance” of the world
that is distinct from it, upon which we further form judgments, but rather as presenting the
world itself from the perspective of the subject’s past experiences.
The second use that Peirce makes of the notion of the percipuum, which Rosenthal calls
wide, is when we form a judgment, in propositional form, that interprets the percipuum in
its narrow sense. These judgments come in the subject-predicate form, such as in the propo-
sition “The chair is yellow”. The difference between the narrow and the wide percipuum is
that the former does not establish any truth conditions, while the latter can be said to be true
or false. However, the truth-value of the perceptual judgment is not solely determined by
its correspondence to some external reality. Peirce notes that merely thinking about a judg-
ment takes time, however short, which implies that, by the time we are finished thinking the
perceptual judgment, the initial percept is no longer present (CP 5.544). The initial percept,
as it is interpreted by the perceptual judgment in the wide sense, can only be remembered
as interpreted, thus allowing for its truth-value to be evaluated only with respect to future
experiences. This means that whether my initial perception of the object will be said to be
“true” or “false” will depend on how my future interactions with the world will take place.
To see how this works, take the apple case again. I see an apple sitting on the table
and I judge (in the wide sense) that it looks red. By the time I finish making the perceptual
judgment, I no longer have access to the initial percept, which makes me unable to deter-
mine whether the perceptual judgment is true of the percept. To determine this, I have to
engage in future experiences with the apple. For example, I could take it outside my house
and look at it in sun light. This would present the apple as being red to me. Or I could
ask another person to look at the apple and tell me its color. This would show whether my
actual interactions with the object conform with what I remember to be the initial percept.
If it does, I might take my actual experience to confirm the past experience, thus making
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it true (or veridical); if it does not, then I might take my initial experience to be false (or
non-veridical) in relation to my actual experience.
One worry is that this view is simply false in relation to how perception actually works.
When one sees a red apple, one does not need to perform any experiment in order to know
that one is seeing a red apple. This is right with respect to how we ordinarily deal with
objects in our environment, and we do not perform experiments with them because we
assume, based on previous experiences, that certain regularities will hold for them. I do
not need to experiment with every apple that I see to know that my judgments about apples
are usually true. In this respect, it is important to note that the truth-value of a perceptual
judgment depends on possible future experiences too, meaning that if we were to perform
actions based on that experience, we would learn that it is true or false.
This point can be further clarified by thinking of perception as analogous to the way
scientific investigation develops. When a scientist is investigating a certain phenomenon,
he interprets what he perceives based on prior knowledge and generates a hypothesis to
explain what is being perceived. In order to determine whether his hypothesis is true, he
has to interact with the phenomenon (e.g., by conducting experiments), such that he will
reformulate certain aspects of his hypothesis, or drop it altogether. Additionally, he has
to see whether other scientists can interact with that phenomenon, and arrive at the same
(or very similar) interpretation or hypothesis. If a certain agreement is reached about the
nature of the phenomenon being investigated, then, and only then, the scientific community
will agree on the nature of the phenomenon, and on the most adequate theory of it. Ian
Hacking (1983) notes, for example, that interaction with the world often comes before we
have a theory of it. He mentions the case of J. J. Thomson and Robert Millikan, who did
not know about the existence of electrons — as we understand the term today — when they
studied electric charge. They could perceptually interact with what we now call “electrons”
through instruments, but it was only when the scientific community learned enough about
electrons, that they could be used to intervene in other parts of reality, thus making them
“real” (Hacking 1983, 262–263). Now, whenever scientists are concerned with electrons,
they do not need to perform experiments to determine their nature, for they take as granted
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that the regularities observed in prior interactions with them would hold in the present
moment.
The discussion above illustrates aspects of Peirce’s theory of perception that will be
central to my proposal in the next section. The first is that Peirce sees perception as being
a continuous and ongoing process in which time plays an essential role. One implication of
this is that Peirce denies that perception is a succession of distinct mental states, meaning
that we cannot clearly distinguish between the role of what is merely given in terms of
sensory inputs (the percept), and how we interpret these inputs (the perceptual judgment).
For Peirce, these are different features of an ongoing process of interacting with the world.
I shall call this continuity of perception over time its temporal aspect.
The second aspect, which is a consequence of the temporal aspect, is that perception
is not a passive process, meaning that fully understanding how we are perceptually related
to the world requires considering, first, the nature of our previous interactions with the
world; second, how we are prompted to act based on what we perceive; and third, how our
interactions relate to the experiences of other individuals. I call this the active aspect of
perception.
These two aspects also highlight an important feature of perception that is often under-
emphasized by most contemporary theories. This is the idea that perception is determined
by our interactions with other individuals in the environment. This is not a new aspect of
perception in itself, but rather an important implication of the temporal and active aspects.
As with the process of scientific investigation, perceptually interacting with the world also
involves evaluating our experiences in terms of how other individuals act, and also in rela-
tion to what we are taught by those individuals. For example, instead of reaching for the
apple to verify if it is real, I can ask other people whether they see the same apple. Their
answer will then influence how I evaluate the wide percipuum formed on the basis of my
narrow percipuum. Hence, there is an important sense in which social interactions influence
how we perceive the world. In the next section, I develop the temporal and active aspects
in more detail and show how they can help us theorize about perception; in particular, how
they can satisfy the Hybrid Triad.
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2.3 The pragmatic view
I will now discuss how a theory of perception inspired by Peirce’s theory can satisfy the
Hybrid Triad. I will call it the pragmatic view of perception. The pragmatic view takes as
a starting point the temporal and active aspects of perception. I proceed by discussing the
representational and relational aspects of the pragmatic view, and apply it to the issue of
the veridicality of perception. This discussion will allow us to see how the pragmatic view
can satisfy the Hybrid Triad.
2.3.1 The representational aspect of perception
I have argued that Peirce’s theory of perception takes the temporal and active aspects of
perception seriously. I do not mean to suggest that other views in philosophy of perception
completely ignore this. My aim in this section is rather to show how we can deal with
important contemporary problems when we think about perception explicitly in these terms.
That said, when I claim that perception is continuous in time, I mean two things: first, that
it is not possible to draw a clear separation between perception and other mental states,
such as beliefs, and second, that perceiving is an ongoing active process and not merely a
succession of discrete mental states.
Note that the first claim is not that perception and beliefs are the same thing. The impos-
sibility of drawing a clear separation between them relates to how perception unfolds in our
continuous interaction with the environment. So, for example, when I see a yellow chair in
my office, it is plausible to say that I have a visual experience of a yellow chair and that I
formed the belief “There is a yellow chair in my office”. For the pragmatic view, the per-
ceptual experience and the belief are continuous in the sense that it is misleading to see this
case as involving a two-step process where we first perceive and only then form beliefs on
the basis of perception. In other words, seeing a yellow chair in my office partly consists in
believing that there is a yellow chair in my office. These two things (perceiving and believ-
ing) are indeed different, but this difference is only clearly visualized in analytical contexts,
meaning that there is no clear way to separate them we we look at our actual interactions
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with the world. Moreover, with respect to the second claim, when I say that perception is
active, I mean that perception is not simply a matter of a subject being sensorily stimulated
by the world. Being perceptually related to the world also requires interacting with it based
on sensory stimuli.
When we consider these two aspects together, it is possible to see how the pragmatic
view makes sense of the “representational aspect” of perception. The fact that perception
develops in time and requires the interaction of subjects with their environment allows
subjects to change, based on this ongoing interaction, their interpretation of what is being
perceived over time. Imagine that I see an apple on the kitchen table and decide to have a
bite. However, after the first bite, I notice that it is a fake wax apple. I then reconsider my
initial experience and realize that it was misleading. That is, I had a visual experience of an
object (the percept) and my initial perception was influenced by my previous interactions
with apples (the percept plus the perceptual judgment yielding a percipuum in the narrow
sense). I thought that the apple looked tasty and that I should have a bite (the percept plus
the perceptual judgment yielding the percipuum in the wide sense). By the time I formed
this perceptual judgment, the initial percept was gone, so what determines whether my
experience is true is how my future engagement with the object would line up with the how
other subjects would engage with the object in that situation.7 Finally, I decided to have a
bite and discovered that my initial perception was misleading.8
Although this is one way in which I can revise my representations of the world over
7Here we stumble on an important notion in Peirce’s philosophy, that of truth. For Peirce, a proposition
would be true if, given enough inquiry about its nature (what he usually called “the end of inquiry”), it would
generate agreement among inquirers. However, Peirce is not concerned with offering a theory of truth, in the
sense of providing necessary and sufficient conditions for truth, but rather an analysis of what it means to say
that something is true (see Misak 2004; Hookway 2012; Legg 2014a). As Cathy Legg (2014a) points out: “
[the] ‘end of inquiry’ [...] is not ‘end’ in the sense of ‘finish’. It is ‘end’ in the teleological sense of ‘aim’ or
‘goal’. Rather than a description of some future time where all questions are settled, Peirce’s explication of
truth is an idealised continuation of what scientists are doing now, namely settling questions about which they
genuinely doubt” (206). What I have in mind here is something similar, but now applied to perception: that
is, a perceptual experience is said to be true or veridical if it generates agreement among relevant inquirers
in relevant situations when their perspectives are taken into account. I develop this claim in more detail in
section 2.3.3.
8One worry with this example is that it assumes that perception can represent high-level properties (see
Peacocke 1992; Siegel 2006; Nanay 2011), such as kind properties, as opposed to low-level properties (see
Tye 1997; Dretske 1997; Clark 2000), such as color and shape. While this is a controversial issue, it is only
tangential to the idea being conveyed here, as the same points could be made in relation to low-level properties,
e.g., in cases where we see objects as instantiating different colors because of different illumination settings.
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time, it is not the only one. In some cases, these revisions require interacting not only with
inanimate objects, such as apples, but with other perceptual subjects in the environment.
Suppose that I arrive one day at my office and see a pink chair in the corner. I do not own a
pink chair, so I simply assume that someone left it there for some reason. However, since I
feel curious, I ask my colleagues whether they know why the chair is there. To my surprise,
I find out that they cannot see the pink chair and they say that the only chair in the room is
my usual black chair. In this case, I have a visual experience of a pink chair and I perceive
that chair as being there based on my prior experiences — i.e., chairs are objects that I
usually see in offices. But when I asked my colleagues if they knew anything about it, I
found out that I was hallucinating the chair, for none of my colleagues could see it.
One worry here is that this will only work if we assume that perception is cognitively
penetrable, which is a highly controversial issue (see Siegel 2006; Stokes 2012, 2013).
Roughly, as Stokes puts it, the idea is that “[...] perception is, sometimes, penetrated by
cognition.” (2013, 647). Note, however, that the example above does not require assum-
ing that perception is cognitively penetrable. The “revisions” are not revisions in the phe-
nomenology of my experience, but rather in the way I evaluate my experience. After talking
to my colleagues and learning that there is no pink chair, I might still continue to see the
chair for some reason or another. The only difference now is that I know that the experience
is not veridical, which I could not tell before by merely introspecting.
These examples show that, while it is true that we form representations of the world
when we perceive, those representations are constantly revised as we interact with the world
and other individuals. For the pragmatic view, perception is representational in the sense
that each individual perceives the world from the perspective of his previous experiences.
These representations prompt subjects to act, thus creating opportunities to reformulate
them. If we understand the representational aspect of perception along these lines, then the
first part of the Hybrid Triad is satisfied.
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2.3.2 The relational aspect of perception
The pragmatic view is also fundamentally relational, which is similarly possible because
of its temporal and active aspects. Relationalists say that the objects of perception shape
experiences in a constitutive sense, meaning that the properties of objects determine how
we see them. Yet, it is hard to understand how this constitutivity can be reconciled with the
idea that perception is representational.
It is important to distinguish here between relationalism, which is a view about per-
ception, and metaphysical naïve realism, which is a view about the objects of perception.
Relationalism says that perception is constitutively shaped by its objects, but does not say
anything about the nature of those objects. Most relationalists, however, accept metaphys-
ical naïve realism, which says that the objects of perception are ordinary material objects,
such as tables and stones, which are completely mind-independent (Brewer 2007, 88). Once
we associate these two views, relationalism is taken to imply that perception is constitu-
tively shaped by ordinary material objects. However, these two views are independent: it
is possible to be a relationalist without being a metaphysical naïve realist about perceptual
objects.
That being said, by saying that the pragmatic view has a fundamentally relational as-
pect, I endorse the first view above, but reject the second. In other words, I believe that
perception is ultimately a relation to what I will call pragmatic objects, which include what
we ordinarily call material objects, but is not restricted to them. Broadly understood, prag-
matic objects are the objects of the mind that promote action. I understand action in two
senses here: first, there is physical action, such as moving my arm to reach for an apple; and
second, there is mental action, such as thinking that an apple looks tasty. To motivate this
view of perceptual objects, I shall introduce what I call the phenomenology-first approach
to perception and then connect it to the temporal and active aspects.
The phenomenology-first approach consists in looking at the qualitative elements of
our experiences without assuming any theory about their nature. When I see a red apple
sitting on a table, the phenomenology-first approach says that I see a thing which has certain
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qualities grouped together, such as color and shape. Moreover, I see that object as being
distinct from myself, in that its existence does not seem to depend on its relation to my
mind. More specifically, what I mean here is that this object seems to resist any of my
attempts to change it — e.g., if I wish that a banana could be red, this wish cannot change
the qualities of the perceptual object. This is all the phenomenology-first approach extracts
from perception: it recognizes that, when I perceive something, it seems to me that I see
some qualities united together, which I call a “thing”, and that thing seems to be something
external to my own consciousness. At this level, I refrain from judging whether the thing is
physical or mental. The objects that we perceive in this minimalist phenomenological sense
and that make subjects to act in the environment, irrespective of whether they are real, are
what I call pragmatic objects.
To further clarify this point, pragmatic objects can be compared to a more familiar
notion, the idea of intentional objects. Broadly understood, intentional objects are the
objects that our mental states are directed at (Brentano 1973; Crane 2001, 2013). Pragmatic
objects are similar to intentional objects in this respect. However, while Brentano (1973)
conceived of intentional objects as being distinctively mental, pragmatic objects are defined
in neutral ontological terms. In other words, they are objects in the sense that they are
the kind of things that minds can be directed at, but facts related to their existence (or
inexistence) are to be determined in terms of the actions that they promote in subjects.
That is why the phenomenology-first approach is important, namely, it requires us to put
aside our knowledge of the world acquired through previous interaction with it to properly
identify pragmatic objects. In this sense, the phenomenology-first approach resembles the
phenomenological reduction proposed by Husserl (1982; 1988), in which we are required
to suspend our “natural attitude” to investigate what is presented to the mind.9
Before we proceed, it is important to highlight an assumption being made here in re-
lation to the neutral ontological aspect of pragmatic objects. That is the view that how we
ultimately understand metaphysical notions, such as existence and non-existence, physical
9While such methodological assumptions might seem controversial for some analytic philosophers, there
has been a growing interest in how the phenomenological reduction can be a useful tool for philosophy of mind
and cognitive science more generally (see Gallagher and Zahavi 2013, ch. 2 for a more detailed discussion).
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and mental, and so on, are best characterized in pragmatist terms. The basic idea here refers
to what Peirce called the pragmatic maxim in his well-known essay How to Make Our Ideas
Clear (CP 5.388). Peirce conceived of the pragmatic maxim as a logical principle that an-
alyzes the meaning of concepts in terms of the conceivable practical effects the concepts
have or would have have in our experience.10 For example, Peirce says that a thing is hard
if it would not be scratched by many other things. The concept HARD is therefore defined
in terms of the effects it would have in our experience if we were to interact with hard
things. The same is assumed here of more general metaphysical notions, which is what
allows us to say that a pragmatic object exists only in relation to the actions that it promotes
in subjects. Instead of viewing opposing notions as discontinuous, the pragmatist opts for a
continuous characterization by appealing to actions (see Menary 2009; Solymosi 2013 for
related discussions).
This is a bold metaphysical assumption to make and a full pragmatic account of per-
ception has to motivate it properly if it is to succeed. However, my scope here is more
modest. I do not want to provide a full-blown argument for a pragmatist view of percep-
tion, but simply show that understanding perception in pragmatist terms can be useful to
deal with a particular issue in philosophy of perception. I will not, consequently, attempt
to defend any pragmatist metaphysics here. By making this assumption explicit, however,
I hope that it becomes clear that, instead of being wrong-headed, the attempt to bring prag-
matist elements to theorizing about perception draws at least part of its motivation from an
independent and well-established philosophical tradition, namely, classical pragmatism.
With these clarifications in mind, let us return to the discussion of pragmatic objects.
The phenomenology-first approach, as discussed above, does not allow us to know much
about pragmatic objects and therefore to take any position on whether they are physical
or mental, or even real (or existent). We only know that we can possibly interact with
them. Throughout the course of our lives, we learn that some pragmatic objects can be
10This is not, however, Peirce’s initial formulation in How to Make Our Ideas Clear. As he later recognized,
his first formulation of the maxim was too nominalist, in that it did not take into account how things would
effect our experiences in possible but not actual experiences. Later in his works, Peirce provided a new
formulation of the maxim in the Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism (CP 5.14), which is the one described
here. Since I do not intend to provide a complete picture of Peirce’s philosophy, I will leave these exegetical
subtleties aside.
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used in a certain way, and that certain regularities hold in our interactions with them. More
importantly, I know that the regularities hold not only for me, but for other people who
interact with those objects. I can talk to my partner about the apple on the table and we can
discuss its properties. If my partner is hungry and decides to eat the apple, her hunger will
be satisfied. The point is that we do not need to make metaphysical assumptions about the
nature of those objects in order to make sense of their role in perception. All we need to
do is to pay attention to their qualities, the effects generated by our interactions with those
objects, and how they allow us to get along with other individuals who can also interact
with them.
This discussion highlights that, on the phenomenology-first approach, we perceive dif-
ferent pragmatic objects, and our interactions with them reveal different regularities. Know-
ing these regularities allows us to interact with individuals who can also perceive those
pragmatic objects. Now, some of those objects will not be useful to engage in further ac-
tions in my environment. For example, if I see a car parked outside but my friends do not,
and I tell them that we can use it to go the beach, that will obviously not be possible. In this
case, my perception has a pragmatic object, but fails to allow me to engage in further inter-
actions with the world and other individuals. Thus, a pragmatic object is said to be “real”
or “not real” depending on the paths of action that I undertake based on my perception of
it, and on whether those actions line up with the actions that other individuals undertake in
the same context.
One might worry that this fails to be a realist theory of perception, in the sense that it
does not say anything about whether the things we perceive are really out there, or mere fig-
ments of our minds. I will address part of this worry later when I talk about the veridicality
of perception, but the pragmatic view is certainly not an anti-realist theory of perception.
The pragmatic view takes a different starting point than most contemporary theories of
perception, i.e., it does not assume beforehand that perception is a relation between two
fundamentally distinct entities, namely, a subjective mind and an objective world. The
phenomenology-first approach urges us to start considering perception blinded from on-
tological theories. Thus, it says that our notion of reality, understood as something that
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exists independent of any perceivers, is a late product of our perceptual interactions with
the world. It is only after we interact with the world and learn which pragmatic objects can
serve as successful guides for action in the environment for different individuals that we
form this notion. An object is said to be “real” when more than one individual can interact
with it, such that they can undertake successful paths of action in the environment. This
view can deliver us a notion of “reality” understood as mind-independence without having
to talk about the nature of the objects in question.
I do not expect to make a complete case for this notion of “reality” here, but only show
that the pragmatic view of perception does not ignore these worries. My claim is, instead,
that all perceptual experiences involve a relation to pragmatic objects. Moreover, I want
to say that pragmatic objects constitutively shape the way we perceive the world. This
preserves the relationalist insight that objects shape experiences and avoids disjunctivism,
because all experiences relate to objects. And once disjunctivism is discarded, we can
understand the relational side of non-veridical experiences without having to say that they
are not instances of perception.
To illustrate this, consider the following example. Imagine that you are at the beach
with some friends, and you spot something floating on the sea.11 At first glance, it looks
like a log to you. Your friends can also see this object, but it looks different to them. John
thinks that it is a broken piece of wood from a boat, and Peter sees it as seaweed. Given
that the object is far away, it is hard to tell with precision what it really is. However, in this
particular context, that black dot floating on the sea stimulated your visual systems, and
each of you “created” an interpretation of what is being perceived based on your previous
experiences.
This case illustrates a situation where different individuals are sensorily stimulated by
the same external thing, but they end up seeing different things. It is natural for us to
ask what these individuals are perceiving. Since we want a hybrid theory that preserves
constitutivity, we cannot simply say that they perceive the same thing, for otherwise they
would not have different experiences. How would the pragmatic view conceive of this case?
11This example has been adapted from Hausman’s (2006) discussion of the relationship between perception
and semeiotics in Peirce.
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The first thing to note is that you, John, and Peter have developed different habits during
your past interactions with the world. So, when you see that thing on the beach, each of you
will interpret it according to your previous experiences. This is Peirce’s percipuum in the
narrow sense. At the initial moment, you are related to different pragmatic objects: a log,
a piece of wood, and seaweed, respectively. You then make judgments about the nature of
this object, e.g., “The black dot on the sea is a log”, which is Peirce’s percipuum in the wide
sense. Note that, despite these interpretive elements influencing how you perceive the black
dot, they influence perception only to the extent that they determine that different pragmatic
objects will be picked up because of them. On the phenomenology-first approach, the piece
of wood, the seaweed and the log are all perceived as objects out there in the environment.
The pragmatic view says that perception is temporal and active, so we should take into
account the future interpretations we make based on what we sensorily perceive. Suppose
that, as the object gets closer, you learn that it is a log. It turns out that the pragmatic object
of your initial perception is the object that persisted, for it allowed you, John, and Peter
to make reliable inferences about the world. Throughout this process, however, you have
been related to different pragmatic objects which have shaped the way you see the world.
I am not suggesting that the initial pragmatic objects are intermediary entities separating
you from the final pragmatic object, but that during the perceptual process, you relate to
different pragmatic objects, and your interactions with the world eventually lead you to
relate to the “right” pragmatic object. This is possible, initially, because your habits make
you pick different initial pragmatic objects, but as you interact with the world, you can
correct your interpretations, such that you end up picking the “right” pragmatic object.
When I say that the initial pragmatic objects are different from the final one, I mean
that they are qualitatively different, but not numerically different. In the same way that the
same object can appear with different colors to a daltonic individual and an individual with a
normally functioning visual system, the same external object can appear as a different object
for me and someone else — i.e., a log as being seaweed. Instead of saying that individuals
represent the same object differently, the pragmatic view says that the same object appears
differently to individuals because of their prior habits, which can be corrected by their
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future interactions with it. Therefore, the final pragmatic object is said to be the “real” thing
residing in the world, but this is not because it has a physical or material nature, but rather
because it is the object that allows subjects to interact successfully in the environment.
This discussion allows us to see how the constitutivity of relationalism can be incorpo-
rated by the pragmatic view. By relying on the idea that subjects perceive different prag-
matic objects because of their past experiences (Peirce’s percipuum in the narrow sense),
we can make sense of how our representations can influence the way we perceive the world
without giving up on the idea that objects constitutively shape our experiences. However,
since perception also involves making judgments (Peirce’s percipuum in the wide sense),
it can only be fully understood in relation to future actions undertaken because of the ini-
tial experience. Thus, when subjects interact with the environment, they revise their initial
interpretations, such that they can eventually pick up the “right” pragmatic object. The
temporal and active aspects of perception are essential in this process, for it is only by ac-
knowledging them that we can understand how subjects can relate to different objects in
the course of perception without saying that those objects stand between mind and world.
This satisfies the second part of the Hybrid Triad, that is, that a genuine hybrid view should
preserve the constitutivity idea.
2.3.3 The veridicality of perception
Can the pragmatic view provide a direct realist view of perception? This is the third part
of the Hybrid Triad and bears on the distinction between veridical and non-veridical ex-
periences. For my purposes here, I take it that veridical experiences are those that deliver
the subject correct information about the external world. To recapitulate the example from
the beginning, when I have a visual experience of a red rectangular book and there is a red
rectangular book in front of me, my experience is veridical. In contrast, non-veridical ex-
periences provide partially or completely misleading information about the external world
to a subject. These are usually classified as either illusions or hallucinations respectively. I
have an illusory experience when I perceive some feature or property of the external world
misleadingly, and I have a hallucinatory experience when I have experiences of things that
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do not exist in the external world.
The dispute between representationalism and relationalism depends, in part, on how
one conceives of the veridicality of perception. One advantage of representationalism is
that it provides a unified account of veridical and non-veridical experiences, which differ
only with respect to the accuracy of a given perceptual experience. Relationalists take a dif-
ference position on this issue, stating that perception is constitutively shaped by its objects.
However, non-veridical experiences can be indistinguishable from veridical experiences, in
the sense that the subject cannot tell, from his own point of view, whether it really involves
an object or not. So, the problem is to explain the possibility of there being similar experi-
ences in the absence of objects. To deal with these cases, some relationalists have argued
that the subject not being able to tell veridical from non-veridical experiences does not im-
ply that there is no difference between them. In fact, some relationalists, such as Martin
(2004), go so far as to claim that the only similarity between veridical and non-veridical
experience is the fact that they are indistinguishable. This results in a bold metaphysical
claim, often called metaphysical disjunctivism, which claims that either an experience is a
perception, in which case it is constitutively shaped by an object, or it is a mental state of a
different kind.
How does the pragmatic view conceive of the distinction between veridical and non-
veridical experiences? I have suggested that a satisfying hybrid view should preserve the
constitutivity of relationalism for non-veridical experiences, which casts doubt on the plau-
sibility of disjunctivism. My proposal is that we can avoid disjunctivism and do justice to
the constitutivity idea by claiming that perceptions, veridical and non-veridical alike, are
related to pragmatic objects. Moreover, the distinction between veridical and non-veridical
experiences depends on whether subjects can take successful paths of action based on such
experiences. I shall say that an experience is successful when the subject can pursue paths
of action that allows him to coordinate his actions with both the environment and the actions
of other subjects.
To motivate this approach, let us reconsider the case of the black dot on the sea. Each of
you see different pragmatic objects: a log, a piece of wood, and seaweed respectively. You
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also learn, later on, that the object is a log. At this initial stage, who is perceiving veridi-
cally? One natural answer is that you are the one who has a veridical experience, while
John and Peter have non-veridical experiences. The reason is that your experience captures
how the world is, while their experiences do not. However, if perception is relational, this
cannot be the case, for you, John, and Peter are perceiving the same thing.
The pragmatic view holds on to the initial intuition that you are perceiving veridically,
while John and Peter are not. However, it says that, considered only in relation to their
objects, there is no absolute question of whether an experience is veridical. An experience
is only said to be veridical or non-veridical in relation to what I call pragmatic contexts,
which are broadly understood as the practical situations in which the actions we undertake
on the basis of our experiences relate to the actions that other subjects undertake on the
basis of their experiences. In more detail, I understand pragmatic contexts as being actual
or possible12 situations in which perception could occur, in which (i) the physical consti-
tution, (ii) the biological selective history, (iii) the way a perceptual subject interacts with
the world, and (iv) how it interacts with other perceptual subjects, mutually co-determine
whether an experience is veridical, or not.
Let us explore this in more detail. On the example above, your experience is said to
be veridical because it is the only one that leads to successful inferences about how the
world is in the relevant pragmatic context. In other words, your experience is the only one
that allows you to successfully interact with other subjects in the environment. To see this,
take the case of Peter. Peter’s initial experience is of seaweed. However, as you discuss
the nature of that thing on the sea, you formulate new interpretations of what you see, such
that Peter eventually agrees with you when the object is close enough for him to identify
it as a log. This is only possible because you and Peter are human beings, and therefore
you have a similar physical constitution and you share the same evolutionary history (i
and ii above). Moreover, due to these similarities, you can interact with the world and
evaluate your actions on the basis of your interactions with each other, such that you can
12This is where realism enters into the theory. Veridicality does not depend only on actual contexts of
interaction, but also on possible but not necessarily actual contexts. Therefore, we do not need to say that it
depends on the existence of individual subjects.
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coordinate your actions in the environment accordingly (iii and iv above). Thus, if subjects
can agree on what the pragmatic object of their experiences is after engaging in actions in
the world, then the experience is veridical. Otherwise put, an experience is veridical if it
would generate pragmatic agreement in relevant pragmatic contexts.
Two important clarifications are required. First, although the notion of agreement seems
to imply some kind of verbal communication, I understand it more broadly here. I can reach
pragmatic agreement with other subjects even when there is no verbal communication of
any sort. When I pass the basketball to another player in my team, we are in pragmatic
agreement about what we perceive, for we can coordinate our actions based on how we
perceive the ball. Second, it is important to note that pragmatic agreement depends on
the actuality and possibility of subjects interacting in pragmatic contexts. The example
above seems to suggest that an experience will be veridical or non-veridical only if subjects
actually interact on the basis of it. However, this would imply that if no interaction takes
place, there is no answer to the question of which experience is veridical. I want to say
that the veridicality of an experience depends not only on subjects actually engaging in
actions on the basis of the experience, but also on possible and non-actual paths of action
that would have been the case if subjects had engaged with the experience. In other words,
an experience is veridical not only if it generates actual pragmatic agreement in actual
pragmatic contexts, but also if it could have generated pragmatic agreement if the subjects
had further engaged with the experience. Thus, even if after looking at the object on the
sea you, Peter, John had left the beach, your experience would still be veridical and theirs
would not be, for if you had engaged with them, your experience would be the one to have
generated pragmatic agreement.
To further motivate this approach, let us now consider a hallucination, the pink chair
that I see in my office. The pragmatic view says that the pink chair is the pragmatic object
of my initial experience and it constitutively shapes it. However, when I talk about that
chair to my colleagues, I learn that they cannot see it, and I convince myself that despite
appearances, there is no pink chair. In this case, I have a hallucinatory experience because
my experience failed to be the source of useful inferences about my environment in relevant
81
CHAPTER 2. PERCEPTION PRAGMATIZED
pragmatic contexts, such that I could not coordinate my actions with the actions of other
subjects. That is, individuals who have the same physical constitution and who share the
same evolutionary history with me (i and ii) could not engage in the same actions with the
environment in that context (iii and iv). Therefore, my experience of the pink chair failed
to generate pragmatic agreement, and thus is non-veridical.
It might be argued that this account does not explain cases in which I am perceiving
veridically, but my friends pragmatically disagree with me. For example, it might be the
case that there is a pink chair in the office, but for some reason on another, my colleagues
fail to see it. The pragmatic view seems to imply that my experience is still hallucinatory
in this case. Here it is important to remember that a full account of veridicality depends
not only on the actual, but on the possible interactions that could happen in a pragmatic
context. Thus, while in most situations it is better to rely on actual pragmatic agreement to
assess the veridicality of an experience, this does not mean that this agreement is absolute
or infallible. The idea here is that my experience counts as veridical in this case because, if
other people were to enter the office, they would see the chair and pragmatically agree with
me.
One worry likely to arise in relation to this account is that it does not distinguish between
veridical and illusory experiences. A number of illusions do generate pragmatic agreement,
but we still take them to be non-veridical. For example, in the Müller-Lyer case, where we
see two lines as being of different lengths when they are not, due to the arrows attached
to their extremities, we might pragmatically agree that the lines are of different lengths.
Therefore, the pragmatic view has to say that this experience is veridical. In response, it is
worth noting that we know this experience to be illusory because we further interacted with
it, for instance by finding out that if we remove the arrows at the extremities, we can see
that the lines are of the same length. Thus, the interaction with the lines allows us to see that
the initial state of pragmatic agreement was wrong. It is only then that we pragmatically
agree that the lines are of the same length and that the initial experience is illusory. This
means that the pragmatic view is ultimately fallibilist, in the sense that absolute pragmatic
agreement about the status of a given experience is impossible. Although this might seem
82
CHAPTER 2. PERCEPTION PRAGMATIZED
problematic at first glance, this is what actually makes the idea of illusions and halluci-
nations possible. If we want to be direct realists about perception, then we have to take
our interaction with the world into account, for this is the only way to know that what we
sensorily perceive is actually real. This does not give a complete answer to the problem of
illusion, but I hope it is enough to show that the pragmatic view does not ignore it.
I do not expect this to be a full account of the veridical and non-veridical distinction,
but rather an outline of how we can think of it in pragmatic terms. However, one important
worry relates to perception in the animal realm. The definition of pragmatic context seems
to be restricted to individuals belonging to the same species, thus ignoring the fact that other
animals are perceptually related to the same world as humans. The pragmatic view does
not preclude humans from pragmatically agreeing with non-human animals. The difference
in these cases is that the relevant pragmatic contexts will differ across different species.
Suppose that I am standing next to a pigeon and a crazy person throws a brick at me. Both
the pigeon and I see the brick approaching and dodge it, for we see it as a potential source of
harm. According to the definition above, I am in pragmatic agreement with the pigeon, for
we perceive the object in similar relevant ways, which allows us to engage in further actions
to achieve an end, i.e., avoiding being hit. However, pigeons are tetrachromatic animals,
as opposed to humans, who are trichromatic, which makes us see colors differently. If
we could devise an experiment in which pigeons were required to identify the color of
that object, there would be likely pragmatic disagreement between me and the pigeon. So,
instead of ignoring animal perception, the pragmatic view provides a useful framework to
understand how different species perceive the world differently. On this view, we can avoid
potential problems relating to questions such as which species perceives the world correctly.
We can opt, instead, for a notion of veridicality that is context-sensitive, thus making room
for the idea that different species can veridically perceive the same world (see Chirimuuta
2017).
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2.4 Conclusion
To conclude, if this view of veridicality is plausible, the pragmatic view can finally offer
a theory of perception that is direct, i.e., perception is directly shaped or constituted by
its objects (the pragmatic objects), that moves beyond disjunctivism. Since perception is
temporal and active, we can say that even non-veridical experiences have objects, and are
constitutively shaped by them, without saying that they are fundamentally different from
veridical experiences. This reconciles representationalism and relationalism on the issue of
veridicality, for the constitutivity idea and the view that veridical and non-veridical experi-
ences belong to the same metaphysical kind are preserved. We are thus left with a theory
that satisfies the Hybrid Triad, that is, it provides a satisfying reconciliation of representa-
tionalism and relationalism about perception. Although this paper has not developed a full
pragmatic account of perception, it has laid the groundwork for the development of such
theory. In particular, it has established the basic framework to think of important problems
in contemporary philosophy of perception, such as the nature of veridical and non-veridical







This chapter is my first attempt (in collaboration with Kourken Michaelian) to deal with the
questions mentioned at the Introduction in philosophy of memory. It starts by considering
the debate over the objects of episodic memory, which has for some time been stalled, with
few alternatives to familiar forms of direct and indirect realism being advanced. The chap-
ter thus moves the debate forward by building on insights from the recent psychological
literature on memory as a form of episodic hypothetical thought (or mental time travel) and
the recent philosophical literature on relationalist and representationalist approaches to per-
ception. The former suggests that an adequate account of the objects of episodic memory
will have to be a special case of an account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought
more generally. The latter suggests that an adequate account of the objects of episodic
hypothetical thought will have to combine features of direct realism and representational-
ism. We develop a novel pragmatist-inspired account of the objects of episodic hypothetical
thought that has the requisite features.
Chapter 3 inaugurates Part II of the thesis, which is dedicated to memory. In chrono-
logical terms, Chapter 3 was written concomitantly to parts of Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.
Because the chapter is a result of a collaboration with Kourken Michaelian, it brings two
bodies of literature together to raise a new question in the philosophical landscape. The
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question of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought, as we call it, is an updated version
of the question of the objects of memory in the context of recent empirical work done in
psychology. The proposal of the chapter is to motivate this question and provide a positive
solution to it. The positive solution that we offer is what we call the pragmatic approach to,
or the pragmatic view of, the objects of episodic hypothetical thought.
The pragmatic approach to episodic hypothetical thought is based on the pragmatic
view of perception developed in Chapter 2. The notion of pragmatic objects reappears
here, but now applied to single out the events that serve as objects for episodic hypothetical
thoughts. The phenomenology first approach, which is an important element in Chapter
2, also appears here when I discuss how to individuate pragmatic objects, but I do not
use this specific terminology here. One important conceptual contribution of this chapter,
particularly in relation to the pragmatist-inspired work that I have done in the thesis, is that
the formulation of the notion of habits of action is first given here. While the idea behind
the notion was already present in Chapter 2, it now receives a clearer and more detailed
treatment.
One important discontinuity between Chapters 1 and 2, on the one hand, and Chapter 3,
on the other hand, is the fact that considerations about pragmatic agreement do not appear in
Chapter 3. This is a question that is likely to come up for the reader, so I shall say something
about it here. When I first started thinking about memory and episodic hypothetical thought,
I was tempted to adopt the framework that I developed in Chapter 2 in this new topic. In
other words, I wondered if an account of the objects of memory, and likewise an account
of the veridicality of memory, could be given in terms of pragmatic agreement. Despite
there being close similarities between these questions and their perception correlates, an
important difference is that, unlike the objects of perception, the objects of memory are
not contemporary with states of remembering, which makes it hard to see how subjects
can interact with them and reach pragmatic agreement. Moreover, because the distinction
between actual and ideal or counterfactual pragmatic contexts of agreement was not yet
clear to me when I first started working on this chapter, I thought that it would not be
possible to simply transfer the framework of Chapter 2 to Chapter 3. For this reason, the
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strategy I adopted was to apply some elements of the framework proposed in Chapter 2 and
adapt them to conceive of a new framework that could be applied to episodic hypothetical
thought. So, while there are obvious connections between the perception framework and
the one that will be developed here, they are not the same. The closest that I get to providing
an analysis of memory in terms of the framework provided in Chapter 2 is section 3.4.3,
and while the notion of “context of thought” is used there, it is not meant to be the same
notion as the notion of “pragmatic contexts”. The “pragmatic” bit was left out on purpose
because of the difficulties that I just discussed.
Finally, the reader might find it helpful to read the discussion article in the Appendix A
as a complement to this chapter. In that short discussion piece, I provide an accessible dis-
cussion of the main motivations to take episodic memory to be a form of mental time travel
(or, alternatively, episodic hypothetical thought). Moreover, I offer a concise discussion of
the main philosophical issues that arise in the context of this idea, which are explored in
more detail in this chapter.
Outline
This chapter introduces a novel question, the question of the objects of episodic hypo-
thetical thought, and provides an answer to it based on classical pragmatism. Section 3.1
introduces the question of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought and discusses the
motivations to consider it. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 consider traditional accounts of the ob-
jects of memory as possible answers to the question of the objects of episodic hypothetical
thought. Both direct realism or relationalism (Section 3.2) and indirect realism or repre-
sentationalism (Section 3.3) are shown to be problematic. Section 3.4 explores our positive
account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought influenced by the classical pragma-
tism of Charles Peirce. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes by responding to an objection raised
to the pragmatist account.
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3.1 From the objects of memory to the objects of episodic
hypothetical thought
When a subject remembers an event, to what is he related, in the first instance? What, in
other words, are the direct objects of episodic memory? This is the traditional question of
the objects of episodic memory.1 Following Reid, direct realists have argued that the direct
objects of memory are past events themselves. Following Locke and Hume, indirect realists
have argued that the direct objects of memory are not events but rather representations of
events, claiming that it is only in virtue of his (direct) relation to a representation that a
remembering subject is (indirectly) related to an event. Contemporary discussions of the
objects of memory continue to unfold largely within this early modern framework, but the
framework predates the empirical psychology of memory, and we suggest that it may be
time to move beyond it. We suggest, in particular, that it may be time to replace the tradi-
tional question of the objects of episodic memory with a question that takes contemporary
psychological thinking about memory into account: the question of the objects of episodic
hypothetical thought.
Adopting De Brigard’s (2014a) terminology, we use “episodic hypothetical thought” as
a blanket term referring not only to episodic memory (roughly, the capacity to remember
events that occurred in the personal past) but also to episodic future thought (the capac-
ity to imagine events that might occur in the personal future) and episodic counterfactual
thought (the capacity to imagine events that might have but did not occur in the personal
past).2 In philosophy, it has generally been assumed that there is no need for an adequate
positive account of episodic memory to refer to these other forms of episodic hypothetical
thought — that, if they figure in an account of memory at all, they will do so merely nega-
tively, as forms of imagination from which memory must be distinguished. In psychology,
in contrast, it is increasingly taken for granted that episodic memory can be adequately
1The term “episodic memory” originates in psychology (Tulving 1985a). Philosophers have historically
referred to episodic memory using a variety of different terms but are increasingly adopting the psychological
terminology (Perrin and Rousset 2014).
2In section 4, we introduce a fourth category of episodic hypothetical thought: future-oriented episodic
counterfactual thought.
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understood only if it is seen as one instance among others of a more general capacity for
simulating possible episodes. On this view, episodic memory overlaps heavily with other
forms of episodic hypothetical thought — also known as “mental time travel” — at every
level from the neural to the phenomenological. This is not the place to summarize the evi-
dence in favour of the psychological approach (see Michaelian 2016c for a review), and we
will simply take for granted the consensus view that the more general category of episodic
hypothetical thought is prior to the more specific category of episodic memory. This view
suggests that the traditional question of the objects of episodic memory should be replaced
with a new question: What are the direct objects of episodic hypothetical thought? When a
subject thinks about a possible event, to what is he related, in the first instance?
In what follows, we defend a specific answer to this question. Our argument unfolds in
two stages, with the first stage being primarily negative in character. We build in this stage
on two distinct literatures. The psychological literature on episodic hypothetical thought,
on the one hand, provides new insights into the relationship between episodic memory and
other forms of episodic hypothetical thought. The philosophical literature on the objects of
perception, on the other hand, which is considerably more advanced than the literature on
the objects of memory, points to the need for and possibility of alternatives to traditional
forms of direct and indirect realism. Building on these two literatures, we arrive at two
conclusions. In section 3.2, we show that, when the traditional question is replaced with
the new question, as research on episodic hypothetical thought suggests it ought to be, a
previously overlooked problem for direct realism comes to light: direct realists have usu-
ally been disjunctivists, but it turns out that direct realism leads to a form of disjunctivism
far more extreme than has hitherto been appreciated. Indeed, the form of disjunctivism in
question is unacceptably extreme, and our first conclusion is thus that direct realism should
no longer be seen as a viable option. In section 3.3, however, we show that considerations
originally adduced by philosophers of perception demonstrate, when applied to the domain
of episodic hypothetical thought, that indirect realism is equally problematic: episodic hy-
pothetical thoughts turn out to be “silent” in the sense that they do not establish their own
satisfaction conditions. This, in turn, undermines indirect realism, and our second conclu-
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sion is thus that indirect realism should likewise no longer be seen as a viable option.
Overall, the first stage of the argument suggests that an adequate account of the objects
of episodic hypothetical thought will preserve the desirable features of direct and indirect
realism while eliminating those that render them unviable. The second stage of the argu-
ment is positive in character, aiming to develop an account of this sort. We build in this
stage on a third, older literature, finding, in section 3.4, the starting points for an alternative
to direct and indirect realism in Peircean pragmatism and developing these into a detailed
pragmatist account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought. Given its unfamiliar
character, the pragmatist account is bound to be controversial, and, while we cannot hope
to respond here to all objections that the account is likely to encounter, we do, in section
3.5, respond to what we take to be the most pressing objection to the account, arguing that
it can, initial appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, successfully accommodate the
role of autonoetic consciousness in episodic hypothetical thought. Thus, while we may
not succeed in persuading readers antecedently sceptical of pragmatism that the pragmatist
account is the way to go, our third and final conclusion is nevertheless that it represents a
promising avenue for future research in this area.
We note in advance that the argument of the paper is somewhat complex, as it both takes
on an unfamiliar question (the question of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought) and
approaches that question via an unorthodox theoretical framework (pragmatism). We ask
our readers to bear with us. The pragmatist account may be unorthodox, but its ability
to avoid the problems that undermine orthodox direct and indirect realist accounts speaks
in its favour. Moreover, even readers who are ultimately unpersuaded by the pragmatist
account (the second stage of our argument) may be persuaded by the claim that direct and
indirect realism fail to provide adequate accounts of the objects of episodic hypothetical
thought (the first stage of our argument). As this claim does not itself rest on pragmatist
assumptions, it is, we believe, incumbent upon opponents of pragmatism to show how
the objects of episodic hypothetical thought can be accounted for within a nonpragmatist
theoretical framework.
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3.2 Direct realism and extreme disjunctivism
This section sets out the first part of the negative stage of our argument. After motivat-
ing direct realism (section 3.2.1), we describe two problems for the view (section 3.2.2).
The first, the co-reality problem, is a generalization of the co-temporality problem famil-
iar from discussions elsewhere in the philosophy of memory. The second, the problem of
confabulation and misremembering, is a counterpart to the problem of hallucination and
illusion familiar from discussions in the philosophy of perception. Our discussion of these
problems will show that, once episodic memory has been situated as a form of episodic
hypothetical thought, it becomes clear that direct realism implies an unacceptably extreme
form of disjunctivism.
3.2.1 Motivating direct realism
Just as direct and indirect realism about the objects of perception can be seen as particular
ways of spelling out basic relationalist and representationalist accounts of the objects of
perception, direct and indirect realism about the objects of memory can be seen as ways of
spelling out basic relationalist and representationalist accounts of the objects of memory.
According to relationalism, memory is fundamentally relational, in the sense that it neces-
sarily involves a relation between the remembering subject and the remembered event. For
the relationalist, states of remembering involve remembered events as constituents, which
implies that, if one is not appropriately related to an event, one is not literally remember-
ing. According to representationalism, memory is fundamentally representational, in the
sense that it does not necessarily involve a relation between the remembering subject and
the remembered object. For the representationalist, states of remembering do not involve
remembered events as constituents; instead, they involve internal representations, which
implies that one might literally remember despite not being appropriately related to an
event. Relationalism comes in a variety of forms, and it will be crucial to our argument
here that forms of relationalism other than direct realism are available, as the pragmatist
account can be seen as an unusual form of relationalism. Direct realism — which can be
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defined as the result of combining generic relationalism with the naive realist assumption
that the event to which the remembering subject is related is an ordinary, concrete, partic-
ular event — is, however, the only form of relationalism that has so far received sustained
attention, and it therefore provides the starting point for our discussion.
One reason often offered in favour of direct realism is that, unless the indirect realist
can identify criteria that enable the subject to distinguish genuine from merely apparent
memory representations, indirect realism may lead to scepticism about memory knowl-
edge (Bernecker 2008). Some indirect realists have argued that such criteria can in fact be
identified (Michaelian 2016c), but these arguments do not respond to what what is often
considered to be the most intuitively powerful reason in favour of direct realism, namely,
that it aligns with the phenomenological directness of remembering. Its phenomenological
plausibility has meant that, while indirect realism has also found many adherents, direct
realism has remained a popular view.
There are significant disagreements among different varieties of direct realism, but all
direct realists are in agreement on the naive realist assumption identified above. In an oft-
quoted formulation, Laird (1920), for example, maintains that “memory does not mean the
existence of present representatives of past things. It is the mind’s awareness of past things
themselves”. More recently, Bernecker emphasizes that, “on the [direct] realist view, what
one is directly aware of in memory is the past event in propria persona, and not some
representation of it” (Bernecker 2008, 68). Debus is similarly explicit, arguing that “[t]he
[recollectively] remembered object or event itself is a part of the [recollective] memory”
(Debus 2008, 405). There is no hint in any of these formulations that the objects of memory
are anything other than ordinary, concrete, particular past events.
3.2.2 Extreme disjunctivism
Though it remains popular, direct realism faces serious problems. Here, we argue that two
such problems ultimately undermine the appeal of direct realism.
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From the co-temporality problem to the co-reality problem
The first problem arises because the mental state of remembering and the event that is
remembered are located at different points in time, making it difficult to see how the latter
might be the direct object of the former. Direct realism about perception may face a version
of this “co-temporality problem” (as Bernecker 2008 refers to it) as well, since the process
of perceiving takes time to unfold (Russell 1992). But, whereas the object perceived and
the state of perceiving often at least overlap in time, the event remembered and the state
of remembering may be separated by periods of many years, and the problem is arguably
more urgent for direct realism about memory.
Responding to the co-temporality problem, Debus (2008) argues that direct realists can
allow that the past event can serve as the direct object of the present mental state as long
as they assume that the latter stands in the right sort of causal relationship to the former
— in other words, as long as direct realism is combined with the causal theory of memory
(Martin and Deutscher 1966). Given, however, that — as Debus herself emphasizes —
what it is for an event to be the direct object of a mental state is for it to be a constituent
of that state, it remains difficult to see how an event located in the past might be the direct
object of a state of remembering located in the present. Bernecker (2008), who, like Debus,
combines direct realism with the causal theory, argues that direct realists can overcome this
difficulty if they reject presentism, the view that events exist only at the times at which they
occur, in favour of eternalism, the view that events do not cease to exist once they have
occurred (Price 1936). If past events continue to exist once they have occurred, they are in
principle available to stand in constitutive relations with present mental states, and adopt-
ing eternalism might thus in principle allow the direct realist to avoid the co-temporality
problem.
Eternalism is an intuitively implausible view. Some may already be convinced of eter-
nalism for independent reasons. To them, the eternalist solution to the co-temporality prob-
lem comes at no extra metaphysical cost. Others, of course, are not so convinced. To some
of these, the price of the solution may seem to be too high. To others, the price may seem
to be worth paying, but we argue in the remainder of this section that, if direct realism is
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understood as an answer not just to the question of the objects of episodic memory but also
to the question of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought, the cost of the solution goes
up dramatically. It eventually turns out, moreover, to be inapplicable to forms of episodic
hypothetical thought other than episodic memory, rendering it unavailable even to those
convinced of eternalism for independent reasons.
Direct realism about the objects of episodic hypothetical thought as a whole would be
an unusual view, but it is not difficult to motivate. The most intuitively powerful reason
in favour of direct realism about the objects of episodic memory, as we have seen, is the
phenomenological directness of remembering: when one remembers an episode, one (in
most cases) feels as if one is attending to the episode itself, not to an internal representation
of the episode. Similarly, when one imagines a future or counterfactual episode, one (in
most cases) feels as if one is attending to the episode itself, not to an internal representation
of the episode. Thus forms of episodic hypothetical thought other than episodic memory
share the phenomenological directness of episodic memory, and we might appeal to this
shared phenomenological directness to motivate a direct realist account of the objects of
episodic hypothetical thought as a whole. According to direct realism about episodic hy-
pothetical thought, the direct objects of episodic hypothetical thought would be possible
events — actual past events, in the case of episodic memory, possible future events, in the
case of episodic future thought, and merely possible past events, in the case of episodic
counterfactual thought.
Despite its phenomenological plausibility, this account immediately encounters serious
stumbling-blocks. Because direct realism about episodic hypothetical thought holds that
the direct objects of episodic future thought are future events, it faces a version of the
co-temporality problem significantly more severe than that faced by direct realism about
episodic memory. What we might think of as the “extended co-temporality problem” is the
problem of explaining how events that were experienced by the subject in the past, as well
as events that merely might be experienced by the subject in the future, can be constituents
of his present mental states. Building on the eternalist solution, the direct realist might
argue that events do not exist only at the times at which they occur, not only in the sense
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that an event does not cease to exist once it has occurred but also in the sense that it does
not begin to exist only when it occurs. If events are (so to speak) eternal in both directions,
both past and future events are in principle available to stand in constitutive relations with
present mental states, and adopting this extended form of eternalism might thus in principle
allow the direct realist to avoid the extended co-temporality problem.
Extended eternalism does not, however, provide a full explanation of how possible
events can be the direct objects of episodic hypothetical thought. Because direct realism
about episodic hypothetical thought holds that the direct objects of episodic counterfactual
thought are counterfactual events, it faces a problem yet more severe than the extended co-
temporality problem. What we might think of as the “co-reality problem” is the problem of
explaining how events that merely could have been experienced by the subject in the past
might be constituents of his present mental states. In order to avoid the co-reality prob-
lem, the direct realist might argue that events exist regardless not only of when they occur
but also of whether they occur at all. This solution, it should be emphasized, comes at a
much higher metaphysical price — a price on a par with that of modal realism — than the
eternalist solutions introduced in response to the co-temporality problem and the extended
co-temporality problem.
Even if we are in principle willing to pay the price, moreover, the solution is subject to
a fatal difficulty. The original co-temporality problem arose because it was unclear how an
event might serve as the direct object of a mental state despite not existing at the same time
as the mental state. Eternalism provides a solution to this problem, but it does so, as we
have seen, only given the further assumption that episodic memory involves an appropriate
causal relationship to the subject’s experience of the past event. The variants of eternalism
considered here fail to provide a solution to the extended co-temporality problem or to the
co-reality problem simply because, in forms of episodic hypothetical thought other than
episodic memory, the subject has not experienced the relevant events and therefore stands
in no suitable causal relationship to them. In principle, merely possible events might be
available to stand in constitutive relationships with thoughts about them; in practice, it is
entirely unclear what mechanism might enable them to do so.
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The prospects for applying direct realism to episodic future thought and episodic coun-
terfactual thought thus appear dim. Indeed, Debus (2014; cf. Perrin 2016) has explicitly
argued that there is a difference in kind between episodic memory and episodic future
thought, on the ground that, in episodic memory, the subject stands in an experiential (ul-
timately, a causal) relation to a particular event, whereas, in episodic future thought, the
subject does not and could not stand in an experiential (causal) relation to a particular event.
She thus in effect adopts a form of disjunctivism, with episodic memory as one disjunct and
episodic future thought as the other. A subject is, of course, no more capable of standing
in an experiential relation to a counterfactual event than he is of standing in an experiential
relation to a future event; adopting a disjunctivist view of episodic memory and episodic
future thought will thus naturally lead us to adopt disjunctivism about episodic hypothetical
thought as a whole, with episodic memory as one disjunct and episodic future thought and
episodic counterfactual thought as the other.
The problem of confabulation and misremembering
Disjunctivism about episodic hypothetical thought is distinct from traditional disjunctivism,
according to which there is a difference in kind, within the category of episodic memory,
between successful and unsuccessful remembering. Traditional disjunctivism is imposed
on the direct realist about memory by the need to respond to a second problem, a problem
posed by confabulation and misremembering analogous to the problem posed by hallucina-
tion and illusion the need to respond to which imposes a similar form of disjunctivism on
the direct realist about perception.3
Disregarding unnecessary technical details, the argument runs as follows. (1) The men-
tal states at issue in cases in which we remember events that did not occur, i.e., cases of
confabulation (or “memory hallucination”), or in which we remember events that did not
occur as we remember them occurring, i.e., cases of misremembering (or “memory illu-
sion”), cannot have past events as their objects. (2) The mental states at issue in cases of
successful remembering and those at issue in cases of unsuccessful remembering, includ-
3See Robins 2016a on the relationship between the confabulation/misremembering distinction and the
hallucination/illusion distinction.
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ing confabulation and misremembering, have objects of the same kind. Therefore, (3) the
mental states at issue in cases of successful remembering do not have past events as their
objects. While this is not directly entailed by 3, the representationalist invites us to draw
the further conclusion that (4) the direct objects of memory, both in cases of successful re-
membering and in cases of unsuccessful remembering, are internal representations. Of the
steps of this argument, 1 is the least controversial. In order to avoid having to accept 3 —
and hence potentially being led to accept 4 — direct realists have therefore rejected 2, the
claim that the objects of memory must be of the same kind in successful and unsuccessful
remembering. Bernecker, for example, maintains that “[w]hat we are aware of in genuine
memory is different from what we are aware of in ostensible memory. In genuine memory
we are aware of past events. In ostensible memory, if we are aware of anything . . . we are
aware of mental entities” (Bernecker 2008, 74).
Putting traditional disjunctivism together with disjunctivism about episodic hypotheti-
cal thought, it becomes clear that direct realism in fact leads to a disjunctivism considerably
more extreme than has generally been recognized, with successful memory as one disjunct,
and future thought, counterfactual thought, and confabulation and misremembering as the
other. This extreme disjunctivism might seem to be acceptable as long as we take ourselves
to be entitled to single successful remembering out as having a special status. But a look
at, first, the ordinariness of confabulation and misremembering and, second, the centrality
to our mental lives of forms of episodic hypothetical thought other than episodic memory
suggests that we are not so entitled. Indeed, it suggests that direct realism in fact leads
to a disjunctivism so extreme as to be clearly unacceptable, a disjunctivism according to
which the size of the “successful memory” disjunct at best is dwarfed by that of the “other”
disjunct and at worst may be outright empty.
Setting forms of episodic hypothetical thought other than memory aside for the moment,
consider confabulation and misremembering. It is important to note at the outset that, by
positing a difference in kind between successful memory, on the one hand, and confabula-
tion and misremembering, on the other hand, disjunctivism makes what intuitively seems to
be a unified mental phenomenon into something fundamentally disunified. Disjunctivism
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should therefore be seen not as a position which is intrinsically attractive but rather as a
position to which the direct realist is compelled to retreat in order to save his view. It is thus
unsurprising that defences of disjunctivism often implicitly assume that successful mem-
ory is the norm, i.e., that confabulation and misremembering are exceptions to the rule, as
this assumption makes the “successful memory” disjunct seem larger or more central than
the “unsuccessful memory” disjunct, thus minimizing the intuitive implausibility of the
view. The assumption is, however, unjustified. There is no way of estimating the precise
frequency of confabulation and misremembering outside the laboratory, but what we have
learned about the workings of memory from laboratory studies tells us that they must be
very frequent indeed. Loftus and her colleagues, for example, have demonstrated that it is
possible to implant memories of entire events that were not experienced by the subject (Lof-
tus 2005). Crucially, no special technology is required to implant such memories. Simply
having subjects repeatedly imagine an event is often sufficient to lead them to “remember”
it, which suggests that we sometimes unknowingly implant memories in ourselves. Such
cases of confabulation may be relatively rare, but cases of misremembering are likely to
occur more frequently. Again, no special technology is required to induce subjects to mis-
remember. In the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm, for example, subjects who are
simply presented with lists of thematically-related words often end up remembering non-
presented but thematically-consistent lure words (Gallo 2010). Analogous conditions occur
routinely in non-laboratory settings, suggesting that misremembering is anything but rare.
Confabulation and misremembering occur because memory has a reconstructive, rather
than a reproductive, character: rather than being a matter of the preservation of a represen-
tation or a relationship established at the time of experience, remembering is, as Bartlett
put it in his foundational study (1932), always a matter of creating something anew on the
basis both of the subject’s past experience and of his present state of mind. The evidence
for the reconstructive character of remembering that has accumulated since Bartlett’s time
is overwhelming, and we will not attempt to summarize it here (see Michaelian 2011 for
an overview). Suffice it to say that the evidence makes it clear that, while full-blown con-
fabulation appears to be relatively rare in healthy subjects, misremembering is clearly a
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widespread and inevitable consequence of the normal functioning of memory. This sug-
gests that the size of the “unsuccessful memory” disjunct is far larger than traditional dis-
junctivists have taken it to be. Depending on how the argument from confabulation and
misremembering is interpreted, in fact, it may even be virtually empty. Research on con-
structive memory suggests that, because all memories include details not derived from ex-
perience of the relevant events, they inevitably depart to some extent from experience and
are thus to some extent false (e.g., Conway and Loveday 2015). All memories, in other
words, are to some extent mismemories. This goes, for example, even for so-called “flash-
bulb memories”, exceptionally detailed and phenomenologically compelling memories of
dramatic events (Newman and Lindsay 2009). Thus, if the argument from confabulation
and misremembering is interpreted in such a way that it implies that all mismemories belong
in the “unsuccessful memory” disjunct, there may be little or nothing left in the “successful
memory” disjunct.
Turning to episodic hypothetical thought, while it is difficult to estimate the relative
frequencies with which different forms of episodic hypothetical thought occur, there is
every reason to think that episodic future thought occurs quite frequently (D’Argembeau
et al. 2011): from an adaptive perspective, it is to be expected that we spend as much
time thinking about and planning for the future as we do thinking about the past, and quite
possibly more. Much of the time that we do spend thinking about the past, moreover, is
devoted not to attempting to faithfully reproduce past events but rather to exploring what
might have been had things gone differently — that is, to episodic counterfactual thought,
rather than to episodic memory (De Brigard 2014a). Occurrences of episodic memory thus
may account for a relatively small fraction of occurrences of episodic hypothetical thought.
In fact, research on mental time travel, like research on constructive memory, suggests
that direct realism may ultimately be unable to acknowledge any instances at all of success-
ful or genuine memory. The argument from confabulation and misremembering focuses on
cases in which memory is at least to some extent inaccurate with respect to past events. But
there are also cases in which memory is accurate with respect to past events but which di-
rect realism cannot classify as instances of genuine memory. On views such as Debus’s and
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Bernecker’s, we have seen, a past event is able to serve as a constituent of a present state
of remembering only because memory involves an appropriate causal relationship between
the present state and the past event. In other words, in cases in which no causal relation-
ship obtains, the past event cannot serve as a constituent of the present state, regardless of
the accuracy of the apparent memory. In such cases, the present state will, by direct real-
ist standards, fail to qualify as an instance of genuine memory. What mental time travel
research seems to imply, however, is that, even in many cases of accurate apparent mem-
ory, no causal relationship between the present state and the past event obtains (Michaelian
2016a). The overlap among episodic memory, episodic future thought, and episodic coun-
terfactual thought suggests that episodic memory is a form of episodic imagination. Like
other forms of episodic imagination, remembering draws on past experience to simulate a
target event. Forms of episodic imagination other than episodic memory, of course, can-
not and do not draw on experience of the particular events they target; similarly, episodic
memory can but need not draw on experience of the events it targets. In many cases, the
subject’s experience of a target event does play a role in shaping his memory of the event,
and, in such cases, there may be an appropriate causal link between the present memory
and the past event. But even in such cases, experience of the target event is typically not
alone in shaping the memory — there may be equally strong or even stronger links to one
or more other events. And in some cases, experience of the target event plays no role at
all in shaping the memory — instead, the memory builds entirely on experience of other
events. In such cases, memory involves no causal link whatsoever with the past event. The
upshot, again, is that the “successful memory” disjunct may be empty or virtually empty.
This concludes the first part of the negative stage of our argument. To summarize:
The form of disjunctivism traditionally thought to follow from direct realism is already
unappealing. The extreme form of disjunctivism that in fact follows from direct realism is
far less appealing: if extreme disjunctivism is right, genuine memory is, if it occurs at all,
not the rule but rather a rare exception. We conclude that, once episodic memory has been
situated as a form of episodic hypothetical thought, direct realism no longer appears to be
a viable option.
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3.3 Representationalism and the silence of episodic hypo-
thetical thought
Turning to the traditional alternative to direct realism — indirect realism or representa-
tionalism — this section sets out the second part of the negative stage of our argument.
Indirect realism would in principle provide a means of avoiding extreme disjunctivism.
After reviewing the motivation for representationalism (section 3.3.1), however, we show
that it, like direct realism, is subject to a previously-overlooked but fatal problem (section
3.3.2): just as perceptual states are “silent” in the sense that they do not establish their own
satisfaction conditions, so, too, are episodic hypothetical thoughts. This undermines the
representationalist approach.
3.3.1 Motivating representationalism
The most powerful reason in favour of direct realism, we saw above, is the phenomenologi-
cal directness of remembering. The most powerful reason in favour of representationalism,
in contrast, is its capacity to give an account of the objects of memory that avoids both the
co-reality problem and the problem of confabulation and misremembering. Representation-
alism can provide such an account simply because it holds that, when we remember past
events, we are directly related not to events themselves but rather to internal representations
of events.
We take a mental state to be representational if it presents the world as being a certain
way to the subject, i.e., if it has satisfaction conditions. A representational state is accu-
rate if its satisfaction conditions are met by a state of affairs in the world; otherwise it is
inaccurate. Taking episodic memories to be representational in this sense straightforwardly
allows us to avoid the co-reality problem. According to representationalism, when we en-
gage in episodic hypothetical thought, the direct objects of our mental states are internal
representations of events. Because these representations are located in the present, there is
no mystery about how they might serve as the direct objects of present mental states: just
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as the representations involved (on a representationalist account) in perception can repre-
sent scenes that are not before the subject’s eyes or do not occur at all, the representations
involved in episodic hypothetical thought can represent events that occur at other times or
that do not occur at all. Taking episodic memories to be representational also allows us to
avoid the problem of confabulation and misremembering. Representationalism avoids this
problem because it denies that events serve as the direct objects of memory. The difference
between successful memory and unsuccessful memory is to be understood in terms of the
accuracy of the relevant representations: in cases of misremembering, the satisfaction con-
ditions of the representations are met only to some degree, and, in cases of confabulation,
they are not met at all.
Representationalism thus allows us to avoid not only traditional disjunctivism but also
extreme disjunctivism. Because it places memory in one category and other forms of
episodic hypothetical thought in another, direct realism is bound to treat episodic memory
as something exceptional. In contrast, because it says that the direct object of any instance
of episodic hypothetical thought — whether episodic memory, episodic future thought, or
episodic counterfactual thought, and whether successful or unsuccessful — is a representa-
tion, representationalism provides a unified treatment of episodic hypothetical thought as a
whole.
3.3.2 The silence of episodic hypothetical thought
Though it therefore has considerable appeal, indirect realism faces a serious problem. It is
the role that it assigns to satisfaction conditions that allows representationalism to provide a
unified account of episodic hypothetical thought as a whole. But it is also this role that gets
representationalism into trouble, for there is good reason to think that episodic hypothetical
thoughts do not in fact establish their own satisfaction conditions.
We build here on Travis’s (2004) argument for the view that perceptual states are
“silent” with respect to their capacity to establish satisfaction conditions. As Travis ar-
gues, perceptual states cannot be assessed for accuracy alone because there is more than
one state of affairs that will satisfy how things appear to the subject. The satisfaction con-
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ditions are determined, instead, by things that are external to perceptual states, such as the
subject’s doxastic states.4 Consider a pair of scenarios. In the first, you see an apple in the
kitchen and decide to eat it, only to discover that it is a wax apple. In the second scenario,
you see an apple in the kitchen but decide not to eat it, because you know that it is one of
the wax fruits your partner bought last week. The visual experiences at issue in these two
scenarios may appear exactly alike to you, but their satisfaction conditions are arguably
different: the former experience is about a real apple, while the latter is about a fake apple.
Because how the experiences appear to you is the same while the satisfaction conditions
are different, we may conclude that satisfaction conditions are determined by something
external to perception — in this case, your beliefs.
Episodic hypothetical thought, we suggest, is similarly silent. Silence here refers, in
particular, to the capacity of the mental state to determine the temporal location (past/future)
and modal status (actual/possible) of the event. Consider another pair of scenarios. In the
first, you have an episodic hypothetical thought that we would intuitively describe as a
memory of your tenth birthday party. It seems clear to you that you are remembering an
event that occurred in the actual past and not merely imagining a possible future event.
This seems clear to you because you have a set of beliefs that suggest it. You believe,
for instance, that you are currently an adult, that the child presented in the thought is a
younger version of you, and that human development is an irreversible process that goes
from childhood to adulthood. What we suggest is that it is these and other relevant beliefs
that determine that your thought is about an actual past event. Compare this first scenario
to a second, in which you wake up one morning with an unusual set of mistaken beliefs.
You believe, for example, that humans are born adults and become children only later in
their lives. Now, suppose that you have the same episodic hypothetical thought as in the
first scenario. Due to your mistaken beliefs, the thought is now about a possible future
event. Despite still believing that you are an adult and despite taking the person presented
in the thought to be you, your belief about how human individuals develop has changed,
thus changing the temporal reference of the thought. In general, the idea is that, if the same
4Travis himself does not explicitly endorse a doxastic account, but this has been one important develop-
ment of his argument (see, e.g., Antony 2011; Genone 2014).
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thought can refer either to the past or to the future depending on the beliefs that accompany
it, episodic hypothetical thought must be silent with respect to temporal location and modal
status.
Note that the suggestion is not that subjects must be consciously aware of the beliefs
that accompany their episodic hypothetical thoughts and that determine the satisfaction
conditions of the latter, for beliefs can influence thoughts both at the personal level, when
the subject is or can be conscious of them, and at the subpersonal level, when the subject
is not necessarily conscious of them. Thus, even if it seems to the subject, at the personal
level, that there are no relevant beliefs that accompany his thought, it does not follow that
these are not present at the subpersonal level. We come back to this point below.
The silence of episodic hypothetical thought challenges the representationalist approach
to the co-reality problem and the problem of confabulation and misremembering. Consider
the co-reality problem. The fact that the objects of episodic hypothetical thought are repre-
sentations is no longer sufficient to an explanation of temporal reference and of its modal
status, for these are now explained by the beliefs that accompany episodic hypothetical
thoughts. Because, when considered alone, representations can be satisfied by past/future
and actual/possible events equally, and because the reference to past or future and the modal
status of events are established by things external to representations, such as the doxastic
states, temporal reference and modal status cannot be internal features of representations.
Consider the argument from confabulation and misremembering. Representationalism sim-
ilarly has difficulty explaining confabulation and misremembering, for the fact that the ob-
jects of episodic hypothetical thought are representations is also no longer sufficient to an
explanation of which particular event serves as the satisfaction condition for a given occur-
rence of episodic hypothetical thought. Because assessing the accuracy of a representation
requires the identification of the particular event that is being assessed, and because such
an identification requires the determination of temporal reference and modal status, a given
episodic hypothetical thought is said to be an occurrence of misremembering or an occur-
rence of confabulating only in relation to the beliefs that accompany those thoughts.
This concludes the second part of the negative stage of our argument. To summarize:
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The core claim of this section is that episodic hypothetical thoughts are silent with respect
to the temporal locations and modal statuses of the relevant events. It is not episodic hy-
pothetical thoughts themselves but rather the beliefs that accompany them that determine
those features. If correct, the “silence argument” undermines the motivation for adopting
representationalism. We conclude that representationalism, like direct realism, no longer
appears to be a viable option.
3.4 The pragmatist alternative
This brings the first, negative stage of our argument to a close. If our reasoning in sections
3.2 and 3.3 is on the right track, neither direct realism nor representationalism can provide
a viable account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought. An alternative to both
accounts is thus required. The purpose of the second, positive stage of our argument is to
develop such an alternative.
The alternative that we propose draws inspiration from classical pragmatism. An im-
portant aim of pragmatism has always been to overcome dichotomies created by classical
philosophical systems. Among these dichotomies are the opposition between mind and
body (see Dewey 1958; McDowell 1996; Godfrey-Smith 1998, 2010) and the dispute be-
tween direct and indirect theories of perception (see Haack 1994; Bergman 2007; Legg
2014b; Wilson 2016). The latter was of particular interest to Peirce, and, while he did
not himself address the topic of episodic hypothetical thought, Peirce’s attempts to bridge
direct and indirect theories of perception within a pragmatist framework suggests that prag-
matism may contain insights relevant to the question of the objects of episodic hypothetical
thought. Our strategy in the remainder of the paper will thus be to focus on one central
Peircian idea, using it as a starting point for answering that question. This idea is the prag-
matic maxim, Peirce’s claim that the meanings of concepts should be analyzed in terms of
the conceivable practical effects that their referents have or would have. For example, the
concept HARD, which Peirce defined as that which would not be scratched by many other
things, is understood in terms of the effects hard things would have if we were to interact
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with them. We begin (section 3.4.1) by motivating pragmatism. We then develop (section
3.4.2) a pragmatist account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought, showing how the
account handles temporal reference and distinguishes among different kinds of episodic hy-
pothetical thought in a manner consistent with the silence of episodic hypothetical thought
as described in section 3.3. Finally, we show (section 3.4.3) how the pragmatist account
deals with the problems raised in section 3.2 — the co-reality problem and the problem of
confabulation and misremembering — thereby avoiding disjunctivism.
Before proceeding, we acknowledge, again, that readers unfamiliar with pragmatism
may find our account to be outlandish in certain respects. We ask such readers to bear
with us, suspending judgement until they have seen what pragmatism allows us to say
about the objects of episodic hypothetical thought. Moreover, we emphasize, again, that the
arguments for the negative conclusions given in sections 3.2–3.3 does not rest on pragmatist
assumptions. Readers unpersuaded by our positive argument in section 3.4 are thus free to
accept our negative arguments and to develop nonpragmatist alternatives to our account.
3.4.1 Motivating pragmatism
We begin with some terminology. By “pragmatic objects”, we will mean objects of mental
states that are immediately available to the mind, regardless of whether they exist. Objects
such as tables and unicorns are pragmatic objects, because they are immediately available to
us in thought, perception, memory, and so on. But things that we do not usually think of as
“objects” can also qualify as pragmatic objects: mental states, such as a pain, and physical
events, such as the World Cup final, can be the objects of our mental states — e.g., one can
hope that one’s pain goes away or wish to attend the World Cup final. Pragmatic objects
thus resemble intentional objects, as originally introduced by Brentano (1973), in the sense
that they are the things that mental states are directed at. However, while Brentano took
intentionality to be what distinguishes the mental from the physical, the pragmatist account
defended here will treat pragmatic objects as ontologically neutral.
Pragmatic objects are also distinguished from intentional objects by the fact that they
are always seen as objects for action; they are, that is, conceived of in relation to how they
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prompt, or would prompt, subjects to act in virtue of being related to them. By “actions”,
we will mean both physical actions and mental actions resulting from the relation between a
subject and a pragmatic object. For example, picking up a stone on the beach as a souvenir
counts as a physical action because the pragmatic object (the stone) prompts certain bodily
movements. Similarly, thinking of the stone as a good souvenir counts as a mental action
because the pragmatic object (the stone) prompts the occurrence of a certain mental state.
(It is, of course, also possible for pragmatic objects to cause physical actions and mental
actions at the same time, such as when one forms the belief that the stone would be a good
souvenir and therefore moves one’s body to pick it up.)
Because pragmatic objects are identified at the phenomenological level, they are defined
in ontologically neutral terms: they are objects of the mind that prompt action, meaning
that they might or might not exist and might or might not be physical or material. The strat-
egy employed here is thus similar to the phenomenological reduction proposed by Husserl
(1982; 1988). In order to identify pragmatic objects, we suspend our previous knowledge of
the world and focus solely on what is immediately present to the mind (see Gallagher and
Zahavi 2013, 24). For example, when one hallucinates a dog, one’s hallucinatory experi-
ence has a pragmatic object because it prompts one to act. However, when we consider this
pragmatic object in relation to other things that we know about the world, we might infer
that it does not exist concretely, because it is not the kind of thing that would be perceived
by other subjects in the same situation.5
The ontological neutrality of pragmatic objects raises a question: how can we distin-
guish between existent pragmatic objects, such as chairs and stones, and non-existent prag-
matic objects, such as possible objects and possible events? This is where the pragmatic
maxim comes into play. The maxim says that the meaning of a concept is determined by
the practical effects that it would have in experience. In line with the maxim, we propose
to distinguish between existent and non-existent pragmatic objects in terms of the practical
effects these would have in experience. The idea is that pragmatic objects prompt actions,
which, when they enable subjects to deal successfully with their environments, become ha-
5For more detailed discussions of these issues, see Chapter 2, Sect. 2.3.2 and 2.3.3.
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bitual. For example, driving a car for the first time is a complex task that requires constant
attention. Inexperienced drivers find it challenging to change gears, but, as they get used
to driving, this becomes an automatic task. Through repeating the same actions to deal
with the same complex task, drivers develop what we will call a “habit of action”, which
is the ability to reproduce, in current situations, actions that enabled them to deal success-
fully with earlier similar situations. We can distinguish between two kinds of habits of
action. “Teleological” habits of action are developed over the course of an individual’s life
to achieve goals that are relevant to the individual — for example, driving. “Teleonomic”
habits of action are evolved and consequently shared among individuals of the species —
for example, the tendency of the squid to release ink when approached by a predator. This
distinction enables us to distinguish between existent and non-existent pragmatic objects,
for these differ with respect to the kind of habits of action that they recruit.
Consider the visual experience of seeing a dog in a lab. This experience will prompt
certain actions. Suppose that you are surprised to see the dog and ask your colleagues why
it is standing there. They tell you that there is no dog in the lab and that you must be
hallucinating. In this case, you perceive a pragmatic object, but the actions generated by
the object fail to be coordinated with the actions of your colleagues in that situation. In
other words, the effects generated by the pragmatic object of your experience are different
from the effects generated by the pragmatic objects of your colleagues’ experiences. Thus,
despite the fact that your experience has a pragmatic object, the object of your experience
does not exist in the sense that it fails to generate the practical effects that would coordinate
your experience with the experiences of your colleagues. On our account, the difference
between existent and non-existent objects is one of degree and not one of kind. The differ-
ence of degree is explained in terms of the kinds of habits of action that are recruited by
an object. A pragmatic object exists if it recruits teleonomic habits of action in multiple
subjects, thus allowing for the coordination of actions in meaningful ways among those
subjects. For example, to complete a puzzle, humans can coordinate their actions with each
other in meaningful ways because they can identify shape and color in similar ways, which
is only possible because they share certain evolved perceptual capacities. In contrast, a
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pragmatic object is non-existent when it recruits only teleological habits of action, which
usually do not allow for intersubjective coordination of actions. For example, a thought
of a tenth birthday party will recruit different habits of action in different individuals, as
those habits will depend on how each individual interacted with birthday parties in the past.
We thus avoid using ontological notions, such as “physical” and “mental”, to distinguish
between existing and non-existing things. This makes explicit a crucial commitment of
the pragmatist account, which is that, because the objects of different mental states are all
pragmatic objects, they are all fundamentally of the same kind. This commitment is crucial
because, as we will see, it allows us to say that the relationship of mental states to existing
and non-existing objects is of the same kind, which is an important step towards avoiding
disjunctivism.
The motivation that we have offered here for our account of pragmatic objects as the
objects of thought may strike some as insufficient. Supplying a fuller motivation for the
account would require spelling out the particular version of pragmatism underlying it in
more detail. But our intention here is not to provide a general argument for pragmatism
but, more modestly, to show that a broadly pragmatist view can provide useful insights into
the relationship between the mind and its objects. What the pragmatist account offers is
a triadic understanding of mental relations, in which a mental relation is viewed as being
irreducibly constituted by, first, a mental state, second, its pragmatic object, and third, the
actions prompted by their interaction. This “triadic view” offers an alternative to two-
place or dyadic view of mental relations (see Rowlands 2017), according to which they
are constituted solely by how mental states stand with respect to their objects. The key
novelty introduced by the triadic view, in contrast to the dyadic views which are implicitly
assumed by both representationalism and relationalism, is that it gives actions a constitutive
role in the determination of mental relations. In doing so, it offers a new perspective on the
problems for relationalism and representationalism outlined in sections 3.2 and 3.3.
We apply the pragmatist framework to these problems in the remainder of section 3.4.
Our plan of attack is the following. In section 3.4.2, we propose an account of the temporal
reference of episodic hypothetical thought and of the actuality or possibility of its objects
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in terms of the habits of action that are recruited by pragmatic objects. We build on this
account to address the problems raised above for direct and indirect realism, considering,
first, the problem of confabulation and misremembering and, second, the co-reality prob-
lem. With respect to the former, we employ the notion of habits of action to argue that
confabulation and misremembering can be distinguished based on the inferences that sub-
jects make when they are related to pragmatic objects. With respect to the latter, we rely
on the characterization of pragmatic objects as ontologically neutral to argue that their ex-
istence (or non-existence) is determined only in relation to the actions that they prompt in
subjects. In section 3.4.3, we conclude that the account therefore has the potential to avoid
extreme disjunctivism.
3.4.2 Applying pragmatism
We begin with the temporal reference of episodic hypothetical thought. We then consider
the actuality/possibility of its objects.
Temporal reference
As suggested above, the temporal reference of an episodic hypothetical thought — its ref-
erence to the past or the future — depends on the habits of judging that are recruited by
its pragmatic objects. A habit of judging is constituted when subjects interact with prag-
matic objects and form beliefs about those objects. For example, when eating an apple for
the first time, a subject might satiate his hunger and have a pleasant experience, which will
lead to the formation of judgments about apples, such as “apples are nutritious” and “apples
are tasty”. These judgments will then serve as guides for action in future interactions with
apples. If faced with an apple again, the subject will be inclined to perform certain actions
(e.g., eat the apple) rather than others (e.g., throw it away). In short, habits of judging are
beliefs that influence the subject to act in a certain way based on the outcome of previous
experiences. Note that, although one is often aware of some of the beliefs that influence
one’s actions, our account is compatible with the possibility that many habits of judging
influence thoughts sub-personally, i.e., without one’s being aware of their presence.
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On the pragmatist account, episodic hypothetical thought establishes temporal reference
in virtue of habits of judging of this sort. To illustrate, suppose that you are thinking about
how your life will be in ten years. The pragmatic object of your thought is an event in
which there is a person who looks reasonably like you, is ten years older than you are,
and lives in a beach house. Despite individuating a state of affairs, the pragmatic object
does not establish a particular temporal reference. The reference to the future established
by the thought is due rather to the habits of judging that accompany it. For instance, the
beliefs that the person in question looks reasonably like you, that you are not currently that
old, and that situations in which you are older or where you have a beach house are still
to come, allow you to infer that the thought is about a possible event in the future. The
same goes for thoughts about the past. Suppose that you are thinking about your tenth
birthday party. The pragmatic object of your thought is an event in which there is a child
who looks like you when you were ten. Again, despite individuating a state of affairs, this
pragmatic object does not by itself establish a particular temporal reference. The reference
to the past established by this thought is due to the habits of judging that accompany it. For
instance, the beliefs that the individual in question is you, that you are no longer ten, and
that situations in which you are younger have already happened or are no longer possible
allow you to infer that the thought is about the past.
An obvious objection to this account of temporal reference is that it is inconsistent
with the phenomenology of episodic hypothetical thought. When we think about past or
future events, we do not usually engage in higher-order cognitive processes in order to form
judgments about their temporal locations. In most cases, it seems to one that those thoughts
simply present themselves to one as being about the past or the future. We discuss this
objection in detail in section 3.5, where we argue that the fact that temporal reference is
sometimes built into the phenomenology of episodic hypothetical thought is therefore not
incompatible with the claim that it is underwritten by habits of judging.
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Varieties of episodic hypothetical thought
With an account of temporal reference in place, we turn to modal status. On the pragmatist
account, episodic hypothetical thoughts differ with respect to two kinds of habits of action
recruited by their pragmatic objects. The first is responsible for presenting objects as being
located in the past or future. We have just discussed habits of this kind. The second is
responsible for presenting objects as being actual or merely possible. We now discuss habits
of this kind, showing how the two kinds of habit in conjunction enable us to distinguish
among different kinds of episodic hypothetical thought.
An episodic hypothetical thought is an episodic memory when its pragmatic object re-
cruits habits of judging that place it in the past and habits of action that prompt the subject
to act as if the object has been the case before. To illustrate, consider a first scenario. Some
years ago, John decided to save five percent of his salary to attend a music festival that
happens every year. In 2018 (the present), John remembers going to the 2017 festival. The
pragmatic object of John’s thought is an event involving an individual who looks reasonably
like him going to the 2017 festival. John takes this thought to be about the past because
he believes, for example, that the thought is about himself and that situations where he is
younger are in the past. Moreover, because the pragmatic object makes John react to the
thought in a certain way — e.g., he feels nostalgic about the festival and thinks it was a
good idea to have saved money to attend it — the object is presented to him as being actual,
i.e., as being something that happened before.
Similarly, an episodic hypothetical thought is a (past-oriented) episodic counterfactual
thought when its pragmatic object recruits habits of judging that place it in the past and
habits of action that prompt the subject to act as if the object was once, but no longer is,
possible. To illustrate, consider a second scenario. In 2018, John thinks about how the 2017
festival would have been if it had not been definitively cancelled in 2016. The pragmatic
object of his thought is an event involving an individual who looks reasonably like him in a
festival occurring in 2017. John takes this thought to be about the past because he believes,
for example, that the thought is about himself and that situations where he is younger are
in the past. Moreover, because the pragmatic object makes John react to the thought in a
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certain way, e.g., he does not feel nostalgic and he is not disposed to save part of his salary,
the object is presented to him as having been once possible, but not as being possible at the
moment of his thought.
An episodic hypothetical thought is an episodic future thought when its pragmatic object
recruits habits of judging that place it in the future and habits of action that prompt the
subject to act as if the object is possible. This is illustrated in a third scenario. In 2018,
John thinks about how the 2019 edition of the festival will be. In this scenario, the festival
was not cancelled in 2016. The pragmatic object of John’s thought is the event describing
an individual who looks reasonably like him going to the 2019 festival. John takes this
thought to be about the future because he believes, for example, that 2018 is the present
year and that 2019 will follow it. Moreover, because the pragmatic object makes John react
to the thought in a certain way, e.g., he will continue to save his salary every month to
attend the 2018 edition and look forward to the festival, the object is presented to him as
being possible.
Finally, an episodic hypothetical thought is a future-oriented episodic counterfactual
thought when its pragmatic object recruits habits of judging that place it in the future and
habits of action that prompt the subject to act as if the object was once, but no longer
is, possible.6 Note that future-oriented episodic counterfactual thought differs from past-
oriented episodic counterfactual thought only in its temporal reference. Both are thoughts
about things that were possible at a given moment but are no longer possible at the moment
of thinking. This is illustrated by a fourth scenario. In 2018, John thinks about how the 2019
edition of the festival would have been if it had not been cancelled in 2016. The pragmatic
object of John’s thought is the event describing an individual who looks reasonably like
him going to the 2019 festival. John takes this thought to be about the future because he
believes, for example, that 2018 is the present year and that 2019 will follow it. Moreover,
because the pragmatic object makes John react to the thought in a certain way, e.g., he will
not be disposed to save his salary to go to the 2019 edition, the object is presented to him
6Episodic future thought and future-oriented episodic counterfactual thought are not normally distin-
guished from each other; one virtue of the pragmatist account is that it makes clear the importance of drawing
this distinction.
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as having been once possible, but not as being possible at the moment of his thought.
In short, while the particular habits of action recruited will vary from situation to sit-
uation, it is the presence of habits of action establishing temporal reference and habits of
action marking objects as actual, possible, or not possible, that determine the nature of an
episodic hypothetical thought.
One may worry that this account rules out the possibility of entertaining multiple thoughts
about the same event.7 Suppose that, on several different occasions, you entertain thoughts
about your tenth birthday party. Suppose further that the pragmatic object of one thought
describes your friends and family as being there and you as having chocolate cake and that
the pragmatic object of another thought describes your friend and family as being there but
does not describe you as having chocolate cake. If the pragmatist account is right, one may
worry, these two thoughts cannot in fact both be about your tenth birthday party, since their
pragmatic objects have different features. The worry, in general, is that, given that there is
significant variation in how we think about events over time, the pragmatist account implies
that we can never think about the same event twice.
In response to this worry, we invoke the characterization, offered in section 3.4.1, of
pragmatic objects as being identified at the phenomenological level. Because they are iden-
tified at this level, they are silent in the sense that they are not themselves about events in the
world; reference to events, instead, obtains in virtue of the actions prompted by pragmatic
objects. This means that, even if two thoughts have different pragmatic objects, as in the
example above, it does not follow that they are about different events. This would follow
given a dyadic view on which the features of the objects themselves would be responsible
for establishing reference, but it does not follow given the triadic view. On the pragma-
tist account, while some similarity in terms of the phenomenological features possessed by
their pragmatic objects is required in order for two thoughts to refer to the same event, that
similarity alone does not determine coreference. In view of the scope of our discussion
here, we have focused on how habits of action — including habits of judging — establish
temporal reference and actuality/possibility. But reference is also to be explained in terms
7We are grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.
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of such habits. Consider again the example above. Despite the fact that the relevant prag-
matic objects have different phenomenological features — the first describes you as having
chocolate cake but the second does not — both thoughts may refer to the same event if they
involve not only habits that place the event in the past and lead you to act as if it were actual
but also, in consequence, habits that lead you to form the belief that the relevant event is the
particular event of your tenth birthday party. Two thoughts will thus count as being about
the same event as long as their pragmatic objects share some — but not necessarily all —
phenomenological features, there are habits establishing the same temporal reference and
modal status, and there are habits leading the subject to believe that the pragmatic objects
refer to the same particular event. The issue of how episodic hypothetical thoughts refer to
particular events is a complex one, and addressing it in greater detail is beyond the scope of
this paper. We hope, however, that these considerations suffice to show that the pragmatist
account is capable in principle of addressing it.
3.4.3 Avoiding disjunctivism
We have argued that different forms of episodic hypothetical thought can be distinguished
in terms of temporal location and modal status, where these are determined by the habits of
action that are recruited by their pragmatic objects. The problem of confabulation and mis-
remembering, the co-reality problem, and the issue of disjunctivism remain to be addressed.
Addressing these questions will occupy us for the remainder of section 3.4.3.
The problem of confabulation and misremembering
Before we discuss the pragmatist approach to confabulation and misremembering, let us
be more precise about what we mean by “remembering”, “misremembering”, and “con-
fabulation”. We will say that a mental state is a case of remembering if it allows for true
inferences (i.e., inferences to true conclusions) and no false inferences (inferences to false
conclusions) about the past; it is a case of misremembering if it allows for some true and
some false inferences about the past; and it is a case of confabulation if it allows only for
false inferences about the past. However, since genuine occurrences of remembering can
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involve inaccurate elements (see, e.g., De Brigard 2014a), this distinction applies only in
relation to particular contexts. To illustrate, suppose that a subject is trying to remember
how the weather was during his tenth birthday party. If he remembers that the party was
on a sunny day, and if that happens to be true, he is remembering the event accurately even
if he remembers playing with his friend John, when it is false that John attended the party.
Depending on whether we evaluate the mental state in relation to the weather or to John’s
attendance to the party, the assessment of it as true or false will vary. For this reason, we
will say that a putative memory is evaluated in the “context of thought” in which it occurs,
where a context of thought refers simply to the context specifying the elements relevant to
assessing the accuracy of the inferences made by subjects.
With these clarifications in place, the pragmatist account says that a given mental state is
an occurrence of remembering, misremembering, or confabulation depending on the nature
of the inferences that are prompted by its pragmatic object in contexts of thought. The
pragmatic object of a state of remembering prompts only true inferences about the past; the
pragmatic object of a state of misremembering prompts some true and some false inferences
about the past; and finally, the pragmatic object of a state of confabulating prompts only
false inferences about the past. These definitions are compatible with the silence argument
presented in section 3.3 and with the triadic view, since it is the actions — in this case, the
inferences — generated by the interaction between a mental state and a pragmatic object
that explain the differences between kinds of episodic hypothetical thought.
Consider, first, remembering. When one remembers something, one thinks about an
event to which one was once related in perception. The objects of perception, in turn, are
themselves pragmatic objects and recruit habits of action. For example, when you see a
yellow chair, you form the perceptual judgment “the chair is yellow” because the habits of
judging that are recruited are the habits to judge objects with such-and-such properties as
chairs and objects of that color as yellow. If these habits allow you to make true inferences
about your environment, then your experience is said to be veridical. If they do not, then
it is said to be non-veridical. In parallel to this account of the veridicality of perception,
the pragmatist account says that a mental state is an occurrence of remembering when, in
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a given context of thought, the pragmatic object recruits habits of judging that allow the
subject to make true inferences about the past. A “true inference about the past” is, in turn,
one that would be true of the perception of the event. For example, in the birthday case
above, the subject remembers correctly that it was a sunny day because the inferences he
makes on the basis of this thought would also be true of the perception of the event. Note
that we are not saying that the subject needs to be able to perceive the event again but only
that, if this were possible, the inferences generated by remembering would be true of his
perception of the event. Similarly, we are not claiming that successful remembering must
allow the subject to make all the true inferences that perception of the event would enable
him to make but only that it must allow him to make those that are relevant in the context
of thought.
Consider, second, misremembering. In contrast to remembering, a mental state is an
occurrence of misremembering when, in a given context of thought, the pragmatic object
recruits habits of judging that allow for some true and some false inferences about the past,
i.e., some inferences that would be true and some inferences that would be false of the per-
ception of the event. In the birthday case, the subject misremembers because the pragmatic
object of his thought allows for both true inferences (that it was a sunny day) and false
inferences (that he played with John). Consider, finally, confabulation. A mental state is
an occurrence of confabulation when, in a given context of thought, the pragmatic object
recruits habits of judging that allow only for false inferences about the past, or inferences
that would be false of the perception of the event. In the birthday case, the subject confab-
ulates when, in the relevant context of thought, he judges mistakenly that he played with
John because this inference would be false of the perception of the event.
Two points need to be emphasized here. The first is that the account does not require
that the inferences made on the basis of remembering should have been made at the time of
perceiving. For example, the subject above need not have formed the perceptual judgment
“it is a sunny day” during his tenth birthday party for the thought to count as remembering.
The relationship here is counterfactual, that is, the inference made on the basis of remem-
bering is true if perception of the event would have yielded a similar perceptual judgment
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that would be true. So, this account does not require an actual but only a counterfac-
tual correspondence between inferences made on the basis of remembering and perceptual
judgments.
The second point is that the pragmatist account does not require that the habits of action
recruited in remembering match the habits of action recruited in perception. Because per-
ception and memory ultimately relate to pragmatic objects, if such a match were required,
there would be no distinction between remembering something and perceiving something.
The account only requires that the truth-value of the inferences made on the basis of remem-
bering in a context of thought and the inferences that would have been made on the basis of
a perception of the event be the same. This highlights an important difference between the
pragmatist account and causal theories of remembering (e.g., Martin and Deutscher 1966;
see Debus 2017 for discussion). On the pragmatist account, genuinely remembering an
event does not require the preservation of a trace connecting the actual memory to a pre-
vious perceptual state (see De Brigard 2014b; Robins 2017b for discussion). The subject
must have perceived the event at some point in his life, but the connection between remem-
bering and perceiving is established in counterfactual terms, i.e., in terms of whether the
inferences generated by remembering would be true of the past perception of the event.
One might worry that the fact that it does not require the presence of a trace connecting
remembering to a past perceptual experience renders the account unable to distinguish cases
of remembering from cases of veridical confabulation (see Michaelian 2016b; Bernecker
2017). A veridical confabulation is a mental state such that its pragmatic object recruits
habits of action that allows for true inferences of the past but such that the subject has
never been perceptually related to the relevant event. In other words, the subject makes the
right kind of inferences only accidentally. For example, a subject can confabulate being
at the 2002 World Cup Final and only accidentally make true inferences about the match,
such as that Ronaldo scored two goals for Brazil, when in fact the subject did not go to the
stadium. The pragmatic object here prompts true inferences, but these might be due to sheer
guessing. So, this is a confabulatory state that only accidentally happens to be veridical.
Veridical confabulation would pose a problem for the pragmatist account only if it held
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that a subject can remember an event even if he did not perceive it in the past. But this is
not what the account holds. Instead, it holds that we are to look at the inferences generated
by remembering and consider whether those inferences would be true of the subject’s per-
ception of the event. In the case above, the mental state would count as a case of veridical
confabulation rather than a case of genuine remembering because the inferences generated
by the confabulation would not be true of any of the subject’s past perceptual states. One
might reply, however, that there could be cases of veridical confabulation in which the
subject makes true inferences based on a past perceptual state. For example, by seeing
Ronaldo score two goals on television, and not at the stadium, when the subject says that
he saw Ronaldo score two goals at the final, he is making a true inference about the past
based on a previous perceptual state, namely, watching the 2002 Final on television. This
would mean, the reply continues, that the subject is remembering and not confabulating. In
response, we point out that the reply rests on an ambiguity relating to the kind of inference
the subject is making when he says that he saw Ronaldo scoring two goals. In the initial
case described, the subject infers that he saw Ronaldo scoring at the stadium, but this is not
the same thing as seeing Ronaldo scoring on the television. So, the inference he is making
on the basis of his confabulation would not be true of any past perceptual state because it is
not the case that he saw Ronaldo scoring from the stadium.
The co-reality problem
With the problem of confabulation and misremembering out of the way, we turn to the
co-reality problem. The challenge is to explain how events that no longer exist might be
constituents of mental states. Our account appeals here to the neutrality of pragmatic ob-
jects and the triadic view discussed above. The neutrality of pragmatic objects, again, refers
to the fact that they are only said to be existent or non-existent, to be in the past or in the
future, in relation to the habits of action that they recruit. Building on this, the triadic view
says that the nature of a mental relation is irreducibly triadic, in that it can only be de-
termined by looking (first) at the actions generated by the interaction between (second) a
mental state and (third) a pragmatic object.
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By treating the objects of episodic hypothetical thought as pragmatic objects, the prag-
matist account avoids the co-reality problem. Because existence is understood in terms
of the actions generated by the interaction between a mental state and a pragmatic object,
instead of as a property ascribed to the objects of episodic hypothetical thought, the prag-
matist account is not committed to the idea that non-existent things are constitutive parts
of episodic hypothetical thought. So, for example, when a subject thinks about how his
graduation would have been if he had attended another university, the pragmatic object
describing this event is a constitutive part of his thought, but what determines whether his
thought is about an existing or non-existing event is not an intrinsic feature of the pragmatic
object but rather the actions generated by it. This account avoids problems pertaining to the
ontological status of those objects while simultaneously preserving the distinction between
existence and non-existence, which are now understood in relation to habits of action. By
the same token, the co-temporality problem, too, is avoided, for pragmatic objects need not
be located in the past/future in order for them to be about the past/future. Temporal refer-
ence, as we argued above, is established by habits of action. In this respect, the pragmatist
account offers an alternative to the eternalism (Bernecker 2008) discussed in section 3.2,
for it does not require us to say that past events continue to exist in the present.
A worry that arises at this point is that pragmatism is just a form of representationalism
in disguise because, one might say, “pragmatic object” is just a new term for the old idea of
a representation. For two reasons, this worry is unfounded. First, because pragmatic objects
are silent in Travis’s (2004) sense, they do not establish their own satisfaction conditions.
As discussed in section 3.4.1, pragmatic objects establish reference only in the context of
the actions they prompt in subjects. So, unlike representations, which do establish their own
satisfaction conditions, pragmatic objects are silent. Second, traditional representationalist
views are based on discontinuist views of mind and world (see Menary 2009). In contrast,
the pragmatist account incorporates a continuist view, on which the objects of the mind (so-
called “representations”) and the objects of the world (so-called “physical things/events”)
are viewed as being fundamentally the same. In line with the pragmatic maxim introduced
earlier, the difference between them is accounted for in terms of the effects they generate in
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experience. Thus, “pragmatic object” is not just a new term for the old idea of a represen-
tation, as pragmatic objects are incompatible with at least two important ideas associated
with representations.
Disjunctivism avoided
We are aware that the account developed in the preceding sections presupposes claims that
many readers will be inclined to reject. Our primary aim, however, is not so much to
develop a definitive answer to the question of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought
as it is to provide an initial discussion that might serve to set the stage for future work on the
question. Thus, we invite readers unprepared to sign on to the full-blown pragmatist account
to take a more modest point away from our discussion: even if the details of the pragmatist
account turn out to be wrong, the suggestion that a proper understanding of the nature of
the objects of episodic hypothetical thought requires moving away from a narrow focus on
the nature of mental states and their objects to a broader focus including elements external
to this dyad, such as the actions or beliefs generated by their interactions, might be right.
Nevertheless, the merits of the pragmatist approach should not be underestimated, and, in
the remainder of this section, we show how the approach enables us to avoid disjunctivism.
Disjunctivism poses a problem because it postulates a fundamental discontinuity be-
tween remembering and other forms of episodic hypothetical thought (Debus 2014; Per-
rin 2016). This discontinuity, as we saw above, forces the relationalist to adopt problem-
atic commitments in order to save his view. The pragmatist account, in contrast, offers a
framework in which the continuity between remembering and other forms of episodic hy-
pothetical thought is preserved, thus offering relationalists an option that does not require
disjunctivism.8
The discontinuity between remembering and other forms of episodic hypothetical thought
postulated by disjunctivists is grounded in the view that the objects of remembering exist
but the objects of other forms of episodic hypothetical thought do not. As Debus (2008;
2014) argues, remembering involves being in an experiential relation to events which can-
8For a similar proposal focusing on disjunctivism about perception, see Sant’Anna (2018b) or Chapter 2.
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not possibly obtain in other forms of episodic hypothetical thought. In opposition to this
view, the pragmatist account denies that remembering is distinctive because of the exis-
tence of such an experiential relation. Instead, the difference between remembering and
other forms of episodic hypothetical thought is explained in terms of the habits of action
recruited by their pragmatic objects. In contrast to disjunctivism, this account relies not on
intrinsic features of the objects, such as whether they exist, but rather on the actions gen-
erated by them. Thus, because the pragmatist account focuses on action, even if we grant
Debus’s claim that remembering involves a kind of experiential relation that other forms
of episodic hypothetical thought lack, it does not follow that we are dealing here with two
fundamentally distinct kinds of mental states. This makes it possible to say, in turn, that
all occurrences of episodic hypothetical thought relate to the same kind of thing — namely,
pragmatic objects — which allows for an even stronger form of relationalism, one on which
all occurrences of episodic hypothetical thought are relational.
A basic problem for the claim that all occurrences of episodic hypothetical thought are
relational is that it is simply incoherent to say that we can be directly related to things that
have ceased to exist or that never existed in the first place. This becomes a problem for
the pragmatist account only if it is taken to incorporate a dyadic view of mental relations,
which it does not. Dyadic views take mental relations to be two-place relations composed
by a mental state and an object, such that, if one of the constituents is missing, the relation
fails to obtain. So, because the objects of forms of episodic hypothetical thought other than
episodic memory are viewed as non-existent objects, it is not possible for episodic hypo-
thetical thought to relate to those objects. This view assumes, however, that the predicates
“existent” and “non-existent” apply to objects prior to their being parts of mental relations.
The pragmatist account denies this explicitly when it commits to a neutral characterization
of pragmatic objects. By refraining from drawing the distinction by relying on ontological
notions, “existence” and “non-existence” are applied to objects when they are considered
as parts of irreducibly triadic relations; more specifically, those predicates are applied to
objects in relation to the actions generated by the interaction between a mental state and a
pragmatic object. Thus, because the pragmatist account commits to a triadic view of mental
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relations, it does not require that episodic hypothetical thought relate to non-existent things
in the sense implied by dyadic views.
It is important to note that pragmatic objects do not occupy a third and exclusive on-
tological category. The pragmatist account accepts the idea that things either exist or not,
but it contests the possibility of drawing this distinction without taking into account our
interactions with them. In a pragmatist spirit, we do not deny the importance of the distinc-
tion, but we do question the traditional use of ontological notions to frame it. The general
motivation here lies in the conviction, shared by different pragmatist views, that reality is
continuous and that, due to its continuity, the differences between things must be accounted
for in a similarly continuous way.
This concludes the positive stage of our argument. To summarize: We have shown, in
response to the problem of confabulation and misremembering, how a given occurrence of
episodic hypothetical thought can be characterized as an instance of remembering, misre-
membering, or confabulation by considering whether its pragmatic object prompts wholly
true, partly true/partly false, or wholly false inferences. We have shown, in response to the
co-reality problem, how the triadic view and the pragmatist understanding of the existence
and nonexistence of pragmatic objects allows us to avoid the idea that nonexistent things
are constituents of episodic hypothetical thoughts. And we have shown, finally, how these
features of the pragmatic approach enable it to avoid extreme disjunctivism. In doing so, the
pragmatic approach offers an unconventional, but stronger version of relationalism, where
all forms of episodic hypothetical thought are relational. This new relationalist account
has the advantage that it avoids the problems raised to the more traditional versions of the
relationalism — more specifically, direct realism — while preserving desirable features of
representationalism, namely, the idea that all forms of episodic hypothetical thought are
occurrences of the same kind.
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3.5 Pragmatism and autonoesis
With this, our main argument is at a close. The negative stage of the argument (sections
3.2–3.3) is meant to demonstrate that neither direct realism nor representationalism offers
an adequate account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought. The positive stage
of the argument (section 3.4) is meant to demonstrate that the pragmatist approach repre-
sents a promising alternative. While we acknowledge that readers antecedently sceptical of
pragmatism may not be persuaded by the positive stage of our argument, we reiterate that
such readers may nevertheless be persuaded by the negative stage, which does not itself
rest on pragmatist assumptions. We thus look forward to the development of nonpragmatist
accounts of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought.
In the meantime, we offer, by way of conclusion, a response to (what we take to be) the
most pressing objection to the pragmatist account. One might, as we have acknowledged,
object to the account itself on the ground that the metaphysical status of the pragmatic
objects that it posits is unclear. But one might also object to the argument by means of
which we have motivated the account, and it is to an objection of this sort that we want to
respond in this final section of the paper.
Our overall argument for the pragmatist account depends on the argument for the silence
of episodic hypothetical thought developed in section 3.3. The key element of that argument
is the claim that there is nothing internal to episodic hypothetical thoughts that suffices to
establish satisfaction conditions for them. The objection to this claim is simply that, while
perception may indeed be silent in Travis’s sense, episodic hypothetical thought is not, for
it has an autonoetic character. The view that episodic hypothetical thought — or at least
episodic memory — has such a character has been particularly prominent in recent years
(e.g., Mahr and Csibra 2018), but it has long been standard in both philosophy and psychol-
ogy. James, for example, argued that memory involves a “feeling of the past direction of
time” (1890, 650), while Russell saw memory as involving a “feeling of pastness” (1921,
161–162). Indeed, Klein (2015) has argued that this feeling — which has come, following
Tulving’s (1985b) introduction of the term, to be known as autonoetic consciousness — has
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traditionally been taken to be definitive of episodic — as opposed to semantic — memory.
In line with this tradition, Dokic, for example, has recently proposed an account on which
episodic memory is characterized by an episodic feeling of knowing (Dokic 2014). Even
those who are uneasy with the notion of a feeling of pastness typically simply relocate
pastness from the phenomenology of episodic memory to its content. Fernández (2016),
for example, characterizes the content of episodic memories as informing the subject that
they originate in his past experience, and Martin (2001) and McCormack and Hoerl (1999)
have defended similar views. Regardless of whether autonoesis is characterized in terms of
phenomenology or in terms of content, its involvement in episodic memory suggests that
episodic memories are not in fact silent. If this is right, then episodic memories, and per-
haps episodic hypothetical thoughts of other kinds — Michaelian (2016c) has argued that
episodic future thought involves a feeling of futurity analogous to the feeling of pastness —
would, contra our argument, seem to be able to establish their own satisfaction conditions.
It is not clear, however, whether this objection poses a problem for our account, as there
are reasons to think that subjects might have episodic memories that do not involve auto-
noesis. Klein and Nichols (2012) report the case of patient R.B., who, after an accident
resulting in head trauma, could arguably remember events from his personal past without
the sense of ownership that is usually ascribed to episodic memories. For example, in de-
scribing his recollection of studying with friends at MIT earlier in his life, R.B. claims that,
besides seeing “the scene in [his] head” and being “able to re-live it”, he has a “sense of
being at there, at MIT, in the lounge” (Klein and Nichols 2012, 687). However, he adds,
it does not feel like he owns the memory but rather like he is “imagining [or] re-living the
experience [...] described by someone else” (687). As Klein and Nichols describe R.B.’s
case, “he knows [the memories] are his in some sense, but he feels as though they are not
‘owned”’ (2012, 688). On Klein’s and Nichols’ (2012) description, R.B. possesses infor-
mation about the what, when, and where of the events in question and is also capable of
“re-living” them. Moreover, he is able to recall them at will. The only thing missing is the
sense of ownership of those memories. As he puts it, “I could answer any question about
where I lived at different times in my life, who my friends were, where I went to school,
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activities I enjoyed, etc. But none of it was ‘me’.” (Klein and Nichols 2012, 686). Thus,
it seems that R.B.’s mental states resemble occurrences of episodic memory in normal sub-
jects, except for the fact that they lack autonoesis. This suggests that, although autonoesis
is pervasive in episodic memories in normal subjects, it is not a requirement for their oc-
currence. By mentioning R.B.’s case, we do not expect to adjudicate the debate, but only
to show that the claim that episodic memory necessarily involves autonoesis is not uncon-
troversial and, therefore, that autonoesis does not straightforwardly imply that the silence
argument is wrong.
However, even if we set this issue aside and grant that episodic memory necessarily
involves autonoesis, autonoesis can be incorporated into our view. Consider, first, phe-
nomenological accounts. The fact that a memory seems to the subject to be about the
past does not threat the pragmatist account. We have argued that beliefs can accompany
episodic hypothetical thoughts in two ways, personally and sub-personally. While tempo-
ral reference can feature in the phenomenological character of a thought, which is defined
in personal terms, it does not follow that what explains the occurrence of temporal refer-
ence must itself be a personal-level process. Thus, the claim that it seems to subjects that
their thoughts are by themselves about the past is consistent with the claim that tempo-
ral reference is due to beliefs operating at the sub-personal level. This account parallels
doxastic accounts of perceptual error, in which perceptual errors are viewed as a result not
of perception but of the doxastic states accompanying it. On such views, subjects need
not be conscious of the doxastic states that cause perceptual errors in the same way that,
on our view, subjects need not be conscious of the doxastic states that determine tempo-
ral reference. Again, this is because doxastic states can operate at the sub-personal level.
The upshot is that phenomenological features of our mental states including temporal ref-
erence or perceptual error can be consistently explained by sub-personal processes, which
is compatible with the pragmatist account.
Consider, second, content-based accounts. On these accounts, it is possible for autonoe-
sis to be built into the content of episodic hypothetical thought but not necessarily reflected
in its phenomenology. Content-based accounts, we claim, are not incompatible with the
127
CHAPTER 3. THINKING ABOUT EVENTS
pragmatist account. The pragmatist account denies that episodic hypothetical thought pos-
sesses content in isolation from other mental states, but it does not deny that it can have
content when considered in relation to those mental states. Once we consider episodic hy-
pothetical thoughts in relation to the beliefs that accompany them, they are no longer silent
— i.e., they acquire content or satisfaction conditions. So, as long as the possession of sat-
isfaction conditions, and therefore of temporal reference, is explained by this relation, the
pragmatist account can accommodate the idea that episodic hypothetical thought can have
content.
One final objection is that this response is inconsistent with the silence argument, the
central claim of which is that episodic hypothetical thought is not representational and
therefore not contentful. This apparent inconsistency can be resolved by noting that Travis’s
original silence argument does not rule out the possibility that perception may have con-
tent, in the sense of possessing satisfaction conditions, but only that perception itself can be
assessed for accuracy. As long as we consider perception in relation to the things that as-
cribe satisfaction conditions to it, we can talk about it as being contentful. Analogously, the
silence argument provided here does not rule out the possibility that episodic hypothetical
thought may have content but only the possibility that episodic hypothetical thought itself
can be assessed for accuracy. However, if we consider episodic hypothetical thought in
relation to beliefs, nothing prevents it from acquiring content from those beliefs. Thus, the
fact that the pragmatist account is compatible with content-based accounts of autonoesis is





This chapter discusses the relational view of memory in relation to cases of unsuccess-
ful remembering. I start by, first, providing a relational analysis of remembering that is
compatible with the most prominent relational view in the literature, which is proposed by
Debus (2008), and second, by considering how such analysis of remembering deals with
unsuccessful remembering. I argue that the relational view, in its current form, cannot
properly distinguish between successful remembering and different forms of unsuccessful
remembering. I proceed by distinguishing between two ways in which unsuccessful re-
membering can happen: misremembering and confabulation. I argue that the requirement
for the presence of an experiential relation, as defended by Debus (2008), is neither nec-
essary nor sufficient for remembering. This is because there are, on the one hand, cases
of remembering that do not instantiate the relevant experiential relations, and, on the other
hand, cases of confabulation and misremembering that do instantiate the relevant experi-
ential relations. For this reason, if the relational view is to be successful in accounting for
unsuccessful remembering, it will need to provide extra considerations to show how it can
deal with such occurrences.
Chapter 4 builds on an important issue that appeared in Chapter 3. This is the problem
of how relational views of memory deal with unsuccessful or non-veridical memory. Just
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as with relational views of perception, it is not entirely clear how memory errors can be
accounted for in a relational framework. The decision to have a chapter focusing on this
particular issue was motivated by an important gap in the memory literature. While rela-
tional accounts of perception are prominent today, relational accounts of memory have been
largely ignored, and hence there have been very few discussions of them recently. The only
philosopher to clearly propose a relational view in recent years is Dorothea Debus (2008).
Despite her efforts, other philosophers of memory have not felt tempted by relational views.
There are, as I discuss in the general introduction and also in this paper, several reasons for
this. However, the problem of how relational accounts of memory deal with error is perhaps
the most pressing one. Thus, while my project in this chapter in mainly critical of Debus’s
particular version of the relational view, the ultimate goal is not to discredit relational views,
but rather to call the attention of those who might be sympathetic to relationalism to the fact
that they need to engage more effectively with issues pertaining to memory errors.
A second and more instrumental reason for focusing on the problem of relational views
and memory errors is because this will play a crucial role in the argument of Chapter 5.
In my discussion of a hybrid view of memory, I argue that, despite the problems facing
relational accounts of memory, there are good reasons to consider them seriously. Thus, in
Chapter 5, I offer an account of memory that incorporates the attractive aspects of relational
views while avoiding its most pressing problem, namely, the problem of error.
In terms of the overall structure of the thesis, one important thing to note in relation to
Chapter 4 is that pragmatism becomes less present in my discussion of memory. This is
explained by the fact that my approach to the philosophy of memory is largely exploratory
here. That is, given the similarity of the issues in the perception literature and the memory
literature, and given the fact that not many explicit discussions of those issues have appeared
in the memory literature lately, my efforts were dedicated to using my knowledge of the
perception literature to advance some debates in the memory literature. The originality
of the discussions in Chapter 4 (and Chapter 5 too) is not, therefore, so much due to the
proposal of sharp positive views, but rather to the establishment of meaningful theoretical
connections between two different areas and the proposal of new topics for discussion in
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future works.
Outline
This chapter discusses the challenges posed by unsuccessful remembering to relational ac-
counts of memory. Section 4.2 attempts to provide a relational analysis of remembering
that is compatible with one of the most prominent relational accounts in the literature. Sec-
tion 4.3 discusses the problems that unsuccessful remembering raises to relational views:
Section 4.3.1 focuses on cases of confabulation and Section 4.3.2 focuses on cases of mis-
remembering. I argue that the relational analysis extracted from relational accounts cannot
properly distinguish between successful remembering and these two different forms of un-
successful remembering.
4.1 Introduction
The dispute between indirect and direct realist views of memory has occupied a central
place in historical debates. Philosophers such as Locke (1975), Hume (2011), and more
recently, Russell (1912), proposed indirect realist views, where in episodic or recollective
memory — i.e., memories of events that we experienced previously — one is said to be
only indirectly aware of the events that one remembers by being directly aware of ideas (or
representations) that are about those events. In contrast, direct realist accounts, also offered
by different authors, such as Reid (2000), Laird (1920), and Russell (1921), claim that
recollectively or episodically remembering something is a matter of being directly aware
of the past events themselves. For direct realists, there is no intermediary entity connecting
one’s memory to the past events themselves.
The quarrel between these two views, however, is not only about whether memory is
direct or indirect. Another way to see the disagreement is suggested by some recent works
related to a similar dispute in the perception literature (see, e.g., Crane 2006; Brogaard
2014; Locatelli and Wilson 2017). This literature suggests that, in the case of perception,
direct and indirect realists disagree about what perception is at the most fundamental level.
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For indirect realists, perception is fundamentally a matter of representing the world.1 For
direct realists, in contrast, perception is fundamentally a matter of being in certain rela-
tions to the world. For this reason, these views have been called representationalism and
relationalism respectively. In a similar fashion, one can see the dispute in memory as be-
ing about whether memory is, at the most fundamental level, a matter of representing the
past, or whether it is a matter of standing in an appropriate relation to it. As an attempt to
provide an updated characterization that is more in line with the contemporary terminol-
ogy, I shall adopt the terms used by philosophers of perception and refer to indirect realist
views as representational views of memory and to direct realist views as relational views of
memory.2
Despite its importance in historical debates, and despite the prominence of its counter-
part in the perception literature, the dispute between representationalism and relationalism
has not received a lot of attention in contemporary philosophy of memory. There are, I
think, two important reasons for this. The first reason is that the causal theory of memory,
which was initially proposed by Martin and Deutscher (1966), has been predominant in
the last four decades. The causal theory says, among other things, that a subject counts
as remembering if and only if the subject’s current mental state is causally related, in an
appropriate manner, to the past events themselves. The view assumes, as a result, a form
of indirect realism or representationalism about memory. That is, it requires that subjects
1It is important to note that, despite believing that perception is, indeed, a form of representing the world,
most representationalists do not see themselves as indirect realists. Searle (1983), for example, offers a
representational theory of perception that, according to him, is not incompatible with more traditional forms
of direct realism. For him, despite representing the world when we perceive it, we are not aware of our mental
states, but of the objects out there in the world (see also Harman 1990). Representations, on this view, are not
the objects of perceptual awareness, but they are the means by which we become aware of external objects.
Bernecker (2008) offers a similar argument in the case of memory. Since the claim that representationalism
is a form of direct realism has been the topic of controversy (see Locatelli and Wilson 2017; Travis 2017;
Martin 2017), I shall not go into any more details here as it will not influence my argument.
2The option for the contemporary terminology is due to three different reasons here. The first is that it
helps avoiding confusion about what representational views are in the case of memory. Indirect realism, at
least in the twentieth century, has often been associated with sense-data theories (see, e.g., Russell 1912;
Broad 1925; Ayer 1956), which are reminiscent of early modern empiricism. In the contemporary debate on
memory, however, those who take themselves to be representationalists are not necessarily committed to such
views, although they will sometimes accept the label of indirect realists. The second reason is that Dorothea
Debus (2008), who is the most prominent contemporary defender of direct realism and whose work will be
discussed later, calls her own view “relational” in allusion to Martin’s (2004) relational view of perception.
And the third reason, which is more general in nature, is that I do not want to suggest that there are any deeper
philosophical connections between representational and relational views and indirect and direct realist views
other than one of historical kinship.
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be capable of having mental representations that are sufficiently similar3 and are causally
related to the past events represented in memory. Consequently, these representations serve
as the intermediary entities connecting current memories to the past events themselves.
The second reason is that a form of representationalism seems to be better supported
by empirical research on memory. For example, it has been suggested by a number of
different researchers that memory is a result of a more general cognitive capacity to think
about events, whether or not those events occurred (see, e.g., Suddendorf and Corballis
2007; Schacter et al. 2007, 2012; De Brigard 2014a; Michaelian 2016c). Thus, because
relationalism seems to require the existence of the objects of memory — and hence of
other forms of episodic thinking — the view simply appears unappealing to most people
when considered in relation to these results. Another issue has to do with the fact that it is
now widely known that, rather than simply retrieving information from the past, memory
is constructive, in the sense that not all the information that one remembers needs to be
originated in one’s past experience of the relevant event (see, e.g., Schacter et al. 2007;
Michaelian 2011; Robins 2016b; Cheng and Werning 2016). This suggests that memory
need not always be able to reach back to past experiences or events, but rather construct
actual representations of what happened. For this reason, a form of representationalism
seems to be the most simple and intuitive option, as representations can be constructed by
the brain in the absence of the represented objects. A third issue is that representationalism
seems to accommodate memory errors better. By memory errors, I mean occurrences of
misremembering (see, e.g., Robins 2016a; Michaelian 2016b), such as when one remembers
some details of an event incorrectly — e.g., remembering having strawberry cake at your
birthday party, when you had chocolate cake — and occurrences of confabulation (see,
e.g., Hirstein 2005; Michaelian 2016b; Bernecker 2017; Robins 2017a), such as when one
remembers events that did not happen — e.g., remembering having a birthday party when
3Martin and Deutscher (1966) conceive of this similarity in terms of a structural analogy holding between
the past representation and the current representation. They say that “the past experience must constitute a
structural analogue of the thing remembered, to the extent to which he can accurately represent the thing”
(191, my emphasis). It is not entirely clear, however, where the structural analogy is to be found. The most
natural interpretation seems to be that the content of the past representation must have the same kind of
structure as the content of the current representation, but they do not say anything as to what the structure of
those contents are supposed to be. Since this point will not play a major role in my discussion, I will simply
take this interpretation for granted here.
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there was no such party. Since representations can mis-represent existing things, or even
represent things that do not exist at all, they provide a good theoretical resource to explain
memory errors.
Despite the apparent advantage of representationalism, the prospects of relational views
in relation to empirical research on memory have not been addressed in enough detail. This
is, in part, due to the fact that there are not many relational views out there, and also because
those who have proposed relational views have not addressed this topic in detail. Consider,
for example, the problem of memory errors and the relational view offered by Debus (2008),
who is arguably the most prominent contemporary defender of relationalism. According to
Debus, one episodically or recollectively remembers something only if one stands in an
experiential relation to the relevant past events. This experiential relation, she says, is to
be understood in terms of the causal, temporal, and spatial relationships holding between
subjects and the past events. Although she offers one important necessary criterion to say
that a subject is remembering, Debus is not very clear on what a complete relationalist
analysis of remembering looks like. In other words, unlike the classical analysis provided
by Martin and Deutscher (1966), she does not give us a clear set of necessary and sufficient
criteria for remembering. As a result, it is not clear when, for the relationalist, a subject
fails to remember, and, therefore, when he misremembers or confabulates.
In light of the recent re-emergence of relationalism in the contemporary philosophi-
cal debate and of the growing empirical literature on memory errors, this paper has two
goals: the first is to discuss what a relational analysis of remembering that takes Debus’s
(2008) relational view as a starting point would look like (Section 4.2); and the second is
to see whether such relational analysis of remembering can accommodate the occurrence
of unsuccessful remembering or memory errors (Section 4.3). As my positive contribution
to this topic, I shall argue that the relational view of memory faces serious problems to
accommodate unsuccessful remembering. In particular, the argument is that the presence
of an experiential relationship alone cannot distinguish properly between successful and
unsuccessful occurrences of remembering. I should note that, while some might view my
proposal as being an implicit endorsement of traditional representationalism, I shall not take
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a firm stand on the subject here. Recent work on the dispute between representationalism
and relationalism in philosophy of perception suggests that they are not mutually exclu-
sive views and hence that “hybrid” views are possible (see Schellenberg 2010, 2011; Siegel
2010; Logue 2014; Hanna 2015; Sant’Anna 2018b). Despite there being no such attempts
of developing hybrid views in the case of memory, it has been already pointed out by some
that this is a potential topic of interest (see Michaelian and Sutton 2017). For this reason,
even if one finds relationalism to be problematic, it does not mean that one is necessarily
committed to traditional versions of representationalism. As it stands, the argument that I
will develop here leaves open the question of whether some form of relationalism can be
preserved by reconciling it with some form of representationalism.
4.2 The relational analysis of remembering
The relational view developed by Debus (2008) says that what is characteristic of remem-
bering is that subjects stand in an experiential relation to the past events. The term “expe-
riential relation” is a technical one, and since it is central to her account, it will be helpful
to examine it more carefully. As Debus points out at the beginning of her paper, she is
concerned with recollective memories, which, according to her, are memories that have ex-
periential characteristics. Recollective memories are, roughly speaking, equivalent to what
psychologists call today episodic memories (see Tulving 1972, 1985a). In other words,
they are memories of particular events that one experienced in the past, such that, when one
remembers, it seems to one that one is “re-experiencing” or “re-living” the relevant event
(Tulving 2002). Thus, those memories have similar characteristics to sensory perception, in
the sense that we seem to “see”, “hear”, “smell”, and so on, the relevant features associated
with the original event, but now “inside” our minds.
Being able to “re-experience” or “re-live” an event requires, in turn, that one experi-
enced the relevant event in the past. It is important to note that, when one remembers, one
is not literally having another perceptual experience of the event, but is rather undergoing
a different kind of mental state that has a distinctive relationship to the past event, namely,
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a specific kind of experiential relationship. So, while it is true that both perception and
memory have experiential characteristics, and while it is arguably the case that both put
us in an experiential relation to their objects, the relevant experiential relation instantiated
in each case is different. For Debus, in the case of memory, the experiential relation is
characterized as one that supervenes on specific causal, temporal, and spatial relations that
hold between subjects and the past events. The relation is causal because, as she points
out, when one remembers, certain neurophysiological events occur in one’s brain. And
these events are, accordingly, caused by earlier neurophysiological process which were, in
their turn, ultimately caused by the past events at the time of the original experience (Debus
2008, 411). Similarly, the relation supervenes on spatial and temporal relations because, as
I mentioned initially, remembering requires that the subject experienced the relevant event
before. That is, the original experience must happen earlier than the memory and there
must be a causal connection with the original experience. Debus frames this in terms of
the original experience and the memory being in the same “spatiotemporal path” traced
by the subject in the world. That is, according to her, by inhabiting the world, subjects
trace a certain “spatiotemporal path”, such that, to count as remembering something, the
spatiotemporal point in which the memory occurs must precede the spatiotemporal point in
which the experience occurred, and both must belong to the same “spatiotemporal path”.
For now, I shall not dispute whether there is such experiential relation or whether it
is necessary for recollective memory. Instead, I will take both these things for granted.
My aim in this section is, rather, to provide a relational analysis of remembering that is
compatible with Debus’s relational view. While there are some indications of what such
an analysis might look like in her discussion, she does not say this quite explicitly. Thus,
as a first step towards providing a relational analysis, I will take the traditional analysis
of remembering provided by Martin and Deutscher (1966) as a starting point and then
modify it to fit with the relational view. For Martin and Deutscher, a subject S will count
as remembering an event e iff:
(1) S has previously experienced e;
(2) S has a present mental representation of e;
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(3) S stands in an appropriate causal relationship to e;
(4) The content of S’s present representation is sufficiently similar to the content of S’s
previous experience.4
To clarify, consider my putative memory M of my tenth birthday party. According to Martin
and Deutscher, M is an instance of remembering because: (1) I had a previous experience
of my tenth birthday party, which led me to form representations of this event; (2) I have
a current representation M of my tenth birthday party; (3) my actual representation M is
caused, perhaps by means of a memory trace, by my past experience of the party; and (4) the
content of M is sufficiently similar to the content of the past experience — e.g., I remember
my parents being there, I remember having chocolate cake, and so on, which were all
represented in my previous perceptual experience of the party. (1)–(4) are, therefore, jointly
necessary and sufficient conditions to say that a subject count as remembering.
Now, can (1)–(4) be incorporated into a relational analysis of remembering? Let’s con-
sider (1) first. Since Debus says quite explicitly that successful remembering requires that
subjects have experienced the relevant events in the past, and this is central to make sense
of the notion of an experiential relation, it seems that (1) can be straightforwardly incorpo-
rated into the relational analysis. The same is true of (3). That is, the experiential relation
is said to supervene on causal and spatiotemporal relations holding between subjects and
events. However, (2) and (4) do not seem compatible with the relational view. Debus is
not very explicit about whether or not she thinks that remembering can involve some sort
of representation. However, there are good (implicit) reasons to think that it does not. The
first reason is that, later on in the paper, Debus says that the experiential relation is sup-
posed to make subjects directly aware of the past events. So, when one remembers, it is
not the case that one’s awareness of the event is mediated, which eliminates the need for
representations.5 The second reason is that Debus frames her view in relation to Martin’s
(2004) relational view of perception, which is a form of direct realism that avoids repre-
4This formulation is adapted from Bernecker (2010, ch. 1). See also Bernecker (2015, 302).
5Although see Bernecker (2008, ch. 5), who claims that the presence of representations in memory is not
incompatible with a form of direct realism. I will leave this issue aside as it is not clear whether Bernecker’s
view is a genuine form of direct realism.
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sentations altogether. While Debus is careful to make explicit that her understanding of
mnemonic awareness differs in important respects from what is usually understood by per-
ceptual awareness, it looks like that the same, or at least very similar, motivations drive
both the relational view of memory and relational views of perception. While this does not
make a conclusive case against the presence of representations, it gives us good reasons to
cast doubt on the inclusion of (2) and (4) into the relational analysis.
Thus, by looking at the analysis proposed by Martin and Deutscher (1966), we can use
(1) and (3) as starting points to conceive of a relational analysis of remembering. Consid-
ered alone, however, (1) and (3) provide only a partial picture of a relational analysis. The
reason is that, for the relational view, the relationship that subjects have to past events is not
merely causal. In order to provide a more complete picture, the relational analysis needs to
require that subjects stand in an experiential relation to the relevant events, which takes into
account not only a causal relation, but spatial and temporal relations as well. On this view,
then, the relational view of memory offered by Debus seems to suggest that S remembers
e iff:
(R1) S has previously experienced e;
(R2) S is presently experientially related to e by undergoing the mental state M ; where
(R2.1) The experiential relation supervenes on specific causal, spatial, and temporal
relations obtaining between S and e.
Thus, to use the same example as above, the relational view says that I remember my tenth
birthday party because (R1) I had a previous perceptual experience of the party, and (R2) I
am experientially related to the party in the sense that my memory is caused by it and the
party is located at a spatiotemporal point that precedes the actual spatiotemporal point in
which I have the memory. On this view, then, (R1) and (R2) are viewed as jointly necessary
and sufficient conditions to say that a subject count as remembering.
Before moving forward, one important clarification refers to the nature of the mental
state M in (R2). Since, on the relational view, M cannot be understood as a form of repre-
sentation, one natural question would be what M is according to the relational view. The
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traditional move by relationalists in perception is to understand M (in the case of perception,
its equivalent P) as being a non-representational form of awareness of particular objects in
the external world, in which those objects are constitutive parts of the perceptual states (see
Martin 2004; Fish 2009). Similarly, in the case of memory, one might understand M as a
non-representational form of awareness of the past, in which the past events are constitu-
tive parts of the mnemonic states. This seems to be what Debus has in mind when she talks
about memory making us directly aware of the past, although, I should note again, she is
careful to make explicit that the kind of awareness involved in memory differs in important
senses from the kind of awareness present in perception (see Debus 2008, 408).
The relational analysis stated above is intended as a response to the general question of
what is it to remember, as opposed to, e.g., the questions of what is it to perceive or what
is it to think. However, in providing an analysis of a given phenomenon, one might ask not
only whether the analysis provides a good way of distinguishing the target phenomenon
from other phenomena, but also whether it distinguishes between different ways in which
the same phenomenon can happen. In the case of memory, in particular, it is possible to
distinguish between successful and unsuccessful occurrences of remembering. Successful
remembering refers to, roughly speaking, cases where we remember things as they hap-
pened. Unsuccessful remembering, in contrast, can take two different forms. The first is
misremembering (Robins 2016a), which corresponds to cases where we get some details of
an event right, but get some other details of an event wrong.6 The second is confabulation
(Hirstein 2005), which corresponds to cases where we get all the details wrong — i.e., the
event remembered did not happen. Since the presence of an experiential relation is central
to the relational analysis, one would expect that the presence or the absence of such relation
would provide a meaningful way to distinguish successful and unsuccessful remembering.
In fact, this seems to be the suggestion behind Debus’s (2008) overall proposal. However,
6I should say that this is not necessarily what Robins understands by misremembering. For Robins,
“[m]isremembering is a memory error that relies on successful retention of the targeted event” (2016a, 433),
which is paradigmatically illustrated by the DRM effect, where the content of what is misremembered is
non-trivially related to the content of what is remembered or retrieved — e.g., subjects are more likely to
misremember seeing particular fruits, such as bananas, if the content of what is remembered or retrieved also
involves fruits, such as apples and oranges. The definition of misremembering that I am using here does not
require such a non-trivial relation. According to this definition, one misremembers if the content of what is
misremembered was not originally experienced.
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it is not entirely clear whether this will work. In the next section, I will argue that (R2), or
the requirement for the presence of an experiential relation, is neither necessary nor suffi-
cient to distinguish successful and unsuccessful remembering, and thus that the relational
analysis, as formulated in here, is at best incomplete.
4.3 Unsuccessful remembering
The problem of unsuccessful remembering and its relationship to the relational view of
memory view has not been explored in much detail. In the perception literature, however,
forms of what we might call unsuccessful perception — i.e., illusions and hallucinations
— have proven to pose real challenges to relational or direct realist views of perception
(see Smith 2002; Crane and French 2017). The main reason for this is that successful or
veridical occurrences of perception can be indistinguishable, from the point of view of the
subject, from unsuccessful or non-veridical ones. Thus, when relationalists or direct realists
say that perception requires the presence of a relation to the objects that are perceived, they
need to explain how and why there can be phenomenologically indistinguishable perceptual
experiences either in the presence or in the absence of the objects perceived.
The same problem, I think, arises for relational or direct realist views of memory. Suc-
cessful and unsuccessful remembering can often be phenomenologically indistinguishable,
which questions the necessity of there being an experiential relation to the past events when
one remembers. In the same way that I can see a spider on the wall and fail to realize that
there is not a spider on the wall, I can remember an event, e.g., my tenth birthday party,
and fail to realize that this event did not happen. However, if I can seemingly remember an
event when it did not occur, and hence undergo the same mental state as the one I would
undergo had the event been the case, then it does not seem to make sense to postulate a
relationship to such event as necessary for remembering. That is, the fact that one can
seemingly remember an event when the event did not happen “screens off” (Martin 2004)
any explanatory role played by the past events in one’s theory of memory.
One strategy popular among relationalists about perception is to resort to a disjunctivist
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view of perception. There are different varieties of disjunctivism (see Byrne and Logue
2008), but one popular characterization is that, at the most fundamental level, successful or
veridical and unsuccessful or non-veridical perception do not share any essential features.
In other words, they are viewed as occurrences of two different kinds (see Snowdon 1980;
Martin 2004; Fish 2009). Thus, if disjunctivism is true, it is no longer a problem to say that
veridical perception is relational, while non-veridical perception is not. In her discussion of
“memory hallucinations”, which I have called confabulations here, Debus (2008) employs
the same strategy. Inspired by Martin’s (2004) disjunctivist account of perception, she says
that the fact that two mental occurrences are indiscriminable from a subjective point of
view does not imply that they are occurrences of the same kind. For Debus, the absence
of the experiential relation in the case of the so-called memory hallucinations postulate
a fundamental separation between them and successful remembering (2008, 414). This
explains why, despite being phenomenologically indistinguishable, successful memories
are relational and memory hallucinations, or confabulations, are not.
Thus, if combined with disjunctivism, the relational analysis can provide a principled
way to distinguish successful remembering from at least one kind of unsuccessful remem-
bering, namely, what Debus calls “memory hallucinations”, or what I have called “confab-
ulations”. However, I think that, even with disjunctivism, the relational analysis fails to
provide a satisfactory way to distinguish between successful and unsuccessful remember-
ing. The main reason, as I will argue in section 4.3.1, is that memory hallucinations or
confabulations do satisfy (R2) above, so there is no principled way to say that they are fun-
damentally different from successful remembering. But before I turn to this question, let
me define more precisely what I will understand by unsuccessful remembering. As I said
before, unsuccessful remembering can take two forms. The first form, misremembering, is
when we remember incorrectly one or more details of an event that occurred.7
The second form, confabulation, is when we remember an event that did not occur at
all. To illustrate, consider misremembering first. Consider, for instance, my memory of my
7For more discussions about misremembering and its relationship to current theories of remembering,
see Robins (2016a) and Michaelian (2016b). For discussions about confabulation, see Hirstein (2005), and
for discussions about the relationship of confabulation to current theories of remembering, see Michaelian
(2016b), Bernecker (2017), and Robins (2017a).
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tenth birthday party. I remember my parents being there, I remember it being a sunny day,
and I remember having chocolate cake. While this memory is about an event that happened,
at least one of its elements incorrectly describe the event; that is, it was a rainy rather than a
sunny day. So, despite being about an event that happened, and despite getting some details
right — i.e., my parents were there and I had chocolate cake — I mis-remember the event
in question. Consider, now, confabulations. Suppose that I remember going to Paris when I
was a teenager. Since I have never been to France, this memory will count as an occurrence
of confabulation because the event in question did not happen.
Now that we have a clearer understanding of what unsuccessful remembering is, I will
move on to show why it poses a problem to the relational view of memory. Section 4.3.1
will discuss confabulations and Section 4.3.2 will discuss misremembering. My main ar-
gument will be that both forms of unsuccessful remembering instantiate the relevant expe-
riential relation to past events and thus that the relational analysis of remembering fails to
properly distinguish them from successful remembering.
4.3.1 The problem of confabulation
Can the relational analysis of remembering rule out cases of confabulations? To answer this
question, we should go back to (R1) and (R2) above. For the relational view, S remembers
e iff:
(R1) S has previously experienced e;
(R2) S is presently experientially related to e by undergoing the mental state M ; where
(R2.1) The experiential relation supervenes on specific causal, spatial, and temporal
relations obtaining between S and e.
The question is, then, whether there are cases of confabulation that satisfy (R1) and (R2).
The most obvious way to rule out cases of confabulation would be to appeal to (R1). Since
the events that one confabulates have not happened, it is not possible that one experienced
those events in the past. Therefore, confabulations do not satisfy (R1) and are thus distinct
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from occurrences of successful remembering. While I think this provides a satisfactory
way to deal with cases of confabulations, it does not seem to reflect the motivation behind
the relational view. When she introduces disjunctivism to deal with confabulations, Debus
argues that confabulations are distinct in kind from successful remembering because, in the
former case, the relevant experiential relationship fails to obtain. So, at least on Debus’s
version of the relational view, it is the presence of (R2), and not of (R1), that provides the
means to distinguish confabulations from successful remembering.
I will come back to (R1) later on. For now, let us focus on (R2), as it is the cen-
tral element of Debus’s view. The question now is, therefore, whether (R2) can provide
a meaningful way to distinguish successful occurrences of remembering from confabula-
tions. To start with, it is important to note that (R2) will be successful in providing such
distinction only if we make the further assumption that, to successfully remember, sub-
jects must be in a unique experiential relation to a unique past event. That being the case,
the claim that confabulations do not count as successful remembering becomes straightfor-
wardly true, for there is no unique experiential relation holding between the subject and the
confabulated event, as the event in question did not happen. However, the relational view
does not require us to make that assumption. The claim is simply that successful remem-
bering instantiates the relevant experiential relation, while confabulations do not. Thus, if
one does not make this assumption, it is not hard to envisage cases where confabulations
instantiate experiential relations to past events in the way described by (R2).
To make this clear, let me introduce the notion of a partial experiential relation.8 A
partial experiential relation is similar to the one describe in (R2), that is, it supervenes on
the causal, spatial, and temporal relations between a subject S and a past event e. However,
because of its partiality, the partial experiential relation only makes the subject aware of
some but not all the constituents, or properties, of e. For example, I can be in a partial
experiential relation to my tenth birthday party, such that I can remember having chocolate
8It is not completely clear whether Debus (2008) is committed to the claim that remembering can only
involve full experiential relations, as opposed to partial experiential relations, as I will discuss here. However,
as it will become clear later on, accepting that remembering can involve partial experiential relations is the
main source of problems for the relational view. For this reason, I will assume that Debus is at least implicitly
committed to the idea that remembering requires the presence of a full experiential relation.
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cake next to my parents, but fail to remember other elements, including that this memory
is of my tenth birthday party. Suppose, now, that I remember an event that did not happen.
Because the event did not happen, the relational view says that there cannot possibly be
an experiential relation between the subject and the event, thus making this an occurrence
of confabulation. But, it does not follow from this that the confabulation fails to put the
subject in partial experiential relations to past events. It could be the case — and I will
argue later that there are good reasons to believe that this is actually the case — that the
confabulation puts the subject in two or more partial experiential relations to two or more
past events, such that he becomes aware of different constituents or features of multiple
events as belonging to a unique event. Consider, for instance, my memory of having pizza
at the beach. While I have never experienced such an event, it is true that I have previously
experienced the following two different events: one in which I had pizza and another one
in which I was at the beach. So, if the notion of a partial experiential relation is sound,
there is no reason why I could not be aware of the confabulated event by being partially
experientially related to two or more events that I experienced previously. However, if that
is the case, then nothing prevents confabulations from putting us in experiential relations to
past events.
One way for relationalists to avoid this problem would be to simply bite the bullet and
add the additional clause that a mental state counts as successful remembering only if it
makes the subject experientially related to a unique event. However, I think this move
should be resisted. If correct, it would lead to a restrictive, and hence counterintuitive,
account of remembering. To see this, suppose that I have a putative memory M of my tenth
birthday party, where I remember having chocolate cake with my parents and my friends.
Since this event happened, and since I experienced it, (R1) is satisfied. However, M is not
brought about by my being experientially related to the event of my tenth birthday party,
but instead, by my being partially experientially related to different events (see Michaelian
2011; Robins 2016b). In this particular case, M puts me in a partial experiential relation to
an event e1, where I had chocolate cake, to an event e2, where I had a meal with my parents,
and to an event e3, where I was hanging out with my friends. In other words, my awareness
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of the three distinctive constituents of M, namely, <having chocolate cake>, <having a meal
with my parents>, <being with my friends>, are awareness of constituents of different past
events that are brought together by M.
If this is right, the claim that remembering requires a unique experiential relation will
require us to say that I am not remembering my tenth birthday party. But this is problematic
for at least two reasons. The first is that M above satisfies (R1) and, moreover, it is expe-
rientially related, in a relevant sense, to past experiences. From a common sensical point
of view, this seems to be enough to say that one is successfully remembering, as one gets
the relevant details right and one does so in virtue of being (partially) experientially related
to the past. The only thing that is missing, arguably, is that the event that M purportedly
makes me aware of, namely, my tenth birthday party, is not operative — i.e., it is not the
ultimate cause — in producing M (see Martin and Deutscher 1966, p. 166). Thus, it might
be argued that, despite seeming so, M does not count as a successful occurrence of remem-
bering because none of the experiential relations trace back to the original event, which is
precisely what is required to say that M allows me to be aware of my tenth birthday party.
This answer will, however, provide only a temporary solution. The reason is that, while
the relational view might be able to rule out cases where none of the partial experiential
relations trace back to the past event itself, it will not be able to rule out cases where at least
one of the partial experiential relations establish such relation. Consider the case above
again. Suppose that my partial awareness of <having chocolate cake> is, in fact, awareness
of myself having chocolate cake in my tenth birthday party. However, my awareness of
<having a meal with my parents> and of <being with my friends> are partial awareness
of constituents of different events, i.e., e2 and e3. In this case, then, there is at least one
experiential relation that traces back to the relevant past event, and thus M should count as
a successful occurrence of remembering even if there is more than one experiential relation
connecting M to multiple past events. Requiring the presence of a unique experiential
relation is, therefore, too restrictive, which provides a counterintuitive account of memory.
So far, I have attempted to show that, from an intuitive point of view, requiring a unique
experiential relation is implausible. However, relationalists might resist this by saying that
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they do not share our intuitions. To put it sharply, the claim here would be that, for re-
lationalism, if there is not a unique experiential relation holding between the subject and
the event remembered, then, intuitively, the subject’s putative memory will not be an oc-
currence of successful remembering. This leads us to the second problem with the idea
that remembering requires a unique experiential relation. While I think that this response
is, in principle, open to relationalists, I do not think it is a promising one. The reason is
that it provides an analysis of remembering that starts by stipulating what the phenomenon
must be, instead of describing or explaining what the phenomenon actually is. The prob-
lem with this approach is that our theoretical intuitions do not always correspond to how
the phenomenon actually is, which runs the risk of making our initial stipulations empty or
explanatorily uninteresting.
And this, I think, is the problem with this strategy. In other words, it has been shown
by empirical research that memory is constructive, in the sense that our memories are con-
structed from different sources other than the original experience. Some people, such as
Michaelian (2011), have suggested that while some causal link must be preserved to the
past experience that the memory is about, not all the elements or constituents that figure
into that memory need to be derived from the original experience. Such elements can come
from different sources, such as semantic information (Cheng and Werning 2016; Cheng
et al. 2016) or background knowledge (Suddendorf and Corballis 1997) present in retrieval
(see also De Brigard 2014a and Michaelian 2016c). Based on this and other empirical find-
ings, De Brigard (2014a) has suggested, for example, that it is not unsurprising that most
of the occurrences of remembering that we call “successful” will have elements that are
not drawn from the original experience. Setting the details of this debate aside, the point
is that how memory works, or how remembering happens in the world, does not seem to
support the prior relationalist theoretical intuition that a unique experiential relation to the
past event must be characteristic of successful remembering. If that was the case, most of
the occurrences of remembering that we call “successful” would be actually unsuccessful.
So, again, appealing to the presence of a unique experiential relation provides a restrictive,
and hence inadequate, account of how memory works.
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I have argued that (R2) does not provide a sufficient criterion to distinguish successful
remembering from one form of unsuccessful remembering, i.e., confabulations, as is sug-
gested by Debus’s relational view. Before I move on to consider misremembering, let me
come back to the relationship between (R1) and confabulations. As I said initially, I think
that relationalists can satisfactorily rule out confabulations by appealing to (R1), as subjects
have not experienced the relevant events. The argument I gave so far only provides reasons
to deny that (R2) is neither necessary nor sufficient to draw the relevant distinction between
successful remembering and confabulation. The problem with placing the burden of the
distinction on (R1) is that it undermines the whole motivation for providing a relational ac-
count of memory. In Debus’s (2008) version of the view, (R2) plays the explanatory role of
distinguishing successful remembering from unsuccessful remembering. This is suggested,
among other things, by the radical move that Debus makes to disjunctivism. But if, as I ar-
gued, (R2) is not required to draw the distinction, the question that poses itself is why give
it a central place in one’s account of memory, so as to call it a relational view of memory,
when, in reality, it is only playing a marginal role in one’s analysis of remembering.
But even if we set this worry aside, relationalism would still provide an incomplete ac-
count of confabulations. I have assumed throughout my discussion that confabulations are
falsidical occurrences of remembering, that is, that they are cases where subjects get things
wrong. However, Michaelian (2016b) has recently pointed out to the possibility of veridi-
cal confabulations, that is, cases where subjects get things right by mere accident. The
most intuitive analogy here, as Michaelian himself makes explicit, is to veridical percep-
tual hallucinations (see Lewis 1980). Veridical hallucinations refer to cases where subjects
perceive the environment accurately, but the cause of the their perceptual experiences is not
the environment, but something else, such as evil scientists or some misfiring happening
at the neuronal level. Similarly, veridical confabulations are cases where subjects remem-
ber the past correctly, but this is not due to their memories being adequately related to the
past, but due to something else, such as the malfunctioning of the underlying mechanisms
responsible for memory, or to the occurrence of processes not ordinarily associated with
remembering, such as guessing. Assuming that veridical confabulations are possible, and
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hence that a complete analysis of remembering must be able to distinguish them from fal-
sidical confabulations, simply appealing to (R1) would not provide such a distinction. Both
veridical and falsidical confabulations fail to satisfy (R1); and, for this reason, the relational
view would mistakenly place these two different occurrences of confabulations under the
same category.
In summary, I do not think that the above provides a definitive case against pursuing
relational views. However, I think that it gives us good reasons to think that appealing
solely to the notion of an experiential relation might not be the best way to go.
Before I move forward, I should address one objection that is likely to arise in the
context of the introduction of partial experiential relations. Some might argue that, even
if there is such a thing as a partial experiential relation, it cannot be used to characterize
confabulations appropriately. In particular, the claim is that partial experiential relations
cannot explain the phenomenology of confabulation. Like successful remembering, con-
fabulations seemingly make us aware of unique events; however, if they can be partially
related to multiple events, as I have suggested, it would follow that it is impossible for us
to experience confabulations as involving awareness of unique events. Instead, it would be
more plausible to say that they make us aware of a conjunction of two or more events. This
would conflict, however, with how we experience confabulations.
This worry can be resolved by noticing that, in partial experiential relations, we become
aware of parts or properties of events (Sant’Anna 2018a; Chapter 5, 171). For example, the
event of my tenth birthday party has different properties, such as “having chocolate cake”,
“having a meal with my family”, and so on. Being fully or wholly experientially related
to this event would entail that I would be aware of all the properties instantiated by this
event. In contrast, in cases where I am only partially experientially related to this event, I
am aware of one or more (but not all) of its properties, e.g., “I remember having chocolate
cake”. Being aware of this particular property does not, however, make me automatically
aware of the event as a whole. So, when confabulations put a subject in multiple partial
experiential relations to different events, it is not required that the subjects experience the
confabulations as being composed by multiple events. Instead, they are said to be aware
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of properties of multiple events which are somehow brought together to consciousness.
In a representationalist framework, the equivalent claim here would be that different bits
of representational content are brought together to form a new representation of a unique
event.
In addition, rather than being incapable of explaining the phenomenology of confab-
ulation, one might argue that, if there is no such thing as a partial experiential relation,
relationalists cannot offer a positive account of the phenomenology of confabulation. Be-
cause, in confabulations, we are not fully or wholly aware of any events, it would not be
possible for us to experience those mental states as making us aware of events at all. One
might, of course, retreat to a negative form of disjunctivism here and simply claim that it
is not the relationalist’s business to explain confabulations, as those are different in kind
from successful remembering. However, if discussions about perceptual error serve as any
guide, this strategy is unlikely to be satisfactory. Negative disjunctivist accounts have been
met with skepticism and some disjunctivists have recently made efforts to provide positive
accounts of error (Fish 2009; Brewer 2011). Thus, unless relationalists are prepared to of-
fer a positive account of confabulation that does not involve partial experiential relations,
the prospects of relationalism will be even dimmer if it does not adopt the notion of partial
experiential relations.
4.3.2 The problem of misremembering
I have argued that the relational analysis of remembering faces trouble to distinguish suc-
cessful remembering from the first form of unsuccessful remembering, which I have called
confabulations. I will now consider the second form of unsuccessful remembering, mis-
remembering, which poses an even more pressing problem to the relational view. The
argument proposed in this section is somewhat independent from the argument proposed in
4.3.1. I will argue that, even if we put the problems pertaining to confabulations aside, the
relational view still fails to distinguish between successful remembering and misremem-
bering.
As I discussed before, in cases of misremembering, one is aware of an event that one
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experienced, but one gets some details of the event wrong. Consider the birthday party
example above. Suppose that, instead of remembering having chocolate cake, I remember
having strawberry cake. I get all the other details about the event right: I remember my
parents and friends being there, I remember it being a rainy day, and etc., but I remember
the flavor of my birthday cake wrong. In such case, arguably, I am aware of an event that
happened, but remember one detail wrong — i.e., the flavor of my birthday cake.
How does the relational view distinguish successful remembering from misremember-
ing? To approach this question, we can employ the same strategy used in the case of con-
fabulations, that is, we can ask whether there are cases of misremembering that satisfy (R1)
and (R2). Since the events that are objects of misremembering have been experienced in the
past, it seems uncontroversial that (R1) is satisfied. However, and this is where the prob-
lem that misremembering poses to the relational view comes to the surface, because those
events exist and were experienced, it looks like that (R2) is also satisfied, for subjects stand
in the right kind of experiential relation to the events. But, if that is the case, then occur-
rences of misremembering satisfy the criteria to be classified as successful remembering,
which is implausible from the perspective of the relational view.
There is one obvious way for relationalists to avoid this problem. This consists in
denying that, when I remember having strawberry cake at my tenth birthday party, I am
misremembering a past event that actually happened. Instead, the suggestion is that, rightly
because I remember myself having strawberry cake, and not chocolate cake, I am not re-
membering my tenth birthday party, but some other event that did not happen. Thus, be-
cause the event in question did not happen, and hence was not experienced by me, the
putative memory does not qualify as an occurrence of successful remembering because the
relevant experiential relation fails to obtain. In other words, my putative memory fails to
satisfy both (R1) and (R2).
This solution faces three important problems. The first problem is that it will sound
counterintuitive to some. As I discussed before, it has been suggested by different re-
searchers that it is not uncommon for our memories to have elements that are not derived
from a unique past experience (see, e.g., Michaelian 2011; De Brigard 2014a; Cheng and
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Werning 2016). Thus, it is not unsurprising that those memories will often be composed
by elements that were not present in the original experience. However, it seems too strong
to conclude from this that we are systematically failing to remember the events in ques-
tion. This would mean that, whenever our memories get some detail wrong, which, as
De Brigard (2014a) points out, happens quite often, the brain mechanisms responsible for
memory would be malfunctioning. However, a system that is systematically malfunction-
ing is problematic from an evolutionary point of view, as one would need to explain why
it has been preserved despite failing to realize its function and why it appears to be useful,
as seems to be the case with memory. So, to avoid these worries, it seems more reasonable
to say that, in misremembering, we are related to the events that happened, but for some
reason or another, we get one or more of the details wrong. This would allow us to say that,
overall, the system is functioning as it should, while still allowing for error to be present in
its outputs, i.e., in the memories produced.
The second problem this solution faces relates to the issues raised in 4.3.1. We could, in
response, point out that, while it might be true that occurrences of misremembering fail to
instantiate unique experiential relations to events, nothing would prevent them from instan-
tiating multiple partial experiential relations to different events. Thus, relationalists would
need to deal with the same problems raised in the context of confabulations. In other words,
they would need to explain how it is possible for unsuccessful remembering to instantiate
experiential relations without making the relational view trivial. And finally, the third prob-
lem is that, even if we set these worries aside, and grant relationalists that, when I misre-
member, my putative memory relates to an event that is different from my tenth birthday
party, the relational view would still provide an incomplete analysis of remembering. The
reason for this is that it would conflate confabulations and misremembering, thus failing to
make sense of the differences between these two forms of unsuccessful remembering. In
other words, while the relational view might be able to distinguish between successful from
unsuccessful remembering, it will not be able to distinguish between forms of unsuccessful
remembering because both misremembering and confabulations are understood in terms of
the absence of the relevant experiential relation. Therefore, the relational view provides
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an inappropriate taxonomy of memory errors, and, consequently, an incomplete analysis of
remembering.
In response to the third problem, relationalists might want to deny that there is a real
distinction between forms of unsuccessful remembering. The claim here would be that
there is no real difference between getting some and all of the details of a given event
wrong; in other words, the same process is taking place in both cases, i.e., the subject is
ultimately unsuccessfully remembering events. Alternatively put, what I have been called
misremembering so far is nothing but a less extreme case of confabulation. Thus, if this is
right, relationalism is not obliged to provide a taxonomy of memory errors along the lines
proposed here.
This move, I think, faces similar problems to the move discussed in 4.3.1 that attempts
to deny that, by definition, there cannot be occurrences of successful remembering that
instantiate partial experiential relations. In other words, it runs the risk of forcing our theo-
retical intuitions into our analysis of the phenomenon in question. While it is not logically
incoherent to say that misremembering is nothing but a form of confabulation, this does not
seem to reflect how misremembering and confabulations actually happen in the world. As
De Brigard (2014a) points out, occurrences of what I have called misremembering should
not be seen as “bad” products of our memory systems; instead, they are the expected out-
comes given how those systems work. Confabulations, in contrast, occur in situations where
something has clearly gone wrong, such as when subjects suffer head injuries that lead to
some sort of brain damage (see Hirstein 2005 and Bernecker 2017 for more discussion). As
Michaelian (2016b) points out, while both misremembering and confabulations share the
feature of being both erroneous — in his terminology, they are both “inaccurate” — unlike
misremembering, which is produced by mechanisms that are working in a reliable manner,
confabulations are produced by mechanisms that are working unreliably (see also Hirstein
2005 for a similar account of confabulations). So, it looks like that the workings of the
systems responsible for misremembering and confabulation differ in important senses.
Another problem, which is epistemological in nature, is that misremembering, but not
confabulation, seems to put us in a position to know at least some things about the past in
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a reliable manner. In her recent account of misremembering, Robins (2016a) notes that,
“[w]hereas misrememberings result from the distortion of retained information, confabula-
tions are wholly inaccurate, reflecting no influence of retained information from a particular
past event” (434). In other words, despite involving distortion, misremembering can still
provide us with some useful information about the relevant events because there is some
retention of information from the past, which is not the case with confabulations. Thus, as
Robins puts it, “[t]he distinction between misremembering and confabulation is particularly
important” (434).
In summary, the main point is that, if relationalists want to pursue this path, they will
need to provide independent reasons, which are not derived from their initial theoretical
motivations, to consider misremembering as being just another form of confabulation. It
is not clear, however, whether there are such reasons. In fact, recent work on the subject
seems to suggest that it is the other way around. In the absence of such reasons, then,
relationalism becomes vulnerable to criticism relating to its failure to provide a picture of
remembering that is sensitive to research being done in the empirical sciences (see Section
4.1). And this is, as I pointed out at the beginning, one important reason why relational
views have not enjoyed much popularity recently. So, denying that there is a real distinction
between misremembering and confabulation is likely to bring more problems than solutions
to relationalists.
To conclude, let me discuss a worry that might arise in relation to my discussion of un-
successful remembering. One might (rightly) point out that my characterization of unsuc-
cessful remembering implicitly assumes that the erroneous or distorted elements of memory
have to be derived from different experiential sources. However, that is not necessarily the
case, as the erroneous elements in some forms of misremembering, such as DRM cases,
need not derive from any experiential source.9 In response, I would like to clarify that,
despite focusing on those cases here, I am not committed to the idea that memory errors
are necessarily cases where the erroneous elements are derived from experiential sources.
Indeed, in DRM cases, it looks like that appealing to non-experiential elements, such as
9I’m grateful to Sarah Robins for calling my attention to this issue.
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semantic information influencing retrieval, is more adequate to explain the occurrence of
those errors. So, my argument here is not meant to apply to those cases. However, when
we look at them more closely, it looks like that the relational view will also have trouble
to explain the occurrence of those forms of misremembering. The reason why account-
ing for error in terms of the influence played by semantic information present at the time
of retrieval is appealing is that a form of representationalism is assumed beforehand. In
other words, because memory is taken to be a form of representation, there is no mystery in
how the content of semantic memories, or semantic information more generally, can distort
the content of episodic memories. This alternative is not, however, available to relational-
ists, for it is not clear whether talk of representation can be coherently integrated into their
accounts. So, relationalism will also be required to provide an account of those cases in
addition to the ones that were discussed here.
4.4 Conclusion
This paper had one major goal, which was to develop our understanding of the issues sur-
rounding the relationship between relational views and memory errors. This has been ac-
complished by, first, producing a relational analysis of remembering compatible with the
most prominent relational view in the literature, and second, by considering how such anal-
ysis of remembering deals with unsuccessful remembering or memory errors. I argued that
the relational view, in its current form, cannot properly distinguish between successful re-
membering and different forms of unsuccessful remembering. I did that by distinguishing
between two ways in which unsuccessful remembering can happen: misremembering and
confabulation. I argued that the requirement for the presence of an experiential relation,
as defended by Debus (2008), is neither necessary nor sufficient for remembering. This is
because there are, on the one hand, cases of remembering that do not instantiate the relevant
experiential relations, and, on the other hand, cases of confabulation and misremembering
that do instantiate the relevant experiential relations. For this reason, if the relational view
is to be successful in the context of empirical research on memory; more specifically, in the
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context of empirical research on memory errors, it will need to provide extra considerations
to show how it can deal with such occurrences.
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Chapter 5
The hybrid contents of memory
Introduction
This chapter proposes a novel account of the contents of memory. By drawing on insights
from the philosophy of perception, I propose a hybrid account of the contents of mem-
ory designed to preserve important aspects of representationalist and relationalist views.
The hybrid view I propose also contributes to two ongoing debates in philosophy of mem-
ory. First, I argue that, in opposition to eternalist views, the hybrid view offers a less
metaphysically-charged solution to the co-temporality problem. Second, I show how the
hybrid view conceives of the relationship between episodic memory and other forms of
episodic thinking. I conclude by considering some disanalogies between perception and
memory and by replying to objections. I argue that, despite there being important differ-
ences between memory and perception, those differences do not harm my project of tracing
an analogy between them.
Chapter 5 brings my discussion of memory to and end, and with it, the thesis is con-
cluded. I said at the beginning that the overall argument of the thesis is that hybrid accounts
of perception and memory should be preferred. Chapter 5 thus relies on a prominent hybrid
account of perception to develop a hybrid account of memory. As such, it provides the final,
and perhaps the most fundamental, element to connect the work done in Part I and Part II
of the thesis. Moreover, Chapter 5 provides an important contribution to the memory liter-
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ature. Besides developing an original hybrid account of memory, which, to my knowledge,
no one has done so far, the chapter brings relationalism back to the main discussions about
memory, which, as I discussed in the general introduction, is dominated by representational
views. However, the re-introduction of relationalism, so to speak, is made in a different
setting. Instead of framing relationalism as being opposite to mainstream representation-
alism, I attempt to show how representationalists can consistently and coherently accept
relationalist insights. So, while Chapter 4 was mainly critical of relationalism, Chapter 5
can be seen as a first step towards a positive engagement with it.
Despite my final discussions of perception and memory having resulted in hybrid views,
the reader will notice that there are important theoretical and practical differences between
the discussions offered in each domain. I would like to discuss three of those differences
here. The first of these issues relates to my reliance on Schellenberg’s hybrid account of
perception to provide a hybrid account of memory in this chapter. In Chapter 2, I formulated
my own pragmatist-inspired hybrid account of perception in opposition to Schellenberg’s
account, which makes the proposal of Chapter 5 seem unmotivated or odd. The decision to
rely on Schellenberg’s account was based on a set of different considerations. The first is
that, as I discussed in the introduction to Chapter 2, my own pragmatist-inspired hybrid ac-
count requires taking on unfamiliar commitments to many readers, which might be reason
enough to put some readers off. And, since the main goal of this chapter was to introduce
hybrid accounts to the memory literature, it seemed to make more sense, from a practical
point of view, to use a more familiar and established view in the perception literature as
a starting point. The second important consideration is that this chapter started off as an
exploratory work. I was not entirely sure whether there could be hybrid views of memory,
and since Schellenberg has provided fairly detailed discussions of her hybrid view of per-
ception, it seemed to make more sense to use it as a starting point. I think, however, that
my hybrid account of memory is also biased towards representationalism, which will likely
raise similar issues to the ones I discuss in Chapter 2. In particular, one topic that I have
not explored here, but that is relevant in this context, is whether there can be a “Hybrid
Triad” of memory. A Hybrid Triad of memory would require an account that, following the
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suggestion made in Chapter 2, firstly recognizes the representationalist insight that mem-
ory depends on how subjects represent the world to be; secondly, preserves the relationalist
insight that events shape our memories in a constitutive sense; and thirdly, offers a direct
realist view of memory. Again, while I think one could make a good case for incorporat-
ing these claims into one’s theory of memory, it is not clear to me how a Hybrid Triad of
memory can be addressed properly.
One natural suggestion here would be to develop a pragmatist-inspired hybrid account
of memory. In the same way in which Schellenberg’s framework can be adapted to memory,
one could argue that my own framework of Chapter 2 could be adapted to memory. This
brings us to the second difference between my approach to memory and my approach to
perception. With the exception of Chapter 3, pragmatism drops out of the picture in my
discussions of memory in Chapters 4 and 5. The reader might reasonably ask why that
is the case. The reasons I offer here are mostly practical, but there is also one important
theoretical reason. To start with the practical reasons, pragmatism drops out of the picture
because, as I said above, I thought it would be more effective to rely on a more established
view in philosophy of perception to make the case for hybrid views of memory. A second
practical reason is that, while Peirce talks a lot about perception, he does not have any
detailed discussion of memory. Some Peircean scholars, most notably Joseph Ransdell,
have indeed attempted to trace parallels between Peirce’s view of perception and his view
of memory, and in my bibliography research, I could only find one paper dealing with this
topic explicitly, which happens to be currently under review. So, while I had a great number
of resources to draw on when connecting Peirce’s view of perception to the philosophy
of perception, it was not clear to me how (or whether) this could be done in the case of
memory.
This was aggravated by the worry, which I mention in the introduction to Chapter 3, that
there did not seem to be a meaningful way to talk about pragmatic agreement in memory.
This brings us to the main theoretical difference between my discussion of perception and
memory. As I mentioned before, this worry was partly due to my inclination to interpret,
early on, pragmatic agreement as being an actual situation rather than an ideal or counter-
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factual one. While it is still not clear to me how to motivate talk of pragmatic agreement
in the context of memory, I am now convinced that, if we interpret this notion in terms of
ideal or counterfactual situations, the framework developed in Chapter 2 can be adapted to
approach memory. Another important issue refers to whether there can be, in the case of
memory, similar notions to the percept and the perceptual judgment, which were central in
Chapter 2. If the similarities between perception and memory are as close as I picture them
in this chapter, then, again, I think there could be memory equivalents of those notions.
While these are all relevant topics to think about a pragmatic account of memory, I did not
explore them in the thesis. But they are, indeed, the tasks of future projects. While it is
understandable that some might find these reasons unconvincing, I hope that they suffice to
at least give some context to the choices made in this chapter.
Outline
This chapter proposes a hybrid view of memory that reconciles insights from representa-
tionalist and relationalist views about the objects of memory. Section 5.1 introduces the
problem of the objects of memory and analyzes the representationalist and the relationalist
answers to it. Section 5.2 develops a hybrid view of memory, called hybridism, by relying
on insights drawn from the philosophy of perception. I argue that, by adopting a hybrid
view of memory inspired by hybrid views of perception, we can consistently preserve good
elements from representationalism and relationalism about memory without inheriting their
problematic aspects. Section 5.3 expands hybridism and applies it to two ongoing dis-
putes in philosophy of memory: the co-temporality problem and the relationship between
episodic memory and other forms of episodic thinking. Finally, Section 5.4 considers some
objections to my project of drawing an analogy between memory and perception.
5.1 The objects of episodic memory
When we remember events from our personal past, our memories seem to refer, or to be
about, things that long ceased to exist. For example, when I remember my tenth birthday
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party, it seems to me that I stand in a relation to an event, my tenth birthday party, that
occurred in the past, but that no longer exists. Recently, the psychologist Endel Tulving
(1972; 1985a) called episodic memories the memories that refer to or are about events.
Despite there being different kinds of memories (see, e.g., Squire 2009; Michaelian and
Sutton 2017; Werning and Cheng 2017), I will be concerned exclusively with episodic
memories, or what philosophers sometimes call “recollection”.
Although I said that episodic memories are memories about events, this characterization
can be misleading. Because other kinds of memory, such as semantic memory, can also
be about events — e.g., remembering that Uruguay won the 1930 Football World Cup
— a more precise characterization would be that episodic memories are about events that
subjects experienced previously in their lives.1 So, remembering my tenth birthday party is
an episodic memory because I was perceptually related to that event previously in my life.
In contrast, remembering that Uruguay won the 1930 Football World Cup is not an episodic
memory, for despite being about an event, I did not experience it.
One important question relating to episodic memories refers to the nature of their ob-
jects. Traditionally, two opposing accounts have been proposed. Representational theories,
or simply representationalism, hold that when I remember a past event, I am directly related
to a mental representation of the event, but only indirectly related to the event itself (Locke
1975; Hume 2011; Russell 1921). In contrast, relational theories, or simply relationalism,
claim that, when I remember a past event, I stand in a direct relation to the event itself
(Reid 2000; Russell 1912; Laird 1920; Debus 2008). In opposition to representationalism,
relationalism denies the presence of any intermediaries between memories and the events
remembered. Despite its historical prominence and importance, the question about the ob-
jects of memory has been largely neglected in the contemporary debate. It is not entirely
clear why this is the case, though. As I will argue below, how one conceives of the objects
of memory will change how one understands different aspects of the metaphysics and the
epistemology of episodic memory. In this context, despite my main goal here being to pro-
vide a framework in which representationalism and relationalism can be reconciled, I also
1In fact, even this characterization is problematic, as I can semantically remember events that I experienced
previously in my life. For my purposes, however, these problems can be put aside.
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expect to make clear the importance that this question has for contemporary philosophers
of memory.
The opposition between representationalism and relationalism can be better visualized
by looking at how they answer three different questions about memory. The first question,
which I will call the problem of error, is how memory errors are possible. The second ques-
tion, which I will call the problem of indistinguishability, is how and why successful and
unsuccessful occurrences of remembering can be indistinguishable from the point of view
of subjects. Finally, the third question, which I will call problem of epistemic particularity,
is the question of how memory grounds our knowledge of particular past events.
Representationalism offers simple and intuitive answers to the two first questions. Be-
cause memory is said to represent past events, error can be explained by appealing to the
notion of content. Content, as Rowlands (2017) points out, is normative, which makes it
possible to assess memory representations for accuracy. In relation to indistinguishability,
representationalism explains it by saying that successful and unsuccessful occurrences of
remembering share a “common factor”, i.e., they all have representations as their objects.
So, because their objects are of the same kind, successful and unsuccessful remembering
can be phenomenologically indistinguishable. However, representationalism faces trouble
explaining the problem of epistemic particularity. When I remember a past event, such as
my tenth birthday party, it seems to me that I remember an event that actually happened
(see Debus 2008, 2014; Perrin 2016). But, since qualitatively identical representations can
be the objects of both successful and unsuccessful remembering, or even of other forms of
episodic thinking (see De Brigard 2014a; Michaelian 2016c), the relation that the objects of
successful remembering establish to the actual past events seems to be entirely contingent,
which makes it hard to see how those mental states can ground our knowledge of the past.
In contrast to representationalism, relationalism gives the question of epistemic partic-
ularity a central place. By denying that there are intermediaries between remembering and
the past events, subjects are now placed in direct contact with those events. Debus (2008),
for example, argues that, due to the presence of an “experiential relation”, where such rela-
tion is understood as supervening on causal, spatial, and temporal relations holding between
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subjects and the relevant events, remembering is capable of putting us in direct contact with
the past events themselves. However, the attempt to explain epistemic particularity comes
at a price, which is that of providing a counterintuitive and excessively complex account of
error and indistinguishability. Because the objects of remembering are the past events, and
because those events do not exist in cases of unsuccessful remembering, relationalism has
to provide an account of the nature of the objects of unsuccessful remembering. While it is
relatively easy to see how there can be a direct relation between a mental state and an event
that exists or that existed at some point, it is unclear whether the same can be said of non-
existing objects or events. Although some philosophers, most notoriously Brentano (1973)
and Meinong (1960),2 believe that such relation is possible, contemporary relationalists,
such as Debus (2008), have favored a different strategy. This strategy consists in adopting a
disjunctivist account of memory along the lines of disjunctivist accounts of perception (see
Martin 2004; Fish 2009). The main claim of disjunctivism is that successful and unsuc-
cessful remembering are only similar with respect to their phenomenology. Based on this,
it is further claimed that phenomenological similarity is not enough to group those mental
states under the same metaphysical kind.
Disjunctivism becomes appealing to relationalists because it helps them to explain the
problems of error and indistinguishability. With respect to error, unsuccessful occurrences
of remembering can be simply regarded as being different in kind from successful ones.
This allows relationalists to consistently hold that, while successful remembering is essen-
tially relational, unsuccessful remembering is not. As to the problem of indistinguishability,
relationalists can simply deny that indistinguishability alone is sufficient to group mental
states under the same kind (see Debus 2008, 414–5; Martin 2004, 37).
Although disjunctivism offers an alternative to relationalists in accounting for error and
indistinguishability, it faces a number of problems that make it unappealing. Besides of-
fering a counterintuitive account by underplaying the importance of phenomenology to
understand the nature of memory, disjunctivism is also problematic when considered in
relation to the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying episodic memory. Empirical work
2Although see Crane (2001; 2013) for a contemporary discussion on the topic.
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suggests that episodic memory is an instance of a more general capacity to imagine events
(Suddendorf and Corballis 1997, 2007; Schacter et al. 2012; Michaelian 2016c), or more
generally to think counterfactually (De Brigard 2014a), which suggests that memory is, in-
deed, similar in important respects to those mental states. Moreover, disjunctivism leads to
an extreme and unmotivated view of memory, in which successful occurrences of remem-
bering become rare occurrences, for given the constructive character of episodic memory
(see Bartlett 1932; Michaelian 2011), most of the memories occurring in ecological con-
texts should allow for some degree of inaccuracy (Conway and Loveday 2015; see also
De Brigard 2014a).
In summary, a large part of the disagreement between representationalism and relation-
alism is due to different conceptions of what elements should be central in an account of
memory. On the one hand, representationalism provides a simple and unified account of
error and indistinguishability, but faces problems to explain epistemic particularity. On the
other hand, relationalism provides an account of epistemic particularity, but commits to an
implausible view, i.e., disjunctivism, to deal with error and indistinguishability. Despite
the apparent incompatibility between them, the question of whether a reconciliatory view
is possible has received little attention in the philosophy of memory. As Michaelian and
Sutton (2017) have noted in a recent survey of the area, “the prospects for hybrid views
of memory remain unexplored”. In contrast, hybrid views incorporating elements from
relationalism and representationalism are becoming popular in the philosophy of percep-
tion (see Schellenberg 2010, 2014; Siegel 2010; McDowell 2013; Logue 2014; Sant’Anna
2018b) and, I shall argue, they provide insightful resources to think about the possibility
of hybrid views of memory. In the remaining sections, I will focus on one prominent hy-
brid view of perception developed by Susanna Schellenberg (2010; 2011; 2016) and I will
propose a similar hybrid view of memory based on it.
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5.2 Towards a hybrid view of memory
In recent works, Schellenberg (2010; 2016) has suggested that the disagreement between
representationalism and relationalism about perception is due to, at least in part, their focus
on different elements of perception. According to her, representationalists are more con-
cerned with explaining the phenomenological particularity of perception, where “a mental
state manifests phenomenological particularity if and only if it seems to the subject that
there is a particular present”, that is, “[...] if and only if the particularity is in the scope
of how things seem to the subject” (2016, 28), while relationalists give more emphasis to
its relational particularity, where “a mental state instantiates relational particularity if and
only if the mental state is constituted by the particular perceived” (2016, 28).
The focus on different aspects of perception, Schellenberg adds, has motivated different
strategies to individuate perceptual states. Representationalists, according to her, adopt the
mental state view, where “experiences are individuated solely by the phenomenology that
the subject experiences” (2010, 20). Alternatively, relationalists rely on the environment-
encompassing view, where “experiences are individuated by the phenomenology and the
material, mind-independent objects, properties, scenes, or events to which the subject is
perceptually related” (2010, 21).
I think that drawing similar distinctions can be helpful to understand the disagreements
between representationalism and relationalism about memory. To avoid confusion, let me
start by defining the memory equivalents of those notions. I will say that a memorial state
instantiates phenomenological particularity iff it seems to the subject that his mental state is
about a past event that was previously experienced. Thus, remembering, misremembering,
and confabulating alike can instantiate phenomenological particularity. Similarly, I will say
that a memorial state instantiates relational particularity iff the memory is constituted by an
event that took place in the subject’s personal past, which refers to the collection of events
that the subject experienced in his life prior to the memory. Thus, successful occurrences
of remembering instantiate relational particularity, but unsuccessful occurrences do not, for
only the former are constituted by events of the subject’s personal past. Moreover, similar
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to the perception case, the attempts to explain phenomenological particularity and relational
particularity motivate different strategies to individuate memorial states. The first strategy,
adopted by representationalists, is the mental state view described by Schellenberg (2010),
according to which memories are individuated by their phenomenological character. The
second strategy is what I will refer to as the past-encompassing view, according to which
memories are individuated by their phenomenology and the events of the subject’s personal
past.
One clarification here refers to what I mean when I say that a memory is constituted
by an event that took place in the past. I am using the term ‘constitution’ in a very gen-
eral way, such that there are multiple ways in which a past event may constitute a present
memory. One such way would be by means of a memory trace (Martin and Deutscher
1966; De Brigard 2014b; Robins 2016b). On this view, a past event is a constitutive part
of a present memory because the latter preserves a causal connection to the former. The
notion of constitution used in this case, however, is not that of material constitution. As
I will discuss in more detail later (see section 5.3.1), an event can constitute the content
of memory even when that event has ceased to exist. Another way would be to say, along
with eternalists (e.g., Bernecker 2008), that the event itself is part of the memory because
it never ceases to exist. In section 5.3.1, I suggest that favoring the first alternative can
alleviate some metaphysical worries about the objects of memory, but for the purposes of
my discussion of the reconciliation of representationalism and relationalism, I do not need
to commit to any of these alternatives.
Let me now discuss how the distinctions introduced above relate to the discussion in
section 5.1. Consider representationalism first. The claim that successful and unsuccess-
ful occurrences of remembering share a “common factor” is supported by the mental state
view because it seems to subjects that their memories relate to particular events, which ex-
plains why memory instantiates phenomenological particularity. On the representationalist
account, successful and unsuccessful remembering both have representations as objects,
thus it is not surprising that their phenomenologies might be indistinguishable. However,
representationalism fails to explain relational particularity. Because representations are
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decouplable (see Rowlands 2017), they can occur whether or not the things that are repre-
sented exist. So, the occurrence of a past event does not seem necessary for the occurrence
of memory. This makes it hard to see how, on the representationalist view, memory can
ground our knowledge of the past.
Consider now relationalism. By adopting the past-encompassing view, relationalists
can explain epistemic particularity. Since successful remembering requires being directly
related to past events themselves, it is easier to see how memory grounds our knowledge
of the past. Moreover, because subjects are directly related to events, relationalism also ex-
plains why successful remembering has phenomenological particularity. However, because
unsuccessful occurrences of remembering do not have objects, the past-encompassing view
faces trouble to explain how they instantiate phenomenological particularity. That is why
disjunctivism becomes appealing: because phenomenological particularity is arguably the
only thing shared between successful and unsuccessful remembering, and because success-
ful remembering is constituted by events, relationalists can postulate a fundamental separa-
tion between them based on the past-encompassing view. So, while it allows for a simple
account of epistemic particularity, the past-encompassing view makes things complicated
for relationalists in relation to error and indistinguishability.
The distinctions introduced here help us not only to understand the opposition between
representationalism and relationalism, but also provide an initial framework to conceive of
a possible reconciliation. The suggestion I want to put forward is that a hybrid or recon-
ciliatory view needs to explain both the phenomenological particularity and the relational
particularity of memory. However, this raises an important question, which is how this
can be done without resulting in any inconsistencies. In the case of perception, Schellen-
berg argues that we need to preserve the idea that perception has content and adopt the
environment-encompassing view as a general strategy to individuate perceptual states. I
will follow her suggestion here and propose that, in the case of memory, preserving the
idea that memory has content and adopting the past-encompassing view provides the path
to reconcile representationalism and relationalism. But, before we move on, a few words
on why it is important to preserve those things. On the one hand, the idea that memory
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has content is important because it provides a way to distinguish between successful and
unsuccessful remembering by allowing us to assess those mental states for accuracy. In
doing this, we can explain, moreover, the nature of the “common factor” that those mental
states share — i.e., both have contents — thus providing an account of indistinguishability.
On the other hand, preserving the past-encompassing view is important because it allows
us to distinguish successful remembering from unsuccessful remembering in terms of its
relationship to past events. That is, in the same way that, according to Schellenberg’s
environment-encompassing view, the particulars that are perceived constitute the contents
of perception, the past-encompassing view requires that the particulars that are remembered
— i.e., events, objects, etc. — constitute the contents of memory.3 This allows us to build
into our theory the relational aspect that explains how memory grounds our knowledge
of the past. More importantly, because we can now say that successful remembering and
unsuccessful remembering have a common factor, the relational aspect introduced by the
past-encompassing view need not lead us to disjunctivism. The differences between those
mental states can be properly accounted for without positing a fundamental separation be-
tween them.
The claims made above will be developed in more detail in the next sections. How-
ever, before we enter this discussion, I shall mention one important assumption that I will
be making. In order to reconcile content and the past-encompassing view, I will be as-
suming an unconventional way to understand the relationship between the content and the
phenomenology of mental states, which I refer to as separatism, and then explore how it
allows us to coherently incorporate content and the past-encompassing view into a unified
view. Separatism opposes intentionalism, which is the view that the phenomenology of our
mental states can be adequately explained by their representational or intentional content
(see, e.g., Dretske 1997; Tye 2000; Byrne 2001, 2009). So, as Fernández (2017) points
out, separatism says that “the phenomenal and intentional [or representational] features of
mental states are independent from each other” (97). Therefore, my claim is that if we take
for granted that a form of separatism is true, we can have a proper hybrid view of memory. I
3See section 5.3.1 for a more detailed discussion of what it means to say that events constitute the contents
of memory.
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do not expect the reader to get on board with separatism at this point; in fact, a proper argu-
ment for a hybrid view of memory will require a proper argument for separatism. However,
since my goal here is to explore whether a hybrid view of memory is possible, I shall set
this question aside for the moment.
Another important thing to note here is that the hybrid view of perception offered by
Schellenberg is not uncontroversial. One issue is that it leans too much on representa-
tionalism, which will make the view unappealing for those inclined to relationalism (see
Sant’Anna 2018b; Chapter 2 for discussion). In particular, one central point of disagree-
ment between representationalists and relationalists is about how to account for the phe-
nomenology of perception. Relationalists, such as Martin (2004) and Fish (2009), tend
to explain it in terms of particulars being constitutive parts of experiences. However, for
the hybrid view, the phenomenology is explained by the modes of presentation, which
are elements composing the representational content of experience (see 5.2.1). Another
complaint, but now coming from representationalists, is that hybrid contents, or relational
contents, build non-conceptual elements into the content of perception. This is problematic
because it undermines an important additional motivation for representationalism, which is
that it provides a neat account of how the content of perception can inform the content of
other mental states, especially beliefs (see McDowell 1996).
Thus, it is not entirely clear whether hybridism has been successful in fully reconciling
representationalism and relationalism. Whether there can be such a full reconciliaton or
what elements from each view should figure into a reconciliatory view are still open ques-
tions in the perception literature (see Locatelli and Wilson 2017, 209). The same challenges,
I think, should be expected to arise in relation to memory. However, these challenges do not
diminish the importance of developing hybrid views. Even if hybrid views fail to satisfy the
demands of “pure” representationalists and “pure” relationalists, they still offer a promising
alternative for those who are not convinced by either of the “pure” theories. Moreover, in
historical terms, this is an important development, as hybrid views show that two apparently
incompatible views are not incompatible after all.
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5.2.1 Hybrid contents
Separatism allows for the formulation of a hybrid notion of content. Hybrid contents, as
I will call them, refer to the satisfaction conditions of memory that are partly determined
by its phenomenology and its relation to past events. Hybrid contents are, therefore, an
alternative notion of content designed to preserve both the phenomenological particularity
and the relational particularity of memory. I will now explore this notion in detail.
In line with my previous discussion, I will rely on Schellenberg’s account of content
here.4 In a recent paper, she has characterized hybrid contents as two-place relations hold-
ing between a mode of presentation of an object and a mode of presentation of a property
(Schellenberg 2010). A mode of presentation here refers to how an object or a property
appears or becomes cognitively available to the subject. So, on the classic example dis-
cussed by Frege (1980), the same object (“Venus”) can have different modes of presenta-
tion (“morning star” and “evening star”) in different thoughts. Similarly, the idea here is
that, in the case of perception, objects and properties can be presented in different ways in
perceptual experiences. In terms of their ontological status, modes of presentation can be
viewed as parts of the representational content of mental states responsible for determining
their phenomenology. Because they establish what it is like for subjects to undergo dif-
ferent mental states, it is possible for those mental states to refer to the same thing while
not necessarily sharing the same phenomenology. With this in mind, Schellenberg suggests
that the following characterization of the contents of perception can be given, where MOP
refers to modes of presentation, o is an object, and p is a property:
Perception = [MOP1(o);MOP2(p)]
I will adopt the same characterization to define the hybrid contents of memory, but
instead of objects and properties of objects, I will replace these with events and properties
of events. So, the hybrid contents of memory are characterized by the following, where
MOP refers to modes of presentation, e is an event, and p is a property of e:
4I should note that the term “hybrid contents” is my own terminology. Despite not using the same term, I
ascribe the core idea behind this notion to Schellenberg’s (2010; 2011; 2016) account of perceptual content.
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Memory = [MOP1(e);MOP2(p)]
Let me clarify what these terms mean. I will not commit to any particular account of
events here; the term is used straightforwardly to refer to situations such as visiting the
Cologne cathedral or drinking beer at the pub. Properties of events are, accordingly, the
particular constituents of those events. For example, when I remember visiting the Cologne
cathedral on a cloudy day, being a “cloudy day” is a property of that event. Similarly,
remembering “having pilsner” is a property of the event “drinking beer at the pub”. The
semi-colon separating the two modes of presentation indicates that properties are presented
as being instantiated by events despite the fact that, in the analysis of the content, they are
related to different modes of presentation.
Another thing that needs to be clarified is what it means to say, in the case of memory,
that modes of presentation present events and properties as being a certain way to subjects.
Consider the case of visiting the Cologne cathedral again. When I remember this event,
the mode of presentation presents it as being located in the past and as having occurred. In
other words, modes of presentation of events are responsible for presenting events as being
in a certain temporal location and as being actual, in the sense that they happened before,
or as being possible.5 Contrast this with imagining visiting the Cologne cathedral. On
such cases, the mode of presentation of the event places it in the future and identifies it as
something that can possibly happen. Similarly, the modes of presentation of properties are
responsible for presenting properties as being instantiated or not by a particular event.6 For
example, when I remember visiting the Cologne cathedral on a cloudy day, that property is
presented to me as being instantiated by the event in question. Likewise, when I think about
how it would be to visit the cathedral on a sunny day, the mode of presentation presents the
property of the event as being instantiated by the event too. The important thing to note here
5See section 5.3.2 for a more detailed account. I should note here that the temporal location specified by
the modes of presentation is coarse-grained in the sense that it does not specify a particular day or time, but
only whether the event is located in the past or in the future.
6While I distinguish between modes of presentation of instantiated and non-instantiated properties here,
most occurrences of remembering and also of episodic thinking discussed in section 5.3.2 will contain only
modes of presentation of instantiated properties. This is because, in most occurrences of those mental states,
the properties are presented to subjects as being instantiated, even though they might not be in reality. Thus,
while it might be possible for a subject to remember non-instantiated properties of events, such as remem-
bering a cathedral and a sunny day, but not ascribing these to any particular event, I will focus, from now on,
exclusively on cases where the properties are instantiated.
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is that modes of presentation are the parts of the content responsible for the phenomenology
of memory, so it is possible for modes of presentation to present events as being the case
and properties as being instantiated without implying that memory refers to events that
actually happened or to actual instantiated properties. Reference, as I will argue below, is
established by another part of the content of memory, which does not necessarily influence
what it is like for subjects to undergo memorial states.
Another important thing to note is that we do not need to restrict ourselves to only one
of the properties of events. It is possible, in principle, to have a memory whose content
has two or more modes of presentation referring to different properties of an event. For
example, I can remember visiting the Cologne cathedral on a cloudy and hot day. In this
case, the content of my memory has a mode of presentation relating to an event and two
different modes of presentation relating to two different properties:
Memory = [MOP1(e);MOP2(p1);MOP3(p2)]
It might be argued that this account of the content of memory does not provide a clear
way to distinguish between events and properties. Suppose that I remember visiting a build-
ing identical to the Cologne cathedral on a cloudy day, but for some reason I remember this
event as taking place in Hamburg. There are two possible ways to characterize the con-
stituents of the content of this memory. We can, on the one hand, say that it is composed by
a mode of presentation of the event “Visiting a building identical to the Cologne cathedral
in Hamburg” and a mode of presentation of the property “cloudy day”, or we can, on the
other hand, say that it is composed by a mode of presentation of the event “Visiting a build-
ing identical to the Cologne cathedral” and two modes of presentation of the properties “in
Hamburg” and “cloudy day”. If this is right, however, we will have different assessments of
the accuracy of the same memory. In the first case, the memory might be said to be confab-
ulatory because the event clearly did not occur. In the second case, it might be argued that
the memory is an occurrence of misremembering because the event in question occurred,
but one of the properties represented failed to be instantiated.7
7For more details on confabulation and misremembering, see section 5.2.2.
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As I mentioned initially, I am not committing to any particular metaphysical view of
events, so there is no principled way to say that one of the characterizations above is better.
However, we can choose between them in the context of our analysis of the content of
remembering. In other words, whether a property will be characterized alongside an event,
as in the first case, or whether it will be assigned a separate mode of presentation, as in the
second case, depends on the questions that we are trying to answer with our analysis of the
content of remembering. If the relevant question is “Does the subject remember the event
of visiting a building identical to the Cologne cathedral in Hamburg?”, then his mental state
is clearly confabulatory. But, if the question is “Does the subject remember the event of
visiting a building identical to the Cologne cathedral?”, then it would make more sense to
say that he does remember such event, although he gets some of the details wrong.
While some might find this pragmatic answer unconvincing, it is does not look com-
pletely absurd when we consider the fact that a large fraction of the memories that we usu-
ally consider “true” involve inaccurate elements. That is, because, as De Brigard (2014a)
notes, “remembering is a particular operation of a cognitive system that permits the flexible
recombination of different components of encoded traces into representations of possible
past events [...] in the service of constructing mental simulations of possible future events”
(158), it is not uncommon for the so-called “true” memories to have some inaccurate ele-
ments. Thus, if we want an account of the content of memory that avoids the conclusion
that most of our memories are not true, a pragmatic strategy that focus on some but not all
elements of the content according to the purposes of the analysis starts to make more sense.
Now, given this characterization of hybrid contents, it is possible to address the prob-
lems raised in section 5.1 in a reconciliatory framework. For the sake of simplicity, I will
focus on cases that involve only one event and one property.
5.2.2 Error revisited
Let us start with the problem of error, which refers to the possibility of memory errors. For
hybridism, because all occurrences of remembering have content, it is possible to assess
them for accuracy. To clarify, consider successful occurrences of remembering first. Hy-
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bridism says that the content of remembering consists in a two-place relation between a
mode of presentation of a particular event e1, which took place in the past, and a mode of
presentation of a property p1, which happens to be a property of e1:
Remembering = [MOP1(e1);MOP2(p1)]
This characterization explains why remembering instantiates phenomenological particular-
ity. The modes of presentation of events and properties, which are responsible for making
them cognitively available to the subject, make it seem to the subject that he is remembering
a particular event with a certain property. Moreover, because both modes of presentation are
successful in establishing reference, the relevant event e1 and the property p1 instantiated by
it become constitutive parts of remembering. This explains how remembering establishes a
relation to past events, and consequently, how it instantiates relational particularity.
Consider now unsuccessful occurrences of remembering, which can be divided into two
different kinds. The first kind is misremembering (see Robins 2016a; Michaelian 2016b),
which refers the cases where we mistakenly remember some feature of a past event. For
example, when I remember having chocolate cake at my tenth birthday party, I mistakenly
remember a feature — that I had chocolate cake instead of strawberry cake — of an event
that happened, that is, my tenth birthday party. The second kind is confabulating, which
refers to cases where we remember events that did not happen, such as remembering that I
went to the beach on my tenth birthday.
Hybridism says that the content of misremembering consists in a two-place relation
between a mode of presentation of a particular event e1, which took place in the past, and a
mode of presentation of a property.
Misremembering = [MOP1(e1);MOP2(__)]
However, because the property presented was not instantiated by e1, its mode of presen-
tation fails to establish reference. In Schellenberg’s (2010) account, when the modes of
presentation fail to refer, the content becomes “gappy”. Since, in the case of misremember-
ing, only the second mode of presentation fails to refer, I shall say that its content is partially
gappy. To further clarify this point, I should say a little bit more about what it means for
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a content to be “gappy”. Although the most natural interpretation is to understand it as
meaning that the content is somehow empty, in the sense that subjects will experience their
memories as having “missing” parts, that is not what I have in mind here. Gappiness is
a theoretical notion here and its meaning is simply that the mode of presentation failed to
establish reference. As I discuss below in 5.2.3, because of separatism, the gappiness or
non-gappiness of modes of presentation do not change the phenomenology of memory. For
this reason, I should emphasize, again, that the memories whose contents are gappy will
not be presented to subjects as being empty or as missing some part.
Now, turning back to the characterization of misremembering given above, note that
it explains why misremembering instantiates phenomenological particularity. Despite one
of the modes of presentation being gappy, it still seems to the subject that he is remem-
bering an event with a property. Because of separatism, the presence or the absence of
reference by the modes of presentation only needs to make a difference to content, but not
to phenomenology. In contrast to remembering, however, misremembering only establishes
partial relational particularity because only one of its modes of presentation is successful
in establishing reference.
Finally, consider the case of confabulating. The content of confabulating consists in
a two-place relation between a mode of presentation of a particular event and a mode of
presentation of a property, but both fail to establish reference.
Confabulating = [MOP1(__);MOP2(__)]
That is, because the event that is made cognitively available to the subject did not happen,
the first mode of presentation fails to refer to something. Consequently, the second mode
of presentation also fails to refer, for there are no properties instantiated by events that
did not happen. In contrast to remembering and misremembering, then, the content of
confabulating is fully gappy.
Analogously to remembering and misremembering, this characterization of the content
of confabulating explains why it instantiates phenomenological particularity. The gappiness
of the modes of presentation, as I noted above, makes a difference to the representational
content of the memory, but not to its phenomenology. However, unlike remembering and
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misremembering, because neither the mode of presentation of the event nor the mode of
presentation of the property are successful in establishing reference, confabulating does not
instantiate relational particularity.
One question that might be asked here is whether it is possible to have a memory whose
content contains a gappy mode of presentation of an event and a non-gappy mode of pre-
sentation of a property.8 In the terminology used here, the content would look like the
following
M = [MOP1(__);MOP2(p)]
One example would be remembering visiting the Coliseum on a cloudy day. Since I have
never visited the Coliseum, the mode of presentation of the event would be gappy, but the
mode of presentation of the property would not, for the property of being a cloudy day was
instantiated by other events that I can remember — e.g., my visit to the Cologne cathedral.
However, on the framework developed here, it is not possible to have a memory with such
content. Whether or not a property is instantiated by an event is an objective fact about the
event, so it cannot be the case that the property “cloudy day” was instantiated by the event
“My visit to the Coliseum” because this event did not happen. Despite the fact that “cloudy
day” is a property that was instantiated by another event that I can remember, the sense in
which instantiation is used here does not imply that the property in the content above was
instantiated by the relevant event. Because of this, the memory in question would have a
fully gappy content and, therefore, it would be a confabulation.
To conclude the discussion of memory errors, I should point out that I have been con-
cerned with only some forms of memory errors, namely, misremembering and confabu-
lating. There are, however, other forms of errors that are of concern to philosophers of
memory. In a recent discussion about how to provide a taxonomy of memory errors, cases
of relearning and veridical confabulation have, in addition to misremembering and con-
fabulating, played an important role in shaping the current theories (see Robins 2016a;
Michaelian 2016b; Bernecker 2017).
8I’m grateful to Kirk Michaelian for pressing me on this point.
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Cases of relearning refer to situations where we experience an event, forget about it,
and then re-acquire information about the event from sources other than our own episodic
memories. For example, I experienced my first day at school many years ago, and for some
reason or another, I forgot about what happened that day. However, due to talking to my
parents, I re-acquired or re-learned some relevant information about the event of my first
day at school. Relearning is said to be a form of memory error because, despite the informa-
tion that is re-acquired being accurate, it is acquired second-hand (e.g., from testimony), as
opposed to the first-hand information that is acquired through remembering (from the past
experience). Veridical confabulations are, in contrast, cases where subjects represent past
events accurately, but the accuracy obtains accidentally (see Michaelian 2016b; Bernecker
2017). For example, a subject might describe accurately what he had for dinner yesterday
and take himself to be remembering this event, but because the underlying processes pro-
ducing his putative memory are not the usual processes that produce episodic memories, or
perhaps because he is just guessing, he is said to be undergoing a veridical confabulation.
Like cases of relearning, the information conveyed to the subject in veridical confabula-
tions is not appropriately derived from his past experiences. While there might be room
to dispute whether relearning and veridical confabulations are genuine forms of memory
error (see, e.g., Bernecker 2017), both cases seem to be intuitively plausible. So, it seems
reasonable to expect that a complete taxonomy of memory errors will need to account for
them. The question is, however, whether the hybrid view can accommodate such errors.
I share the underlying motivation in the current literature that a complete taxonomy
of memory errors needs to include relearning and veridical confabulations. It was not my
task, however, to provide such a taxonomy in this paper. My discussion of the hybrid
view focused instead on central cases of memory errors which have been discussed more
extensively by philosophers of memory. Thus, the hybrid view should not be viewed, at
least in this stage, as a complete account of memory errors. The discussion of relearning
and veridical confabulation will, indeed, require further work from hybridists, but such
work is complementary to the main task of this paper concerning memory errors, which
was to discuss them in the context of the dispute about the objects of memory.
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5.2.3 Indistinguishability revisited
Let us consider the problem of indistinguishability now. This problem refers to the fact
that remembering, misremembering, and confabulating can be indistinguishable from the
point of view of subjects. Hybridism shares with representationalism the idea that there
is a “common factor” between remembering, misremembering, and confabulating, which
explains why they can be indistinguishable. However, unlike traditional representationalist
accounts, it claims that only parts of the contents of those mental states are shared. Those
parts correspond to the modes of presentation. Because, again, modes of presentation are
responsible for making events and properties cognitively available to subjects, they might
be unable to distinguish, from their own points of view, between remembering, misremem-
bering, and confabulating. But, the fact that modes of presentation are shared need not
conflict with the fact that only remembering is relational. For separatism, representational
content can be different even if the phenomenology is the same. This allows hybridism
to incorporate the relationalist idea that, in remembering, the past event and its properties
are constitutive parts of the content, which explains why remembering differs from mis-
remembering and confabulating with respect to its relational particularity. On the hybrid
framework, then, indistinguishability and relational particularity are properly integrated.
5.2.4 Epistemic particularity revisited
Finally, let us consider the problem of epistemic particularity, which refers to the question
of how memory can ground our knowledge of particular past events. Hybridism explains
the epistemic particularity of remembering in terms of the distinctive nature of its content;
more specifically, in terms of the nature of its relational particularity. The content of remem-
bering is the only one that is non-gappy, meaning that it is the only one that instantiates full
relational particularity. It is because of the non-gappiness of its content that remembering,
as opposed to misremembering and confabulating, can ground our knowledge of particular
past events.
The hybrid account thus accepts that there is something distinctive about remembering,
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but it does not, like relational accounts, interpret this distinctiveness as a reason to postulate
a fundamental separation in relation to misremembering and confabulating. In this respect,
it integrates this idea with the representationalist idea that remembering, misremembering,
and confabulating share a “common factor”. This provides an account of memory that re-
spects its phenomenology, which is central to representationalist accounts, and its epistemic
particularity, which is central to relationalist accounts.
One important thing to note in the context of the discussion of epistemic particularity is
that the hybrid view is not saying that successful occurrences of remembering are forms of
knowing the past (see, e.g., James 2017). That is, despite providing us with true or accurate
information about past events, it does not necessarily follow that we know anything about
those events by simply remembering them. Instead, by saying that memory instantiates
epistemic particularity, I want to say that the hybrid view explains how memory makes it
possible for us to know anything about the past. This is a very important distinction in the
context of the philosophy of memory. The reason is that whether memory is factive, i.e.,
whether memory implies knowledge, is a topic of controversy among philosophers. Since
I do not want to take part in this debate, I shall say that instantiating relational particularity,
and hence epistemic particularity, is a necessary but not sufficient condition to say that our
memories allow us to form knowledge of the past.
5.3 Hybridism and the philosophy of memory
Hybridism provides an alternative solution to the longstanding dispute between representa-
tionalism and relationalism. However, it can also be insightful for contemporary debates in
philosophy of memory. I will focus on two different topics here: the co-temporality prob-
lem and the dispute between continuists and discontinuists about the relationship between
episodic memory and other forms of episodic thinking.
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5.3.1 The co-temporality problem
The co-temporality problem, as Bernecker puts it, refers to the question of “[h]ow [...] can
we be in direct touch with events which occurred and ended a long time ago?” or “[h]ow
can the direct object of my present state of remembering be something that has ceased to
exist?” (Bernecker 2008, 69). This problem is particularly pertinent for relationalism, for
as Norman Malcolm (1975) notes, the claim that we are directly acquainted with past events
implies that the past events exist now. But, as the Bernecker quote makes explicit, there is
a tension, if not a contradiction, in saying that things that are past exist in the present. So,
relationalists have to explain how events can be constitutive parts of remembering when
they are not co-temporal with it.
One solution, proposed by Bernecker (2008), is to adopt eternalism about events. On
this view, “[e]vents do not cease to exist when they cease to be present or when there ceases
to be evidence for them. Once an event has happened, it exists eternally; the only thing
that still happens to it is that it retreats into the more and more distant past.” (2008, 71).
Essentially, eternalism goes against presentism, which is the view that only the present —
and therefore only present events — exist. The co-temporality problem relies on presentism
to make its case against relationalism, for it assumes, as a starting point, that past events are
the kind of things that do not exist. So, in adopting eternalism, it is possible to say that past
events can be constitutive parts of remembering and thus avoid the co-temporality problem.
It is not my goal to criticize eternalism here, but since some might see it as a high
metaphysical price to pay in order to deal with the co-temporality problem (e.g., Michaelian
2016c, 63), hybridism might offer an alternative route for them. For hybridism, what must
exist at the time of remembering are the hybrid contents of memory, and not the events
themselves. To clarify why this provides a distinctive answer to the co-temporality problem,
we should go back to the discussion of constitution earlier. In the beginning of section
5.2, I suggested that there are multiple ways in which an event can constitute the contents
of memory. One such way is by means of the presence of a memory trace. A memory
trace, as I understand it, is a referential index of the original event that figures into the
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representational content of a memory.9 It is because memory traces work as referential
indexes that we can say that events constitute the content of our memories. However, in
order to make this clear, I should say more about what a referential index is. A referential
index is a thing A that is responsible for pointing to the existence of another thing B. A can
point to the existence of B because A is existentially dependent on B, that is, A would not
have been the case if B had not been the case. For example, smoke is a referential index for
fire because it points to the existence of fire and smoke is existentially dependent on fire —
i.e., assuming that there is smoke iff there is fire. What is important to note about referential
indexes is that they can exist even in the absence of the things that they existentially depend
on. That is, even in the absence of fire, smoke can still function as a referential index for fire,
in the sense that it points to the existence of fire at a prior moment. Similarly, a particular
memory trace T is a referential index for a particular past event E because it points to the
existence of the event E. Like the case of smoke and fire, T can exist in the absence of E,
upon which it is existentially dependent. Thus, in the absence of E, T can still function as a
referential index for E, in the sense that it points to the existence of E at a prior moment.
Now, the question is how does this help with the co-temporality problem? If one wants
to avoid the problem, one needs to provide an account of how an event e can constitute
the content of memory without requiring that e exists at each particular time that it is re-
membered. However, if e is to be a constitutive part of the content, this does not seem to
be possible without appealing to eternalism. In logical terms, if A is a constitutive part of
B, then, whenever B is the case, A is also the case. To avoid this worry, I will distinguish
here between two senses of constituency. On the one hand, we can say that a materially
constitutes B iff A is a material part of B. On the other hand, we can say that A metaphysi-
cally constitutes B iff the occurrence of B existentially depends on and is explained by the
occurrence of A. Otherwise put, if a had not been the case, B would not have been the case.
For the hybrid view, events constitute contents in the second, but not the first, sense
of constituency. That is, an event e is a (metaphysical) constitutive part of a content C iff
the occurrence of C existentially depends on and is explained by the occurrence of e. So,
9The notion of a referential index is an adapted version of Charles Peirce’s notion of an index, which plays
a central role in his theory of representations.
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when one successfully remembers an event e, it is not required that e materially exists at
the time of remembering. What makes a given content C metaphysically constituted by e
is the fact that, at the time of remembering, C is materially constituted by a memory trace.
This is possible because memory traces are referential indexes, and as such, they estab-
lish the relationship of metaphysical constituency between contents and events by being
material constituents of the contents. So, the hybrid view avoids the co-temporality prob-
lem because it allows for the claim that events (metaphysically) constitute the content of
memories without requiring their material existence.
I do not expect the reader to get on board with this solution straightaway. One particular
worry is that it relies heavily on a particular understanding of memory traces, so more is
needed to motivate it properly. Another worry might be that this solution relies too much
on the idea that there are memory traces, which might put off some readers. I have not
argued for the existence of memory traces here, but since they are important in discussions
about the neurobiology of memory (Thompson 2005; Poo et al. 2016), further exploring
their implications for philosophical theorizing about memory can be potentially fruitful.
A third worry might be that more needs to be said in order to make explicit what it
means for a thing A to be a metaphysical constituent of another thing B and whether refer-
ential indexes can be used to describe this relationship appropriately. One might argue, for
example, that the relationship between hybrid contents and events established by memory
traces is better understood in terms of dependence or entailment, rather than in terms of
constitution. I want to acknowledge all these worries and say that they are worth develop-
ing in exploring the prospects of the hybrid view. However, due to the limitations of scope
and space, I hope that the considerations above are sufficient to give at least an idea of how
the hybrid answer to the co-temporality problem is supposed to work.
To conclude this discussion, I would like to address an objection that is likely to arise
in the context of this discussion of constitution. This objection says that understanding
constitution as metaphysical constitution undermines the main motivation for taking the
hybrid view to be a form of hybrid-relationalist view. Relational particularity, one might
argue, requires material constitution and not metaphysical constitution. In response, I do
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not think this is right. The main motivation to account for relational particularity is that it
grounds epistemic particularity, which is aptly explained by metaphysical constitution. Due
to the referential indexical nature of memory traces, one will have a memory whose content
C is about a particular event e iff e was the case. Thus, C necessarily and existentially
depends on and is explained by e having been the case, which is what is required to account
for epistemic particularity. This might not, of course, satisfy a “pure” relationalist, but since
the hybrid view does not aim at being a combination of pure representationalism and pure
relationalism, but rather a compromised reconciliation, this is not necessarily a problem for
the view.
5.3.2 Continuism vs. discontinuism
As I discussed in section 5.1, the idea that episodic memory is closely related to other forms
of episodic thinking, such as episodic future thinking (Michaelian 2016c; Szpunar 2010)
and episodic counterfactual thought (De Brigard 2014a), is receiving increasing support
from empirical research on memory (see Suddendorf and Corballis 1997, 2007; Schacter
et al. 2007, 2012). This has raised the question of whether episodic memory differs from
other forms of episodic thinking only in degree, or whether the difference is one of kind.
While people involved in the debate often focus on different aspects of the relationship
between memory and episodic thinking (see Perrin and Michaelian 2017 for discussion), I
will focus here on the metaphysical question of whether episodic memory and other forms
of episodic thinking belong to the same metaphysical kind.10
Continuists hold that the similarities between episodic memory and episodic thinking
found by empirical research suggest that they are instances of the same kind (see, e.g.,
De Brigard 2014a; Michaelian 2016c). While continuists are not necessarily committed to
the view that episodic memory and episodic thinking are the same thing, they do not think
that the dissimilarities among them support a fundamental separation. In contrast, discon-
tinuists hold that, while there might be striking similarities between episodic memory and
episodic thinking, episodic memory possesses some features that makes it fundamentally
10See the Appendix A for a more detailed discussion of this.
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distinct from other forms of episodic thinking. One common reason offered in favor of
discontinuism is that episodic memory holds a causal relationship (Perrin 2016) or an “ex-
periential” relationship (Debus 2008, 2014) to past events, while other forms of episodic
thinking do not.
If a hybrid account of memory turns out to be correct, hybridism would support a broad
continuist view according to which episodic memory and episodic thinking belong to the
same metaphysical kind. A hybrid account would require one to take episodic thinking to
possess hybrid contents too. Assuming that this is the case, we can explain the fact that
episodic memory and episodic thinking belong to the same metaphysical kind by pointing
out the fact that they possess hybrid contents. While hybridism sits on the continuist side,
it can still incorporate the discontinuist idea that episodic memory is inherently relational.
On this account, while (successful) episodic memory would be non-gappy because it is
successful in referring to events and their properties, episodic thinking would be gappy,
because it fails to do so.
Episodic thinking is considered to be gappy because it does not refer to existing events
and to instantiated properties. In different forms of episodic thinking, whether we are
thinking about events that can possibly happen or events that can no longer happen, our
thoughts do not refer to particular events. Thus, their modes of presentation are gappy like
the modes of presentation of confabulating. But, despite establishing that the contents of
episodic thinking are gappy, hybridism can explain the phenomenological similarities be-
tween episodic memory and episodic thinking. Due to possessing modes of presentation
in their contents, the phenomenological particularity of episodic thinking, or the fact that it
seems to subjects that they are thinking about particular events is explained by hybridism.
Moreover, it also explains why episodic memory is unique with respect to its relational par-
ticularity. Because of the gappiness of episodic thinking, episodic memory is the only one
capable of instantiating relational particularity. So, hybridism would grant continuists that
episodic memory and episodic thinking are continuous with respect to their phenomenolog-
ical particularity, but would concede to discontinuists by saying that they are discontinuous
in relation to their relational particularity.
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One natural worry here would be in relation to the relationship between unsuccessful
occurrences of remembering, more specifically confabulating, and episodic thinking. If
hybridism is right, then it might be argued that there is no difference between episodic
thinking and confabulating because both have fully gappy contents, which is an odd result.
One strategy to address this worry would be to say that confabulating is a misnomer for what
are actually forms of episodic thinking directed to the past. While this is a possible answer
to the problem, I think this strategy should be avoided if other alternatives are available.
The main reason is that hybridism would need to provide independent reasons to think that
confabulating is simply a form of episodic thinking directed to the past, but it is not clear
whether there are such reasons.
As an alternative, I think that a more detailed account of the modes of presentation
present in the contents of remembering, misremembering, confabulating, and different
forms of episodic thinking, can potentially provide a framework to distinguish between
them. To clarify this point, let me first distinguish between different forms of episodic
thinking. I will follow De Brigard (2014a) and distinguish not only between forms of
thinking about possible past and future events, but also between forms of thinking about
counterfactual past and future events. Consider, first, episodic future thinking. These refer
to cases where we think about events that can possibly happen in the future. For example,
when I think about my holidays at the end of the year, my thought presents me with an
event instantiating certain properties. However, despite seeming so at the phenomenologi-
cal level, the thought fails to refer to existing things, for the event in question does not exist
and the properties are, consequently, non-instantiated.
Consider, second, future-oriented counterfactual thinking. These refer to cases where
we think about events that could have been the case in the future, but are no longer possible.
For example, when I think about how my holidays would be if I had saved money to pay for
them, I am thinking about an event that would happen in the future if I had done something
differently in the past. However, at the present, it is no longer possible for me to save money
to pay for the holidays, which makes this an impossible event. In such cases, the events in
question also do not exist and their properties are non-instantiated. Thus, despite presenting
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me with a particular event and some seemingly instantiated properties, the thought fails to
refer to existing things.
Consider, now, thoughts that are directed at the past. Assuming that episodic memory
is a form of episodic thinking, as De Brigard (2014a) does, we have, on the one hand, suc-
cessful and unsuccessful occurrences of remembering, which we have discussed already,
and, on the other hand, past-oriented counterfactual thinking. The latter refers to cases
where we think about events that could have been the case in the past. For example, when
I think about how my holidays would have been in 2010 had I saved money that year, I am
entertaining a thought about an event that could have happened in the past if I had done
something differently. Similarly to episodic future thinking and future-oriented counterfac-
tual thinking, the event in question does not exist and the properties are non-instantiated.
Thus, despite presenting me with a particular event and some seemingly instantiated prop-
erties, the thought fails to refer to existing things.
Now, to see how we can distinguish between those occurrences of episodic thinking,
including successful and unsuccessful occurrences of remembering, remember that, for hy-
bridism, the content of a given thought is partly determined by its phenomenology and
partly determined by how it relates to the things it is about. These are, respectively, the
phenomenological particularity and the relational particularity of mental states. The claim
hybridism puts forward with respect to the relationship between episodic memory and dif-
ferent forms of episodic thinking is that they are continuous in terms of their phenomeno-
logical particularity, but discontinuous in terms of their relational particularity. So, we
need an account of the relationship between episodic memory and episodic thinking that
explains (1) how all those forms of thinking instantiate phenomenological particularity; (2)
how occurrences of remembering instantiate full or partial relational particularity; and (3)
how forms of episodic thinking differ from each other in terms of content.
While the difference of content of successful and unsuccessful occurrences of remem-
bering is due to their relational particularity, or whether and how the modes of presentation
refer, the difference of content of different forms of episodic thinking is to be found in how
phenomenological particularity is instantiated, or in the kinds of modes of presentation that
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compose their contents. The motivation for this is quite simple: because different forms of
episodic thinking are considered to be fully gappy on the hybrid account, the differences
in their contents should come from the parts responsible for their phenomenologies. To
make sense of these differences, however, we need an account of what kinds of modes
of presentation there are and which ones are present in different occurrences of episodic
thinking.
When we look at the phenomenology of the various forms of episodic thinking de-
scribed above, it is possible to identify two important differences among them. First, they
differ with respect to whether the events are presented as being about the past or the future
and whether they are presented as being actual, possible, or not possible. And second, they
differ in relation to whether the properties are presented as instantiated or not. This allows
us to distinguish between four kinds of modes of presentation for events and two kinds of
modes of presentation for properties to explain the differences in the phenomenology of
those thoughts.
Events
Kinds of MOPs Temporal location / Actual-
ity or possibility
MOPpast/actual Past / Actual
MOPpast/n−possible Past / Not-possible
MOPfuture/possible Future / Possible
MOPfuture/n−possible Future / Not-possible
Properties
Kinds of MOPs Instantiation
MOPinstantiated Instantiated
MOPn−instantiated Non-instantiated
Let us now consider this in relation to the content of episodic thinking. To start, consider
remembering, misremembering, and confabulating. In all of them, the modes of presenta-
tion present subjects with events that seem to be past and actual and with properties that
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seem to be instantiated by those events. While only remembering is successful in refer-
ring to actual past events and to instantiated properties, it is still the case that it seems to
subjects that, in remembering, misremembering, and confabulating, their mental states are
about such things. So, we can say that the modes of presentation composing the content
of remembering, misremembering, and confabulating are modes of presentation presenting
events as being past and actual and modes of presentation presenting properties as being





Note that this characterization is compatible with the account given in section 5.2. Remem-
bering, misremembering, and confabulating still differ with respect to their contents, but
they have the same phenomenology because their contents are composed by the same kinds
of modes of presentation.11
In comparison, consider now episodic future thinking, future-oriented counterfactual
thinking, and past-oriented counterfactual thinking. In cases of episodic future thinking
(EFT), the modes of presentation present subjects with events that seem to be future and
possible and with properties that seem to be instantiated by those events. In cases of future-
oriented counterfactual thinking (FOCT), the modes of presentation present subjects with
events that seem to be future and non-possible and with properties that seem to be instanti-
ated by those events. In cases of past-oriented counterfactual thinking (POCT), the modes
of presentation present subjects with events that seem to be past and non-possible and with
properties that seem to be instantiated by those events. In all those cases, because the events
11It might be argued here that the non-gappy modes of presentation in remembering and misremembering
are different from the gappy modes of presentation in confabulating. In response, I want to clarify that when I
say that the modes of presentation in remembering, misremembering, and confabulating are of the same kind,
I mean that how they present events to the subject is the same, regardless of whether or not they are successful
in referring. Thus, because modes of presentation are responsible for the phenomenology of memory and
because the phenomenology does not necessarily change when modes of presentation are fulfilled, it is not
incoherent to say that remembering, misremembering, and confabulating can have the same kind of modes of
presentation.
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do not exist, the contents are fully gappy. Thus, we have the following characterization of




Now that we have a characterization of the content of different forms of episodic think-
ing, we can see whether hybridism satisfies (1)–(3) above. (1) establishes that a hybrid
account of the relationship between episodic memory and episodic thinking must explain
how they instantiate phenomenological particularity. In the characterization of the content
of episodic thinking given above, this requirement is satisfied. Because the contents of dif-
ferent forms of episodic thinking contain modes of presentation, we can explain why, like
in occurrences of remembering, it seems to subjects that their thoughts are about particular
events with particular properties. Condition (2) requires, in contrast, an account of why
some occurrences of remembering instantiate full or partial relational particularity, while
other forms of episodic thinking do not. The hybrid account provided also satisfies (2): re-
membering instantiates full relational particularity because both modes of presentation are
successful in referring; misremembering instantiates partial relational particularity because
only the mode of presentation of events establishes reference; and confabulating and other
forms of episodic thinking are fully gappy because none of their modes of presentation
are successful in referring. Finally, (3) requires an explanation of how different forms of
episodic thinking and confabulating differ in terms of content, given that they are all fully
gappy. This is also accommodated in the framework above, for despite being fully gappy,
the content of confabulating and other forms of episodic thinking differ because they are
constituted by different modes of presentation. This, again, is fully consistent with the no-
tion of hybrid content developed in section 5.2, for phenomenology partly determines the
content of mental states. Thus, taking different forms of episodic thinking to have hybrid
contents preserves important continuist and discontinuist intuitions.
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5.4 Objections
One assumption that underlies the proposal of this paper is that the dispute between rep-
resentationalism and relationalism in perception and memory have sufficiently similar el-
ements, such that the enterprise to analyze hybrid views of perception to start thinking of
hybrid views of memory is justified. In this section, I will briefly consider some differences
between memory and perception that could serve as bases for objections against my pro-
posal. I also consider one objection which says that hybridism does not succeed in avoiding
disjunctivism.
5.4.1 The character of memory vs. the objects of memory
It might be argued that there is an important difference between the contemporary dispute
between representationalism and relationalism about perception and the same dispute in
memory. Unlike in the philosophy of memory, contemporary philosophers of perception
are concerned with the character of perception, as opposed to the nature of its objects.
Although how exactly to characterize the objects of perception across different modalities
is a matter of dispute (see, e.g., O’Callaghan 2011, 2016), it is widely agreed that they
are mind-independent things or events in the environment. What representationalists and
relationalists ultimately disagree about is whether perception is, fundamentally, a matter
of representing the world or of being directly related to it. Representationalists, as Tim
Crane (2006) points out, hold that “a perceptual representation need not essentially involve
a relation to what it represents” (133), meaning that there can be instances of perceptual
experiences that do not relate to anything, such as hallucinating seeing a unicorn (see, e.g.,
Tye 2000; Byrne 2001; Dretske 2003). In contrast, relationalists insist that there cannot be
perception without a relation (see, e.g., Martin 2004; Brewer 2007; Fish 2009), which mo-
tivates, in part, their appeal to disjunctivism to deal with the occurrence of hallucinations.
While it is true that discussions about the character and the objects of perception and
memory are two different things, it is also true that they are closely related. It is not possible
to give a proper account of what the objects of memory are if we do not have a proper
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understanding of the character of memory. Hybridism is, in this perspective, an attempt to
show that the dispute between representationalism and relationalism about the nature of the
objects of memory can be resolved by adopting an appropriate (i.e., a hybrid) view of the
character of memory. In other words, if the character of memory is hybrid, as hybridism
suggests, the objects of memory are indeed the past events themselves, but we only become
aware of those events by undergoing representational states whose contents are inherently
relational. Recently, Bernecker (2008) seems to hint at a similar view when he says that
Though remembering something may require the having of memory-data, there
is no reason to suppose we are aware of these memory-data themselves. I am
aware of a past event by internally representing the event, not by being aware
of the internal representation of the event. Memory-data do not function as the
primary objects of awareness, but are merely the vehicles of the remembered
information. Memory is indirect in the sense that it involves a series of causal
intermediaries between the past event and the memory experience (memory-
datum). But from this it does not follow that memory is indirect in the sense of
involving a prior awareness of something other than the past event. (75)
Memory-data, or, as I have been using the term, representations, are the vehicles by
means of which we become aware of past events. Despite his account being compatible
with hybridism, Bernecker does not say much about what those memory-data should be
in order to make it possible for one to be aware of past events themselves by means of
representing them. Hybridism, in contrast, deals with this question directly. In doing so,
it provides an account of what the character of memory should be in order to reconcile
representationalist and relationalist intuitions, such that a common ground about what the
objects of memory are can be found.
5.4.2 The temporality of the objects of perception and memory
Another disanalogy between perception and memory relates to the temporality of their ob-
jects. The objects of perception are co-temporal with perceptual experiences, which makes
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it easy to see how they can be constitutive parts of their contents. However, the objects of
memory are not co-temporal with memorial states. Past events no longer exist when we
remember them, so it is hard to see how they can be constitutive parts of the content of re-
membering. Thus, perhaps it is simply misleading to say that memory has hybrid contents
in the same way that perception does.
As I pointed out in section 5.3.1, even if it is true that this disanalogy is genuine, it does
not threaten hybridism. Alternatively, it is possible to question whether the disanalogy is
actually the case. As Bernecker (2008) notes, “also in the case of perception we have to
allow that what is directly perceived is not contemporary with the act of perceiving it”, for
“perceiving a physical object is a causal process that takes time” (69, see also Russell 1912,
17–8). Thus, strictly speaking, the objects of perception are not co-temporal with perceptual
experiences, for the causal processes leading up to perceptual experiences require time to
happen. Although the time separating remembering and past events is significantly longer
than the time separating perceiving and its objects, the difference here is one of degree and
not one of kind. So, if there is a disanalogy between perception and memory, it is not as
dramatic as it initially appeared.
5.4.3 Autonoetic consciousness
A third difference between perception and memory is that the latter seems to involve a
unique kind of consciousness, namely, what Tulving (1985b; 2002) called autonoetic con-
sciousness, or simply autonoesis (see also Klein 2015). Broadly speaking, one might un-
derstand autonoesis in two ways. On the first understanding, autonoesis refers to what
philosophers usually call the “feeling of pastness” (Russell 1921, 161–2) associated with
episodic memories. On the second understanding, it refers to the sense of self or “own-
ership” that episodic memories carry with them (see Klein and Nichols 2012). Although
Tulving distinguished these two understandings later in his works, the initial characteriza-
tion provided by him, according to which autonoesis refers to the sense of self in subjective
time, seems to suggest that autonoesis involves both the elements above. Since this is per-
haps the most common definition of the term, I will stick to it here.
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By relying on a characterization of content inspired by perceptual experiences, it might
be argued that hybrid contents fail to account for this essential feature of memory. Although
some, such as Fernández (2016), argue for a characterizarion of autonoesis in terms of con-
tent, it is commonly accepted that autonoesis belongs to the phenomenological dimension
of memory. Thus, when we take into account hybridism’s commitment to separatism, it is
not required that autonoesis be an essential element of the content of memory. It is con-
sistent with hybridism that differences in the phenomenology of a mental state need not
imply differences in its content, as long as those differences are explained by something
external to the content. Another alternative would be to suggest that autonoesis is not a
feature of episodic memories themselves, but of doxastic states accompanying them, which
are “recruited” by particular elements of their contents (Sant’Anna and Michaelian 2018).
For example, we can say that your memory of your tenth birthday party has the feelings
of pastness and of ownership not because they are built into the content or into the phe-
nomenology of memory, but rather because you hold certain beliefs that accompany your
memory, such as that the child represented in the thought is you, that events in which you
are a child are in the past, and so on. Another alternative would be to explain autonoesis as
arising out of the functioning of metacognitive processes responsible for detecting specific
cues present in the content of memory (see, e.g., Dokic 2014).
Given that there is no agreement as to what autonoetic consciousness is, and given that
this is still a controversial topic in the literature, I do not want to commit to any particular
alternative here. A full hybrid account of episodic memory will, of course, be required to
provide an account of autonoesis, and some of the alternatives described above are poten-
tially compatible with the hybrid view. However, showing that hybridism can in fact rely
on them, or whether a new alternative is needed to explain autonoesis, is the task of a future
project.
5.4.4 Disjunctivism again?
To conclude the paper, I would like to reply to one objection that can be raised to hybridism.
This objection says that hybridism fails to avoid disjunctivism, for the framework I pro-
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vided is logically compatible with the disjunctivist claim that successful and unsuccessful
occurrences of remembering are only similar in relation to their phenomenology.12
This objection overlooks two important points of hybridism. The first point refers to the
fact that hybridism is not committed to the claim that the only thing shared by successful
and unsuccessful occurrences of remembering is the phenomenology. As it became clear
in the discussion of the content of episodic thinking, phenomenology is only a part of the
content of remembering and episodic thinking. So, successful and unsuccessful occurrences
of remembering are similar with respect to their phenomenology because they share a more
basic “common factor”, which is that they are mental states with representational content.
So, those mental states are similar in a more fundamental way, which actually explains why
they share the same phenomenology, thus making hybridism incompatible with the kind of
metaphysical conclusions advanced by disjunctivists.
The second point is that the objection overlooks the fact that hybridism is not concerned
with the logical coherence of disjunctivism, but with the metaphysical conclusions drawn
from the claim that the only thing shared by successful and unsuccessful occurrences of
remembering is the phenomenology. Even if, for the sake of the argument, we grant that
hybridism is compatible with this claim, it does not follow that it is committed to disjunc-
tivism, or at least to disjunctivism in the way described in section 5.1. The problematic
aspect of disjunctivism, from the hybridist’s point of view, is that the disjunctive claim sup-
ports the conclusion that successful and unsuccessful occurrences of remembering belong
to two different metaphysical kinds. Since this claim is not implied by hybridism, it is not
the case that it is committed to disjunctivism even if we accept that the only thing shared
by successful and unsuccessful occurrences of remembering is the phenomenology.
12I would like to thank Markus Werning for raising this objection.
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Conclusion
This thesis consisted of five self-standing articles dealing with issues surrounding the dis-
pute between representationalism and relationalism about perception and memory. The
overall argument of the thesis was that a form of hybridism, where elements from each
of these views are integrated, is to be preferred in both domains. However, because of the
self-standing nature of the chapters, the argument offered for hybridism was not linear. As a
conclusion, I would like to say a bit more on how, despite the non-linearity of the argument,
the thesis still offers a consistent defense of hybridism.
Let me start with perception. Part I, which dealt exclusively with perception, consisted
of two chapters. Chapter 1 built on pragmatist ideas to develop an unconventional rela-
tional theory of perception. This theory, which I called perceptual contextualism, is an
unconventional form of relationalism because it advocates for a different understanding of
the objects of perception, where they are viewed as the impositional elements of perceptual
experiences, that attempts to avoid disjunctivism. While I did not recognize this at the time
Chapter 1 was written, and despite my resistance to acknowledging an objection that made
this point (see Sect. 1.3.3), perceptual contextualism was too permissive to be an “austere”
relational view, that is, a view that explains all the fundamental aspects of perception only
in terms of its relational aspect (see Schellenberg 2010). This only became clear, however,
when I attempted to provide a more solid grounding of my approach to perception in the
classical pragmatist proposal of Charles Peirce.
This realization resulted in the production of Chapter 2, where Peirce’s theory of per-
ception is put to work. By developing what I called perceptual pragmatism — which can
reasonably be seen as an updated version of perceptual contextualism — the hybrid aspect
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of my approach finally became central. The Hybrid Triad, which was introduced in Chapter
2, guided my quest to find a suitable hybrid account of perception based on pragmatism.
While, at least initially, the option to focus on Peirce’s pragmatism was motivated primar-
ily by my previous interests in his philosophy, during the development of the chapter, it
became clear to me that pragmatism could also provide the starting point to explore a new
territory in the perception literature. In other words, perceptual pragmatism is one of the
first attempts in contemporary analytic philosophy of perception, if not the first one, to
tackle more systematically the question of whether there can be a hybrid account of percep-
tion that is not biased towards representationalism.13 In this sense, my pragmatist-inspired
hybrid approach offers an important contribution to the hybrid literature in that it shows
that, at least in principle, there can be hybrid views of perception that are more sympathetic
to austere versions of relationalism. So, while only Chapter 2 explicitly advocates for a
hybrid account of perception, the ideas first developed in Chapter 1 were fundamental to
shape the hybrid account of Chapter 2.
Let me now turn to memory. Part II consisted of the work that I did in the philosophy of
memory. Despite the change in the subject, the ideas advanced in this part could not have
been developed if it were not for the work done in Part I. Chapter 3 was directly motivated
by my interests in an alternative account of the objects of perception. Because there was
also a need for an alternative account of the objects of memory in the context of episodic
hypothetical thought, elements of the pragmatist framework developed in Part I were intro-
duced in this new context. While, again, there was no explicit mention of hybridism in this
chapter, the resulting pragmatist account of the objects of memory, and, more generally, of
the objects of episodic hypothetical thought, contained elements from both representational
and relational accounts of memory. Chapter 4, too, did not address hybridism, but it was
a required step towards a proper motivation of hybridism about memory. As I discussed
above, relational views are very unpopular in the memory literature. This is because re-
13While my hybrid account provides a novel perspective for the contemporary analytic philosophy of per-
ception literature, it is very close to hybrid views developed in the pragmatist literature, especially that of
Peirce scholars. As it is clear from my discussion in Chapter 2, my hybrid account relies heavily on Sandra
Rosenthal’s (2001; 2004) interpretation of Peirce’s theory of perception. Similar interpretations that high-




lationalists have failed to engage effectively with the current discussions in the area. So,
despite Chapter 4 being critical of relationalism, its main goal was not to contribute to its
dismissal, but rather to provoke relationalists to engage more explicitly with their critics.
Again, the work done in Chapter 4 would also not have been possible if it were not for the
work done in Part I on perceptual errors, as the problems that relationalism about perception
and relationalism about memory face in relation to error are very similar.
Given the proximity identified between problems of concern to philosophers of percep-
tion and philosophers of memory, and given my hybrid take on perception, the question of
whether a hybrid approach to memory was possible quickly became central. However, as I
discuss in the introduction to Chapter 5, due to the fact that no hybrid views had so far been
offered in the memory literature, I ended up deciding for a more conservative hybrid ap-
proach to memory. This is why, among other things, the framework used in Chapter 5 was
the one provided by Schellenberg’s hybrid account of perception, and not the one provided
by my own hybrid account in Chapter 2. While this could create a potential theoretical
conflict between Chapter 2 and Chapter 5, strategically speaking, the more conservative
approach of Chapter 5 was more likely to provide a better support for the overall argument
of the thesis. That is, because talking about hybrid views is already a novel topic in the
memory literature, relying on a more established hybrid approach to perception, such as
Schellenberg’s, was more likely to make philosophers of memory sympathetic to enter-
taining the possibility of hybrid views in memory. Moreover, because hybridism requires
taking relationalism seriously, Chapter 5 offers a potentially fresh start for relationalist-
minded philosophers of memory, as it offers a framework that does not require abandoning
representationalism altogether.
In summary, while not all chapters dealt explicitly with hybridism, they played a funda-
mental role in building up the required elements for the hybrid accounts of perception and
memory offered in Chapters 2 and 5. Thus, although the support that those chapters offer to
Chapters 2 and 5 cannot be straightforwardly constructed in a linear way, they still consist






Mental time travel and the philosophy of
memory
Introduction
The idea that episodic memory is a form of mental time travel has played an important role
in the development of memory research in the last couple of decades. Despite its growing
importance in psychology, philosophers have only begun to develop an interest in philo-
sophical questions pertaining to the relationship between memory and mental time travel.
Thus, this chapter proposes a more systematic discussion of the relationship between mem-
ory and mental time travel from the point of view of philosophy. I start by discussing some
of the motivations to take memory to be a form of mental time travel. I call the resulting
view of memory the mental time travel view. I then proceed to consider important philo-
sophical questions pertaining to memory and develop them in the context of the mental time
travel view. I conclude by suggesting that the intersection of the philosophy of memory and
research on mental time travel not only provides new perspectives to think about traditional
philosophical questions, but also new questions that have not been explored before.
This appendix chapter serves as a complement to various discussions pertaining to
memory that appeared in different parts of the thesis. This short paper was written as
an invited contribution to a special issue on the topic for the Unisinos Journal of Philoso-
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phy. While it does not contribute positively to the overall argument of the thesis, the paper
might prove useful as an additional resource, as it provides more accessible discussions to
important issues that appear in the thesis.
Outline
This chapters considers the implications of the idea that episodic memory is a form of
mental time travel to the philosophy of memory. Section A.1 provides a brief background
of the emergence of this idea. Section A.2 discusses this idea in more detail focusing on
issues of interest to philosophers. Finally, Section A.3 discusses the implications of mental
time travel research to the philosophy of memory. I discuss issues relating to the causal
theory of memory (Sect. A.3.1), mental time travel and our knowledge of the past (Sect.
A.3.2), and the objects and metaphysics of mental time travel (Sects. A.3.3 and A.3.4).
A.1 Introduction (paper)
The idea that episodic memory is a form of mental time travel has played an important
role in the development of memory research in the last couple decades. Mental time travel,
according to Suddendorf and Corballis (1997), “comprises the mental reconstruction of
personal events from the past (episodic memory) and the mental construction of possible
events in the future” (133). “The real importance of mental time travel”, they add, “applies
to travel into the future rather than into the past; that is, we predominantly stand in the
present facing the future rather than looking back at the past” (Suddendorf and Corballis
1997, 147).
Traditionally, memory has been taken to be primarily about the past, in the sense that it
allows us to recall things that happened. However, the suggestion that episodic memory is
just a form of mental time travel challenges this idea, for “the primary role of mental time
travel into the past is to provide raw material from which to construct and imagine possible
futures” (Suddendorf and Corballis 2007, 302). These considerations raise a number of im-
portant philosophical questions. A first relevant question refers to whether memory requires
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an appropriate causal connection to past experiences or events. Since Martin and Deutscher
(1966), it has been standard to assume that remembering requires such connection (see,
e.g., Bernecker 2008; Debus 2008; Michaelian 2011; Robins 2016a). A second relevant
question is whether episodic memory can be a source of knowledge of the past (see Debus
2014; Michaelian 2016c). Since mental time travel into the past, or episodic memory, is in
the service of providing raw material to simulate future scenarios, it is not clear whether or
under what conditions it can provide us with reliable information about past happenings. A
third and more general question refers to the relationship between memory and other forms
of mental time travel, such as imagining future events. Because both are a result of similar
cognitive capacities, the question of whether they belong to the same metaphysical kind
becomes central (see Perrin and Michaelian 2017)
These and other questions have attracted attention from philosophers concerned with
memory (see, e.g., De Brigard 2014a; Debus 2014; Michaelian 2016c; Perrin 2016). In this
paper, I will explore some of the implications that the mental time travel view of memory,
as I will refer to it, has to the philosophy of memory. I will start by discussing some
motivations to consider episodic memory as a form of mental time travel. Subsequently, I
will explore the implications of this idea to the philosophy of memory.
A.2 Episodic memory and mental time travel
Before we discuss the relationship between episodic memory and mental time travel, it will
be helpful to first clarify what episodic memory is. The term was initially introduced by
Endel Tulving (1972), and roughly speaking, it corresponds to the memory system respon-
sible for receiving and storing “information about temporally dated episodes or events, and
temporal-spatial relations among these events” (385).1 So, when you episodically remem-
ber an event, your memory contains information about the what, the where, and the when
1The term memory is ambiguous and it might refer to different things, such as one’s capacity to remember
(e.g., “John has a good memory”), the cognitive system responsible for producing memories (e.g., “Your
memory is not working well”), or the outputs of that cognitive system, namely the mental states that we call
“memories” (e.g., “I have a memory of my tenth birthday party”). For my purposes, I use the term to refer
both to the cognitive system responsible for producing memories as well as to the individual mental states
produced by it.
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associated with that event. That is the so-called what-when-where view of episodic mem-
ory, or simply the www view. Episodic memories, on Tulving’s initial formulation, contrast
with semantic memories. Those refer to memories about general facts that were not nec-
essarily experienced. For example, when I remember that the Second World War ended
in 1945, I am semantically remembering a fact by using language. The semantic memory
system, Tulving says, refers to the “organized knowledge a person possesses about words
and other verbal symbols, their meanings and referents, about relations among them, about
rules, formulas, and algorithms for the manipulation of these symbols, concepts, and re-
lations” (1972, 386). Thus, in contrast to episodic memories, semantic memories do not
require the previous experience of the relevant events.
The important thing to note about this definition of episodic memory is that it is pri-
marily based on the kind of information that is processed and stored. And, because of this,
it faces some important problems. One such problem refers to the fact that some semantic
memories possess the relevant “www” information; for example, my memory that the Wa-
terloo battle was fought in 1815. Thus, it is not entirely clear whether episodic memories
and semantic memories can be distinguished solely on the basis of the information pos-
sessed by them. Another problem refers to the phenomenological dimension of episodic
memories. Remembering a particular event that was previously experienced seems to in-
volve more than the retrieval of information. Episodically remembering seems to have a
distinctive phenomenology, involving a ”feeling of pastness” (Russell 1921, 161–62) and
a “feeling of warmth and intimacy” (James 1890). In other words, besides the information
carried, episodic memories seem to make reference to the past (“feeling of pastness”) and
to belong to subjects in a unique way (“feeling of warmth and intimacy”). For example,
when I remember my tenth birthday party, the memory not only presents the event as having
occurred in the past, but also as being “mine”, in the sense that I seem to own the memory.
These and other difficulties have led Tulving to reformulate his first characterization of
episodic memory. Later on, he proposed a definition that took into account the phenomeno-
logical aspects described above. According to him, besides carrying “www” information,
episodic memories involve a unique kind of consciousness, which he called autonoetic
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consciousness or simply autonoesis (see Tulving 1985a, 2005). Autonoesis, Tulving says,
“refers to the kind of conscious awareness that characterizes conscious recollection of per-
sonal happenings”; that is, it is what makes subjects “aware that the present experience is
related to the past experience in a way that no other kind of experience is” (Tulving 2005,
15).2
The definition of episodic memory as involving autonoesis is very important. Because
“[t]he act of remembering [...] is characterized by a distinctive, unique awareness of reex-
periencing here and now something that happened before, at another time and in another
place” (Tulving 1993, 68), remembering makes subjects “capable of mental time travel: [...]
[a] person can transport at will into the personal past, as well as into the future” (67, my
emphasis). So, besides being responsible for the unique feeling associated with episodic
memories, autonoesis gives subjects a more general capacity to “travel” in subjective time.
This is not difficult to motivate on phenomenological grounds. As Klein (2015) notes, there
is a “perceived temporal symmetry between movements toward (future) and away (past)
from the present” (21). To illustrate, imagine that you are thinking about your holidays at
the beach next year. Similarly to episodic memories, you have the feeling that the thought
is owned by you, in the sense that the holidays are yours and not someone’s else. However,
because the event is something that can happen, it is presented to you as being “future” to
your current thought. Thus, it looks like we can “relocate” ourselves to the future in the
same way that we can do it in relation to the past.
The capacity endowed to us by autonoesis to travel both to past subjective time and
to future subjective time consists in an important motivation to take episodic memory to
be just one form — among others — of mental time travel. Despite giving emphasis to
phenomenological considerations above, there are also good empirical reasons to endorse
2Although initially characterized in phenomenological terms, there is no agreement as to what autonoesis
is exactly. Some have argued, for instance, that autonoesis has an important epistemic value. For exam-
ple, Dokic (2001; 2014) holds that episodic memory carries a “feeling of knowing”, in the sense that it tells
subjects that it originates in their past experiences. Fernández (2016) defends a similar view, but he builds
autonoesis into the content of memory rather than in its phenomenology. Quite recently, Mahr and Csibra
(2018) have proposed a “communicative” account of the function of episodic memory, in which autonoesis is
viewed as being responsible for “[delineating] which of our claims about the past we can assert epistemic au-
thority”. Despite these important developments, I shall take for granted the more standard idea that autonoesis
is mainly a phenomenological feature of episodic memory.
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this view. In a recent survey, Perrin and Michaelian (2017) discuss similarities between
episodic memory and future mental time travel found in different domains. In developmen-
tal studies, for example, it has been shown that the children’s capacity to remember the past
and imagine the future arise at approximately the same time (Suddendorf and Busby 2005;
Atance 2008; Fivush 2011). In studies with patients with memory impairments, it has been
found that deficits in memory incur similar deficits in the ability to think about future sce-
narios (Klein et al. 2002; Rosenbaum et al. 2005; Hassabis et al. 2007). Moreover, imaging
studies also show that there is a strong overlap in the brain regions associated with episodic
memory and future mental time travel (Addis et al. 2007; Schacter et al. 2007, 2012).
I will not attempt to review the relevant literature here.3 I shall, instead, point to an
important development of the mental time travel view of memory. More recently, some
researchers have suggested that the primary function of mental time travel is not to allow
us to remember the past. Suddendorf and Corballis (1997), for example, argue that “[t]he
real importance of mental time travel applies to travel into the future rather than into the
past; that is, we predominantly stand in the present facing the future rather than looking
back at the past” (147). In a similar spirit, De Brigard (2014a) says that “remembering
is a particular operation of a cognitive system that permits the flexible recombination of
different components of encoded traces into representations of possible past events [...] in
the service of constructing mental simulations of possible future events” (158, my empha-
sis). And, more recently, Michaelian (2016c) says that “remembering is not different in
kind from other episodic constructive processes” (103), thus “[w]hat it is for a subject to
remember [...] is for him to imagine an episode belonging to his personal past” (111).
The idea that the primary function of mental time travel is not to remember the past,
but to imagine the future, has important consequences. One such consequence is that our
common sense conception of memory, according to which memory’s function is to store in-
formation of what happened, seems to be threatened. It is compatible with the mental time
travel view that our representations of the past be inaccurate as long as they are beneficial
for future actions. So, as De Brigard (2014a) notes, “many ordinary cases of misremem-
3For a detailed review concerned with philosophical questions, see Perrin and Michaelian (2017).
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bering should not be seen as instances of memory’s malfunction” (158, his emphasis). This
raises a further question, which is of particular interest to philosophers, about whether, and
if so, how, memory provides knowledge of the past. Because the primary function of re-
membering is not to recover information about the past, we need a proper account of how
knowledge can be formed on the basis of memory. Similarly, the mental time travel view
poses important questions pertaining to the relationship between memories and the past
events. The causal theory of memory, which has been predominant in philosophy for the
past four decades, stipulates that remembering requires the preservation of an appropriate
causal connection to past events. However, if memory is a form of mental time travel in
the same way that imagination is, and “if imagining need not draw on stored information
ultimately originating in experience of the relevant episode” (Michaelian 2016c, 111), there
is no principled reason to say that such requirement holds for memory.
In summary, the mental time travel view of memory raises a lot of important questions
for philosophers concerned with memory. In an attempt to motivate those problems, I will
consider, in the next section, some implications that the mental time travel view of memory
has to the philosophy of memory.
A.3 Mental time travel and the philosophy of memory
The mental time travel view of memory not only challenges important traditional concep-
tions about memory, but also offer prospects for future research on the subject. In this
section, I will consider some topics that are of potential interest to philosophers of mem-
ory concerning the mental time travel view of memory. However, because the interest of
philosophers on these topics is still very recent, there is not a lot of work dealing system-
atically with the questions that I discuss below. For this reason, rather than attempting to
survey the debate, I will try to motivate some problems of potential interest.
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A.3.1 The causal theory of memory
After the publication of Martin and Deutscher’s seminal paper “Remembering” (1966),
philosophers in the analytic tradition started to develop an increasing interest in philosophi-
cal questions pertaining to memory. Martin and Deutscher proposed what is now known as
the causal theory of memory (CTM). The CTM has been very influential and it still shapes,
to a large extent, how philosophers think about memory today.4 However, if correct, the
mental time travel view raises important concerns about the CTM.
The CTM provides us with a set of criteria to determine whether a given mental state
counts as remembering or not. For the CTM, a subject S counts as remembering an event e
iff:
1. S represented e in the past; (Past representation condition)
2. S has a current mental representation of e; (Current representation condition)
3. The content of the current mental representation of e is sufficiently similar to the
content of the past representation of e; (Content condition)
4. There is an appropriate causal connection between the current representation of e and
the past representation of e. (Causal connection condition)5
To clarify these points, consider my putative memory of my tenth birthday party. In order
for me to count as remembering this event, I need to have experienced it previously. That
is the past representation condition. Additionally, I need to be able to represent the same
event in the present. That is the current representation condition. But my past and current
representations can only be representations of the same event if their contents are suffi-
ciently similar (the content condition); for example, if the contents of both representations
contain members of my family and friends, a chocolate cake, etc.6 Finally, remembering
4For a recent and comprehensive assessment of the CTM in relation to recent developments in the philos-
ophy of memory, see Michaelian and Robins (2018).
5This discussion is adapted from Bernecker (2010, ch. 1). See also Bernecker (2015, 302).
6Martin and Deutscher (1966) conceive of this similarity in terms of a structural analogy holding between
the past representation and the current representation. They say that “the past experience must constitute a
structural analogue of the thing remembered, to the extent to which he can accurately represent the thing”
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requires that my current representation of my tenth birthday be caused, in an appropriate
way, by my past representation of the same event (the causal connection condition). The
requirement for such causal connection constitutes the main novelty of the CTM. Moreover,
since it is also the source of the problems that arise in the context of the mental time travel
view of memory, I will focus on it more closely.
The causal condition is supposed to rule out cases that, intuitively, we do not count
as remembering, but that are allowed by (1)–(3). To see this, consider the case of Kent
described by Martin and Deutscher (1966):
A man whom we shall call Kent is in a car accident and sees particular details
of it, because of his special position. Later on, Kent is involved in another
accident in which he gets a severe blow on the head as a result of which he
forgets a certain section of his own history, including the first accident. He can
no longer fulfill the first criterion for memory of the first accident. Some time
after this second accident, a popular and rather irresponsible hypnotist gives a
show. He hypnotizes a large number of people, and suggests to them that they
will believe that they had been in a car accident at a certain time and place. The
hypnotist has never heard a thing about Kent nor the details of Kent’s accident,
and it is by sheer coincidence that the time, place, and details which he provides
are just as they were in Kent’s first accident. Kent is one of the group which is
hypnotized. The suggestion works and [...] [Kent] believes firmly that he has
been in an accident. The accident as he believes it to be is just like the first one
in which he was really involved. (174)
Kent’s case satisfies (1) and (2) above, as he had a past representation of the car acci-
dent and has a current representation of the same event. Moreover, it satisfies (3) too, for
(191, my emphasis). It is not entirely clear, however, where the structural analogy is to be found. The most
natural interpretation seems to be that the content of the past representation must have the same kind of
structure as the content of the current representation, but they do not say anything as to what the structure
of those contents are supposed to be. Another issue is that it is not clear how much “structural analogy” is
required for S to count as remembering. While we do not want to require the content of the past representation
to be the same as the content of the current representation, it is hard to find a principled way to determine
how much similarity is required. For my purposes, I shall put these worries aside. For a related discussion,
see Michaelian (2011) and Michaelian (2016c, 90).
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Kent’s current representation is sufficiently similar to his past representation. Nevertheless,
it seems wrong to say that Kent is genuinely remembering. The reason is that his current
representation does not preserve the right kind of causal connection to his past representa-
tion. To use Martin and Deutscher’s (1966) term, the past representation is not “operative”
in producing the current representation. In Kent’s case, the operative cause, so to speak, is
the hypnotist. For the CTM, then, remembering is not only a matter of getting the details
of a past experience of an event right, but also of standing in an appropriate causal relation
to that experience.
Besides offering a way to rule out cases not contemplated by (1)–(3), the causal con-
nection condition has also been used to provide a taxonomy of memory. As it stands, the
CTM is an answer to the general question of what it takes for a subject to remember. How-
ever, there is more than one way in which one can successfully or unsuccessfully remember
something, which requires an account of those differences. For example, it is consistent
with remembering my tenth birthday party that I get some of its details wrong.7 I can cor-
rectly remember that my whole family was there and that the party took place at a certain
location, but I can simultaneously remember, incorrectly, that I had strawberry cake. In this
case, we can say that I am misremembering my tenth birthday party. Thus, Sarah Robins
(2016a) has recently argued that, given the constructive character of memory (see Bartlett
1932; Schacter et al. 2007, 2012; Michaelian 2011; De Brigard 2014a), we need to appeal
to a causal connection between past and current representations to distinguish remember-
ing from misremembering.8 In a similar spirit, Bernecker (2017) has suggested that one can
only distinguish successful remembering from confabulations (see Hirstein 2005) if one re-
quires that the former, but not the latter, preserves a causal connection to past experiences
(see also Robins 2016a, 2017a). The causal connection, therefore, is not only important to
provide an adequate analysis of remembering, but also of the different kinds of successful
and unsuccessful remembering.
The mental time travel of view of memory challenges the central status given to the
7Although, again, how much inaccuracy is consistent with remembering is not entirely clear. See
Michaelian (2011) and note 6.
8See Michaelian (2016b) for a critique of Robins’s proposal and an attempt to provide a taxonomy of
memory that abandons the causal connection altogether.
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causal connection condition in a theory of memory. As I discussed above, on the mental
time travel view, the primary function of memory is not to remember the past (see Sud-
dendorf and Corballis 1997; De Brigard 2014a; Michaelian 2016c). But, if that is the case,
then it is hard to see why we should endorse the CTM. There are multiple reasons to think
this. One reason is that, as Michaelian (2016c, 111) notes, because other forms of mental
time travel need not have such causal connection to past experiences, there is no principled
way to require it in the case of memory. This does not mean, of course, that there cannot be
such connection, but only that it is not necessary.
Another reason is that, from the perspective of the mental time travel view, straightfor-
ward occurrences of remembering would be ruled out by the CTM. The causal connection
allows us to preserve the intuition that, in cases such as Kent’s, subjects do not count as re-
membering. However, intuitively we do not seem to require that all occurrences of remem-
bering preserve an appropriate causal connection to past events. Consider the following
case. Imagine that I experienced my tenth birthday party in the past and that I now have a
putative memory of it. I remember my friends and family being there and I remember hav-
ing chocolate cake. However, suppose that my current representation is not being caused
by my previous representation of my tenth birthday party, but rather by two different expe-
riences that involved the relevant elements of my current representation. In this case, the
content of my current representation is partly derived from, say, my experience of my ninth
birthday party, which was attended by the same individuals, and partly derived from my
experience of another party that I attended, where there was a chocolate cake. In this case,
there is no causal connection of the sort required by the CTM, but it seems too stringent to
say that the subject is not remembering the relevant event only because the content of his
current representation is not derived from the content of the original experience.9
A third reason why the mental time travel view challenges the CTM is that the latter
is incompatible with the constructive character of mental time travel. Because mental time
9One might argue here that, intuitively, the case above does not count as a straightforward occurrence
of remembering rightly because there is no causal connection. I do not mean to dispute people’s intuitions
about this and other similar cases, but, as long as we want our intuitions to be compatible with what empirical
research tells us about memory, this seems the most plausible way to describe them. In other words, given
the constructive character of memory (see, e.g., Bartlett 1932; Schacter et al. 2007, 2012; Michaelian 2011;
De Brigard 2014a), it is not unlikely that cases as the one described above can happen.
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travel is in the service of simulating events to assist subjects in future interactions with the
environment, it seems too restrictive to require that our representations of the past have to
draw content from only one singular source. For example, in thinking about how I should
act in my job interview next week, my current representation of the past will benefit more
from drawing on different past experiences of job interviews than drawing on only one
singular experience.10
In sum, the CTM has occupied a central position in philosophical theorizing about mem-
ory for the past fifty years. Besides providing an analysis of remembering that accounts for
a wide range of cases, it provides a useful principle to conceive of a taxonomy of remem-
bering. However, if the mental time travel view of memory is right, the centrality of the
CTM might not be warranted.
A.3.2 Mental time travel and our knowledge of the past
One direct consequence of abandoning the causal condition can be seen in the epistemology
of memory. Because the causal condition is no longer necessary to remember, there is no
guarantee that the content of our current representations derive from the content of our
past representations. That being the case, the question that poses itself is whether, and if
so, how, we can form knowledge of what happened in the past on the basis of our current
representations. Is mental time travel capable of providing such knowledge? Before I turn
to this question, it is important to distinguish between two senses in which it can be asked.
On the one hand, we can ask the pragmatic question of whether memory provides us with
information that, in practical contexts, allows for useful inferences about how things were in
the past. Call this the pragmatic epistemic question. On the other hand, we can ask whether
memory actually provides knowledge of the past, in the sense that it serves as grounds for
our justified beliefs about it. Call this the strict epistemic question.
This distinction is important because a positive answer to the pragmatic epistemic ques-
tion does not necessarily give us a positive answer to the strict epistemic question. It might
be the case that the content of my memory of my tenth birthday party is the same or very
10See, however, Sutton (1998) and Michaelian (2011) for different attempts to provide a causal view com-
patible with the constructive character of memory. For a related discussion, see Robins (2016b; 2016a).
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similar to the content of the memories that other people have of this event, such that I can
make useful inferences about the event in relevant contexts, but it does not follow from
this that my memory allows me to know anything about this event. An answer to the strict
epistemic question, in contrast, requires identifying what makes it possible that our current
memories serve as grounds for our justified beliefs about the past.
The causal condition provides an answer to the strict epistemic question. Because the
content of my current representation of an event is caused by my past representation of it,
the causal connection makes it possible for memory to ground our knowledge of the past.
Otherwise put, the beliefs that we form on the basis of memory are justified because there
is an appropriate causal connection between memories and past events. However, if, as the
mental time travel view suggests, this condition is not necessary for remembering, how can
we explain the relationship between the content of our past and current representations?
It is not entirely clear what the alternative for defenders of the mental time travel view
are here. In fact, because he is the most systematic critic of the causal condition, Michaelian
(2016c) has been the only one so far to provide an explicit treatment of the question. His
approach consists in adopting a broad reliabilist framework in epistemology, according to
which “the epistemic status of a belief is determined by the reliability of the process that
produced it” (Michaelian 2016c, 39, see also Goldman 2012). Roughly, the idea is that one
is justified in holding a certain belief if that belief was produced by a reliable process. On
Michaelian’s proposal, then, we can explain why memory serves as grounds for forming
knowledge of the past in terms of the reliability of its underlying processes. This solution,
however, will not be appealing if one is not already inclined to a form of reliabilism. The
reason is that, as Michaelian (2016c, 40) recognizes, it takes reliabilism as a starting point
and then proceeds to explain how memory is reliable. However, if one is skeptical of the
idea that reliability itself can provide an account of epistemic justification, an account of
how memory is reliable will not suffice to address the strict epistemic question.
The question of whether reliabilism is a good account of epistemic justification is be-
yond my scope here. However, given the question at hand about how memory can form
knowledge about the past, it might be useful to explore other alternatives. One possible
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approach might be to adopt an eternalist view of events (e.g., Bernecker 2008). Accord-
ing to eternalism, past events do not cease to exist when they become past. Eternalism is
promising because it allows one to say that past events are constitutive parts of memories.
To see this, consider an analogy with perception. Relationalists about perception claim that
mid-sized objects are constitutive parts of perception, in the sense that I could not have a
visual experience of the chair in my office if this object were not there (see, e.g., Campbell
2002; Martin 2004; Brewer 2007; Fish 2009). An important motivation for acknowledging
the constitutive role played by objects in perception is that it allows one to explain how
they ground our knowledge of the world (see Schellenberg 2016 for a recent discussion).
Similarly, it might be argued, acknowledging the constitutive role played by past events in
memories allows one to explain how they ground our knowledge of the past (see Sant’Anna
2018a; Chapter 5).11
Eternalism faces important problems. It is not obvious, for example, how our memories
can be constituted by events located in a different spatiotemporal location. While it makes
room, at least in principle, for that relation to take place by recognizing the existence of past
events, an account of how they relate to our current mental representations is still required.
The problem is that it is hard to see how such an account would look like. Another problem
for eternalism is that it requires us to pay a high metaphysical price to account for how
remembering grounds our knowledge of the past. Because we are required to postulate the
existence of past events, some might view this solution with skepticism (e.g., Michaelian
2016c, 63).
Another alternative, which I shall call the pragmatist solution, is to deny that the prag-
matic epistemic question is different from the strict epistemic question. On such view,
having knowledge about the past is simply a matter of making useful inferences about how
things were back then. Whether or not we have knowledge of the past, the pragmatist will
say, depends on how our memories can inform our future behavior. If memories allow for
11Debus (2008) makes the exact same point when she claims that “the Relational Account [of memory]
must be true if we accept (as we should) that people can sometimes gain knowledge about the past on the
basis of their [memories]” (406–7). However, her account of memory requires postulating a fundamental
separation between memory and other forms of mental time travel view, which makes her view unpromising
here (see Debus 2014 and section A.3.4).
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behaviors that lead to coordinated action with other individuals in relevant settings, such as
discussing who attended your birthday party, or more primitively, discussing where food
can be found, then that is all that is required to say that we have knowledge of the past. The
pragmatist will deny, therefore, that there needs to be, necessarily, a causal connection to
past representations, as long as the current representations allow for useful inferences about
the past.
The pragmatist solution also faces important problems. The first problem is similar to
the one raised above to reliabilism. In other words, it will only look appealing for those who
are already inclined to a pragmatist view in epistemology. The second problem is that the
pragmatist solution seems arbitrary, in the sense that it seems to imply that our knowledge
of the past depends on what certain individuals “agree” to be the case. However, it is not
clear who the relevant individuals are in each situation, or even if there is a principled
way to identify them. Moreover, the focus on usefulness might lead to counterintuitive
results, for a memory might be useful to guide the current behavior of different individuals
without being true of the past. In other words, it is completely plausible that subjects might
misremember some or all details of an event in a similar way, such that their memory reports
agree with each other, but nonetheless fail to effectively describe what happened.
To conclude this part, it seems that an account of how we form knowledge of the past
according to the mental time travel view might require some controversial commitments.
While these commitments might take place at different domains — e.g., in metaphysics, as
in the eternalist solution, or in epistemology, as in the reliabilist and the pragmatist solutions
— a convincing answer to this question will inevitably require a proper motivation of those
commitments.
A.3.3 The objects of mental time travel
The mental time travel view of memory also raises important questions about the objects
of mental time travel. If memory is only one form of mental time travel, then an account of
the objects of memory will inevitably depend on a more general account of the objects of
mental time travel. Traditionally, philosophers have addressed the question of the objects of
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memory in quite some detail. Inspired by Hume (2011) and Locke (1975), representational
or indirect realist views hold that the objects of memory are internal representations of
events (see, e.g., Russell 1921; Byrne 2010). Relational or direct realist views, in contrast,
say that the objects of memory are the past events themselves (see, e.g., Reid 2000; Laird
1920; Russell 1912; Debus 2008). Given this framework, one natural suggestion here to
address the question of the objects of mental time travel would be to take one’s preferred
account of the objects of memory and apply it to mental time travel. However, this seems
to get things backwards. On the mental time travel view of memory, the mental time travel
category is more basic than the category of memory, so we first need an account of the
objects of mental time travel, which will only then inform our account of the objects of
memory.
The question of the objects of mental time travel has not been addressed in the literature
so far. So, there are no established views about it. However, this should not prevent us
from thinking about what an answer to the question might look like. One way to start
addressing it is to distinguish between different forms of mental time travel. Although this
is not always made explicit in discussions on the subject, there is more than one way in
which mental time travel into the past and into the future can happen. Besides episodic
memory, which refers to mental time travel to past events that occurred, and episodic future
thinking, which refers to mental time travel to events that might occur, we also think about
counterfactual events located in subjective time (see De Brigard 2014a). For example, I can
think about how my life would be right now if I had not gone to college. In this case, I am
thinking about an event that could have happened in the past, and that would influence the
present, but that is no longer possible. Similarly, I can think about how my life will be in
ten years if I had not gone to college. In this case, I am thinking about an event that would
be the case in the future if some other event in my past had been different. In both cases,
then, I am entertaining thoughts about counterfactual situations oriented to the past and to
the future.
The above suggests that an account of the objects of mental time travel needs to take into
account not only episodic memory and episodic future thinking, but also forms of episodic
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counterfactual thought (see De Brigard 2014a) directed to the past and to the future. This
makes the initial question significantly harder, for now we have to explain how things that
can no longer be the case can somehow be the objects of our thoughts. One promising line
of investigation might be to appeal to the notion of intentional objects. Intentional objects,
as originally introduced by Brentano (1973), are non-existent objects which are the direct
objects of awareness of the mind. Although this is a promising line, no one has pursued it
systematically as of yet.12
Another alternative might be to look at the traditional accounts of the objects of memory
as starting points. While relational views have been defended more consistently in the con-
text of memory, they do not seem to offer promising prospects for a more general account
of the objects of mental time travel. The reason is that the objects of mental time travel,
except for arguably the objects of memory, do not exist, which makes it impossible for us to
be related to them. So, unless one is willing to commit to more controversial metaphysical
views, such as the view that there are intentional objects (e.g., Crane 2001, 2013) or some
form of modal realism (Lewis 1986), it is not clear whether relational views can be coher-
ently sustained. In contrast, representational views might be more promising. Because the
objects that are represented by mental time travel need not exist to be represented, there is
no need to worry about the metaphysical status of those events. What is relevant to explain
how we are aware of the relevant events are the existence of the representations, which
would serve as proxies for the events. It is not clear, however, what the problems for a
representational account of the objects of mental time travel would be. Since this question
has not been explored in enough detail, it remains to be seen whether representationalism
can stand up to a more detailed analysis.
A.3.4 The metaphysics of mental time travel
The consideration of the questions above finally leaves us in a position to consider a more
general question about the metaphysics of mental time travel. As we saw, the mental time
travel view of memory raises a lot of different issues regarding the epistemology and the
12See, however, Crane (2001; 2013) for potentially helpful discussions about intentional objects in philos-
ophy of mind.
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metaphysics of memory. But how pressing those questions are will depend on how one
sees the category of memory in relation to the broader category of mental time travel. Until
now, I have taken for granted that there are good reasons to accept that memory is just
another occurrence of mental time travel. However, some philosophers have resisted this
view. Debus (2014), for example, argues that memory and future future-oriented mental
time travel — or what she calls sensory imagination — are occurrences of different kinds
because there are important metaphysical dissimilarities between them.
The debate about the metaphysics of mental time travel is still very recent and, as with
some of the other questions above, there are not well-established views in the literature.
Despite this fact, I will follow Perrin and Michaelian (2017) here and distinguish between
continuist and discontinuist metaphysical views of mental time travel. Continuists accept
that the similarities between memory and other forms of mental time travel support the
more general view that they are occurrences of the same kind. Discontinuists, in contrast,
say that those similarities are not enough to say that memory and other forms of mental
time travel are occurrences of the same kind.
Reasons for endorsing continuism vary. The general motivation, though, seems to stem
from different strands of research in the empirical sciences. As I discussed in section A.2,
there is a great variety of empirical work that highlight important similarities between
episodic memory and mental time travel. Perhaps the most distinctive motivation comes
from the fact that mental time travel into the past and mental time travel into the future
draw on very similar cognitive resources, which suggests that a common or “core” cog-
nitive mechanism responsible for mental time travel will be eventually identified (Addis
et al. 2007; Schacter et al. 2007, 2012). In more philosophical terms, then, we can see
continuism as relying on a more naturalistic stance towards the question of the relationship
between episodic memory and mental time travel. In other words, for continuists views,
because there is a lot of different empirical evidence suggesting that episodic memory is
just another occurrence of mental time travel, we should take this evidence seriously when
thinking about the metaphysics of mental time travel.
Discontinuist views, in contrast, seem to be motivated by more general a priori con-
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siderations about the metaphysics of mental time travel. This is not to say, of course, that
discontinuists simply ignore the empirical evidence on which continuism relies.13 Instead,
they believe that other considerations, such as whether mental time travel establishes an
appropriate causal connection to the events in question, are also important to provide an
appropriate picture of the metaphysics of mental time travel. Debus (2014), for exam-
ple, argues that episodic memory and other forms of mental time travel are occurrences of
two fundamentally distinct kinds.14 To support this claim, she says that, unlike episodic
memory, other forms of mental time travel fail to put subjects in an experiential relation-
ship with the relevant events. The notion of an experiential relationship is a technical one,
which refers to the causal and spatiotemporal relationship that subjects have to the events
that their thoughts are about. In episodic memory, this relationship obtains because the rel-
evant events occurred and we can, at least potentially, draw the causal connection between
the current memory and the past event. In other forms of mental time travel, in contrast, the
relationship does not obtain because the relevant events do not exist.
Besides reflecting different metaphilosophical attitudes towards the same question, the
dispute between continuism and discontinuism reflect different commitments taken in re-
lation to the questions discussed in previous sections. Consider the question of whether
episodic memory requires an appropriate causal connection to past events. While con-
tinuism is compatible with the CTM, it does not give the causal connection condition a
central place in its metaphysical theorizing of mental time travel. For continuism, the pres-
ence (or the absence of) a causal connection reflects, at best, only a difference of degree
between episodic memory and other occurrences of mental time travel. For discontinuists,
however, this question is central for the metaphysics of mental time travel. The presence
(or the absence of) a causal connection is sufficient to separate two mental occurrences as
being of two different kinds.
The same applies to the question of our knowledge of the past and the objects of mental
13See, for example, Perrin (2016) for a more modest discontinuist view that takes into account the similar-
ities highlighted by empirical research.
14Debus discusses only the relationship between episodic memory and future-oriented thinking, or sensory
imagination as she calls it. However, since her argument seems to suggest that other forms of mental time
travel are equally distinct from episodic memory, I shall not make this distinction here.
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time travel. For continuists, like Michaelian (2016c), a proper account of how episodic
memory provides us with knowledge of the past can be given by looking at the reliability
of the mechanisms that produce memories, which, in turn, do not require causal connec-
tions to the past. Thus, the things that make us aware of the past events are the internal
representations, which are detachable from those events. In this sense, continuists might
be more inclined to adopt a representational view of the objects of mental time travel. For
discontinuists, in contrast, episodic memory is capable of providing subjects with knowl-
edge in a way that other forms of mental time travel cannot. This is because it puts us in a
relationship to past events, which necessarily involves a causal connection to them, that is
not possible by means of other forms of mental time travel. Thus, discontinuists might not
be satisfied with a representational view of the objects of mental time travel, as represen-
tations of events can occur in the absence of causal connections to the relevant events. A
direct realist or relational view of memory (see Debus 2008) will, therefore, seem more ap-
pealing for discontinuists, which Debus (2014) recognizes to be central to her discontinuist
account.
A.4 Conclusion
The view that memory is a form of mental time travel offers exciting prospects for new re-
search in the emerging sub-field of the philosophy of memory. Traditional views of mem-
ory, such as the causal theory of memory, and traditional questions about memory, such
as how it provides knowledge of the past and what is the nature of its objects, need to be
reconsidered in the broader framework of mental time travel. These questions, however,
are inter-related with more general and new questions that arise only in the context of the
research on mental time travel, i.e., what the objects of mental time travel are and what
is the metaphysical status of those mental states. Thus, the intersection of the philosophy
of memory and research on mental time travel not only provides new perspectives to think
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